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Recent racially charged events have brought renewed focus on racial 
tensions in the United States, effectively ending the myth of a postracial society.  
Moreover, the recalcitrance of race-relevant social problems suggests that 
current methods of addressing those problems are inadequate, or at least 
incomplete.  Such is the case with the received view, social constructivism, 
according to which race results from historically and culturally specific practices 
and decision.  New psychological research challenges the received view, 
suggesting that racial cognition results in part from psychological mechanisms 
that operate outside of the conscious awareness of human agents.  This body of 
research has led to interactionist, complementarian constructivist models of race.  
Ron Mallon and Dan Kelly’s position, “hybrid constructionism,” advances the 
claim that “racial social roles are psychologically constrained.”  My position, the 
psychological construction of race, is committed to something more specific—
that opaque psychological mechanisms are foundational to social construction, 
that is, that the individual psychology constructs the subsequent social 
constructions.  In short, if hybrid constructionism is “constraint-ist,” 
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To many, the election of Barack Obama, the first Black President of the 
United States, signaled the transition to a “postracial America.”  A National Public 
Radio broadcast considered the prospect of “A New, Postracial Political Era in 
America” (Siegel, 2008).  The L.A. Times was more tempered, alluding only to 
“Obama’s postracial promise” (Steele, 2008).  A bit later, academics joined the 
fray.  In “Reality or Rhetoric? Barack Obama and Postracial America,” Bettina 
Love and Brandelyn Tosolt report that “Dominant discourse holds that Obama’s 
election proved the end of racism,” but argue that “an alternate view is 
possible...that Obama’s election reveals less about the end of racism and more 
about the public’s view of racism as a changing construct” (Love & Tosolt, 2010, 
p. 19).The strongest claim came from John McWhorter, a Columbia University 
linguistic professor, who wrote in Forbes that “in answer to the question, ‘Is 
America past racism against Black people,’ I say the answer is yes” (McWhorter, 
2008, n.p.).  He continued by conceding that “nothing magically changed when 
Obama was declared president-elect,” but then opined that 
our proper concern is not whether racism still exists, but whether it 
remains a serious problem.  The election of Obama proved, as 
nothing else could have, that it no longer does...increasingly, 
alleged cases of racism are tough calls, reflecting the complexity of 
human affairs rather than the stark injustice of Jim Crow...So, if I 
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have to give a single answer, it is, yes, we can call ourselves a 
postracial country. (McWhorter, 2008, n.p.) 
 
Despite McWhorter’s confidence, the following year, Michael C. Dawson and 
Lawrence Bobo published a paper under the grimmer sounding title, “One Year 
Later and the Myth of a Postracial Society” (Dawson & Bobo, 2009, p. 247).  
Finally, writing for politico.com, Roger Simon asks “What happened to postracial 
America?” and answers that it “Didn’t last very long” (Simon, 2009, n.p.).  
Now, more than 6 years later and nearing the end of President Obama’s 
second term, the claim of postracialism is hard to fathom.  The last year and a 
half alone has seen a spate of high-profile, controversial cases of White police 
officers killing unarmed Black men, which led to emotionally-charged public 
protests.  In July 2014, Eric Garner died after officers wrestled him to the ground 
while attempting to arrest him for selling cigarettes illegally.  His final words, “I 
can’t breathe,” became rallying cry for civil rights activists and socially conscious 
professional athletes, among others (Newman, 2014, n.p.).  In November 2014, 
police shot and killed 12-year-old Tamir Rice, who was playing with a fake pistol 
outside of a recreation center (Fitzsimmons, 2014).  In perhaps the most famous 
case, police shot and killed unarmed Black teenager Mike Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri, setting off a series of protests in August 2014 that resulted in 
confrontations with police, dozens of arrests, and a scathing U.S. Justice 
Department review of the Ferguson Police Department (Fitzsimmons, 2014).   
In addition to these and other high-profile police shootings of unarmed 
Black men, a chapter of a prominent fraternity was banished from a major 
university after a video showed members engaged in a racist chant (The 
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Associated Press, 2015).  And, in June 2015, a 21-year-old White man entered a 
predominantly Black church in South Carolina, sat through a prayer meeting for 
nearly an hour, and then opened fire, killing nine church members (Workman & 
Kannapell, 2015).  Not long after his arrest, The New York Times reported that 
the man had ties to a White supremacist organization (Schmidt 2015).  In 
response, President Obama, who (through no fault of his own) had been 
characterized as the very symbol of postracialism in the United States, 
acknowledged that racism remains “deeply embedded in the United States as a 
‘part of our DNA’” (Shear, 2015, n.p.).  In sum, after President Obama’s election, 
“the term ‘postracial’ was everywhere” (Holmes, 2015, n.p.).  And today? “Well, it 
has mostly disappeared from the conversation, except as sarcastic shorthand” 
(Holmes 2015, n.p.).  An interesting question, then, is whether the claim of 
postracialism was justified even back in the bad old days of 2008? 
My answer is, no, and not just because of the way things turned out.  To 
explain my answer, I want to further examine this claim that President Obama’s 
election signaled the advent of postracial America.  In fact, at the risk of 
appearing facile, I want to start by taking a look at the proposition itself:  
“Barack Obama is the first Black President of the United States.” 
Of course, the proposition expresses a very interesting historical fact, but that’s 
not my focus here.  I think that the proposition is philosophically fascinating, a 
fact obscured by its socio-historical importance and a syntactic simplicity that 
obscures a trove of philosophical questions and commitments.  So, let’s ignore 
the historical significance for a while, and ask a maddeningly philosophical 
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question instead. What would make that proposition true?   
Well, Barack Obama would have to be the POTUS, of course, which 
would require that he be a natural born U.S. citizen, that he be at least 35 years 
old, and that he receive at least 270 Electoral College votes.  Those bases are 
covered, so Mr. Obama is President.  Furthermore, there were no Black U.S. 
Presidents prior to Mr. Obama, so if he is Black, he is the first Black POTUS.  
But, is he?  Is Barack Obama Black?  And, if so, what conditions make him 
Black? 
To be clear, with the first question, I do not aim to question Mr. Obama’s 
“Black-ness” in terms of its authenticity or sufficiency, in the sense that one might 
question whether he is “Black enough” (Coats, 2007, n.p.).  Rather, the second 
question captures what I am getting at—that Mr. Obama is Black is apparently 
uncontroversial, so what makes it uncontroversial?  So, to my mind, the most 
philosophically interesting fact is not that Mr. Obama became the first Black 
President of the United States, but just that he is Black.  What would it take for 
him to be White? 
Mr. Obama has one Black parent (his father, who was Kenyan) and one 
White parent (his mother, who is from Kansas).  He was reared primarily by his 
mother’s (White) family, and even many of his life experiences are more closely 
associated with White, rather than Black culture.  He earned two Ivy League 
degrees, for example, and became President of the United States.  So, again, by 
what criteria is Mr. Obama Black?  One thing is certain, McWhorter can’t be right 
if a “mixed-race” man can become the first Black president.  Putting it that way, in 
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fact, renders the claim of postracialism absurd.  If this question seems trivial, 
consider that, shortly after the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, a controversy 
arose over the question whether the surviving perpetrator is White.  An informal 
New York Times study found “substantial ambiguity about whether the Tsarnaev 
brothers were White” (Kteily & Cotterill, 2015, n.p.).  Furthermore, the study 
suggests, that “Whiteness perception had the potential to play an important role 
in the outcome of Mr. Tsarnaev’s trial.  The lower that individuals rated Mr. 
Tsarnaev as looking White, the more willing they were to punish him severely” 
(Kteily & Cotterill, 2015, n.p.).  
When considering difficult cases such as these, one is tempted to begin 
with biology, and as I show later, the biological answer was the answer for 
people living in the European and American colonial period.  Beginning with 
Francis Bernier’s New Divisions of Earth by the different species or races which 
inhabit it, the 18th- and 19th-century view of race was dominated by the idea that 
human races constituted primordial, natural, discrete biological units tied to 
continent of ancestry.  The certainty of those claims likely strikes the modern 
reader as scientifically and socially naïve, but connections between biology and 
race are deeply ingrained–evidence suggests that even young children tend to 
reason that, whatever else is true about race, any person’s racial designation is 
the same as his or her biological parents’ designation.  This colonial era 
biological explanation of race is clearly inadequate, however.  One reason 
among many is that scientific rigor led scholars away from the view of 
discreteness in biological taxa, let alone racial division, which is recognized as 
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too fluid to count even as a subspecies.1 
Predictably, the response to the failure of the biological-anthropological 
reductive approach to race was excessively opposite.  In biology’s stead, social 
constructivist models came to dominate racial discourse.  Social constructivist 
accounts of various stripes suggest race is best understood as the result of 
historical traditions and intentional individual and collective cultural choices.  
Today, the social project, just like its biological predecessor, faces challenges on 
several fronts.  
The most serious threat comes from Ron Mallon and like-minded 
philosophers who promote an “evolutionary-cognitive approach” to race that 
takes account of the contributions of innate psychological mechanisms to racial 
cognition.  Mallon’s position, which is detailed throughout the dissertation, is that 
the essentialist thinking that informs racial cognition results from an innate 
psychological mechanism that is characteristic of the human species and 
“specialized for solving” a relatively narrow range of problems. At minimum, 
Mallon’s view suggests that to the extent that innate psychology and implicit bias 
contribute to racial cognition, historical and cultural factors cannot complete the 
story about race.   
Ironically, another threat to social constructivist explanations originates in 
contemporary biology.  While geneticists, populationists, and biologists remain 
committed to the denial of the discrete human groupings of the 18th- and 19th-
                                                          
1 I will discuss and assess these various positions in great detail below, so extensive 
citations will be provided at that point.  For introductory purposes, I’m only introducing the general 
ideas to be engaged later.  The citations I have provided are from media articles whose authors 
do not reappear in the main body of the dissertation. 
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century “biologization” of race, they also recognize statistical, probabilistic, 
contingent connections between race and biology.  Former director of the Human 
Genome Project Francis Collins, for example, argues that race and ethnicity have 
some “biological connection.”  Several intuitive concerns lead to doubt over the 
completeness of social constructivism, as well.  One might wonder why different 
models of racial categorization exhibit stable, cross-cultural patterns.  One might 
wonder why proposed solutions to racism have seen limited success, if race is 
contingent merely on historical and social convention.  
As I will show, some of the causes of the racially charged events 
described above are seated deeply in human nature.  Moreover, the 
phenomenon of race has a broad reach, affecting a large number of important 
social contexts, including biomedicine, criminal justice, and education.  Several 
years before Mr. Obama’s historic achievement, for example, the Food and Drug 
Administration “took a controversial step...approving the first drug ever intended 
for one racial group” (Saul, 2005, n.p.): A study of 1,050 African-American heart 
failure patients showed that BiDil, a combination of two previously available 
generic drugs, “reduced deaths by 43%” (Saul, 2005, n.p.).  Of course, one might 
wonder how the advents of the era of race-based medicine and the postracial era 
could coincide. 
  In my view, the claim of postracialism was never viable, even given only 
the evidence available in 2008.  More importantly, I don’t think any current 
explanation of race and racial phenomena sufficiently accommodates these sorts 
of complicated cases.   Even new, more sophisticated, nonessentialist attempts 
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to explain race biologically fall short, though they remain relevant.  And, social 
constructivism, as I will show, supplies only part of the solution; taken alone, it is 
incomplete.  Because of the incompleteness of traditional explanations, I attempt 
to combine insights from social constructivism and biology to form an 
interactionist model of race.  In order to provide a medium for such interaction, I 
appeal to research on innate psychology and implicit bias to argue that race is 
psychologically constructed.  I proceed as follows. 
In the second chapter, I motivate the dissertation with a discussion of a 
series of related problems revolving around what Lisa Gannett (2010)  calls a 
“dichotomous framing of alternatives,” according to which race is either biological 
or social with no allowance for a middle ground.  Among other things, Gannett 
calls for an account of race appropriate to contexts in which social and biological 
factors interact. BiDil, of course, provides an illustrative example.  In the third 
chapter, I use a series of papers by Mallon to argue that one traditional approach 
to conceptual problems, the semantic strategy, fails to meet our philosophical 
needs for addressing race.  I then introduce Mallon’s alternate strategy, which is 
based in the evolutionary-cognitive program.  Chapter 4 serves to elaborate that 
program, and Chapter 5 centers on a related psychological research program, 
implicit bias.  Collectively, I refer to these two programs of research as “opaque 
psychology” because the key point for the dissertation is that both innate 
psychological mechanisms and implicit bias work outside of the conscious 
awareness and control of the agent.  Finally, in Chapter 6, I use those 
considerations of the relationship between psychology and racial cognition to 
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argue that the conception of race as socially constructed should be 
supplemented by the conception of race as psychologically constructed.  
In particular, I locate the psychological construction of race (PCR) within a 
family of related attempts to combine crucial insights from social constructivism 
and research on opaque psychology.  Within that family, Mallon and Dan Kelly 
lay out a position called “hybrid constructionism,” arguing that opaque 
psychology “constrains” social phenomena associated with race.  PCR is 
committed to a more specific claim—that opaque psychology is fundamental to 
the social constructions, that is, that it provides a foundation on which social 
constructions are built.  If Mallon and Kelly’s hybrid constructionism is “constraint-
ist,” PCR is purely constructivist.  Moreover, PCR is fashioned not as a definition 
of race, but as a framework on which context-dependent uses of race can be 
constructed to address pressing practical concerns.  Before getting there, 












THE DICHOTOMIZATION OF RACE: 
 





In a provocative 2010 paper, Gannett details a set of closely related 
problems for contemporary race scholarship.  Each results from a traditional but, 
in this context, misguided metaphysical commitment that fosters a 
dichotomization of race concepts, according to which race is either a biological 
reality or a social construct (Gannett, 2010).  Gannett argues that the dubious 
metaphysical assumptions that underwrite the race dichotomy “foreclose” the 
asking of certain questions, many of which are among the most socially and 
politically important.  While her focus is race in biomedical contexts, Gannett’s 
perspicuous analysis of the dichotomy and its consequences reveals a broader 
type of conceptual problem endemic throughout a host of racially relevant 
contexts.   
The problem runs deep—at stake are issues such as what, if anything, 
race is and what to do with ‘race’2 talk in biomedical and other crucial contexts.  
                                                          
2 In almost all instances I use single quotes, as I have here, to signify the concept and 
double quotes to signify the word that represents the concept.  So, the word “race” might be said 
to represent the concept ‘race’.  Some authors italicize words to signify the concept, so Glasgow 




Given the importance of those sorts of questions, Gannett urges philosophers of 
science to work beyond the traditional question of whether race is “really real” 
and instead take a context-sensitive, pragmatic approach that focuses on its 
contingent, dynamic, and statistical nature (Gannett, 2010).  A primary aim of this 
dissertation is to provide a vehicle for the strategic shift Gannett invites, so I now 
turn to the details of Gannett’s paper, proceeding as follows. 
I begin with the cornerstone of Gannett’s concerns, the tendency among 
philosophers of science to take one-or-another “natural kinds” approach to 
theorizing about race, the restrictive parameters of which dichotomizes race 
concepts into apparently mutually exclusive biological and social causal realms. I 
then turn to the dichotomy itself, offering several examples of scholars whose 
arguments foster it.  Finally, I discuss some of the most pernicious consequences 
of race dichotomization and conclude with a summary of what philosophical 
projects might be motivated by Gannett’s concern.   
 
2.2 The Natural Kinds Approach: Is Race “Really Real”? 
For much of its history, scholars and layfolk alike commonly associated 
race with the biological conjectures of the European and American colonial 
period.  After defeat of the Nazi regime near the end of World War II, however, 
the predominant paradigm of race shifted to social and cultural explanations.  As 
sociologist Howard Winant notes,  
At the beginning of the 20th century, a nearly comprehensive view 
of the race concept still located it at the biological level.  On this 
account, races were ‘natural’: their characteristics were essential 
and given, immutable…[but] significant shifts in the early 20th 
century…motivated the gradual but inexorable development of a 
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more sophisticated social scientific approach to race. (Winant, 
2000, p. 172)  
 
Completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP), however, “provoked 
questions, both inside and outside the academy, about the status of race as a 
category of classification in biomedicine and as a biological phenomenon at the 
level of the genome” (Gannett, 2010, p. 364).  Former head of the HGP and 
current National Institutes of Health director Francis Collins, for example, argues 
that “it is not strictly true that race or ethnicity has no biological connection” 
(Collins, 2004, p. S13). Moreover, successful incorporation of “population 
genetics approaches in relevant fields like DNA forensics and pharmaceuticals 
are taken as evidence for race’s validity as a category of classification in 
biomedicine and reality as a biological phenomenon at the level of the genome” 
(Gannett, 2010, p. 364).   
Among the most prominent outcomes of these approaches is the 
controversial drug BiDil, the first medication approved by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration to target a condition in a particular race, namely, heart disease in 
African Americans. Evidence shows that BiDil is significantly effective in African 
Americans but not in other racial or ethnic groups; in fact, the “trial was 
terminated early because there was 43% relative mortality benefit” in African 
Americans (Taylor, et al., 2004, p. 2415).   The drug’s approval remains 
controversial, however, as opponents point to its potential to reify race at the 
biological level and to the commercial motivations for its production, among other 
things.  
Given the potential reach of a case like BiDil, Gannett considers how 
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philosophers of science can best contribute to race scholarship in light of 
renewed interest in the relationships between race and biology. She challenges 
the widespread tendency of philosophers of science to “take a metaphysical 
approach relying on theories of natural kinds” in debates about race’s biological 
and biomedical significance (Gannett, 2010, p. 365).  The questions about race 
on this line are familiar ones—Does race “cut nature at its joints”? Is race a real 
biological natural kind or merely a social construct?  Gannett recognizes the 
intuitive appeal of this approach but raises several concerns about its utility, and, 
along the way, she undermines race’s candidacy as natural kind, ultimately 
prodding philosophers to eschew “the metaphysical pursuit of the ‘really real’…to 
forego the ‘really real’ for the ‘real’” (p. 365).  This crucial claim demands 
elaboration. 
Gannett (2010) introduces the distinction between the real and the “really 
real” early in the paper, citing David Hull’s view on the goal of systematics with 
regard to species: “systematists find species as the things that evolve to be the 
most ‘real’ groups of organisms around, even if they are not real enough for 
some to count them as being really real” (Hull, 1998, as cited in Gannett, p. 
364).  While scientists are generally satisfied with the real, Gannett says, 
philosophers of science often are compelled to go farther, exploring the really 
real.  With regard to the category “species,” for example, working biologists 
gather data, make informed generalizations, and even adjust the parameters and 
definitions of “species,” all without excessive worry about whether the category 
really cuts nature at its joints. In contrast, philosophers of science “assume [they] 
14 
 
best contribute to debates about genetics and race by providing or withholding 
assent to the legitimacy of biological race concepts by appeal to what is ‘really 
real’” (Gannett, 2010, p. 365).  If Gannett’s distinction remains obscure, the 
following two examples should help.  I use the first to clarify the distinction itself, 
the second to spell out consequences of failing to heed it.   
First, Charles Sanders Peirce (1955) defends a pragmatic conception of 
the concept ‘force’ that (implicitly) illustrates the conceptual distinction between 
the real and really real. 
In a recent admired work on Analytic Mechanics it is stated that we 
understand precisely the effect of force, but what force is itself we 
do not understand!  This is simply a contradiction…if we know what 
the effects of force are, we are acquainted with every fact which is 
implied in saying that a force exists, and there is nothing more to 
know. (pp. 35-36) 
 
The point of supplying the example is not to defend Peirce’s pragmatic 
method for defining scientific terms, the truth of which has little bearing on my 
thesis.  Rather, I want to make clear that while his opponent appeals to the 
“really real” nature of force, Peirce argues that the proper metaphysical level of 
investigation of force is the “merely” real.  In most contexts, so long as we can 
measure force for predictive purposes, its deep metaphysical nature is irrelevant.  
Gannett’s point is made clearer by analogy.  For many racialized contexts, the 
proper level of philosophical investigation is the “merely” real, or what is real 
enough to be of practical concern.  Her complaint, then, is that those 
philosophers of science who entrench themselves in approaches that explore the 
deepest metaphysical nature of race miss, ignore, or even preclude questions 
crucial to social and political concerns.  In short, whether really real or not, race is 
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at minimum an important social category with real-world effects, but Gannett 
charges that the natural kinds approach blinds us to many of them. 
As the second example will show, the risks of hypercommitment to deep 
metaphysics are often obvious.  To take a simple (and admittedly absurd) 
example, when a train is hurtling toward your stalled car, you try to restart the car 
or you abandon it; you do not want to waste time in consideration of whether the 
train is mind-independent or not.  Doing so is reminiscent of the mistake made by 
the victim in the classic Buddhist parable of the poisoned arrow.  In the parable, a 
man is wounded with an arrow.  His friends and kinsmen summon a surgeon to 
remove the arrow and restore his health, but the man, apparently a devout 
metaphysician, refuses to have the arrow removed until he knows who shot it, 
whether he used a longbow or crossbow, whether it was made of bamboo or 
some other material and so on.  Gannett recapitulates the Buddha’s message: 
Commitment to metaphysical speculation can come at the expense of more 
immediate practical problems.  Gannett’s point, then, is that when philosophers 
focus on race’s deep metaphysical status, they make the mistake of the arrow 
victim—suspending important practical matters in favor of abstruse philosophical 
ones that may not even have principled solutions.  Stated rather uncharitably, it is 
as though in a racialized context one were to say, “I know it appears that African 
Americans receive unfair treatment in the U.S. judicial system, but we can’t do 
anything about that now.  We haven’t yet determined whether ‘African American’ 
names a real category!”   
These examples seem fatuous, but they represent a common 
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philosophical conundrum: While metaphysical speculation is likely important for 
many reasons, over-commitment to deep metaphysical pursuits can lead to 
disastrous consequences—one might get hit by a train or die from an arrow 
wound or fail to take action against racism.  Returning to Gannett, the specific 
worry is that the natural kinds approach to race precludes the asking of relevant 
social and political—that is, practical—questions, many of which are among the 
most important for our social aims.  Even if race is not really real, Gannett might 
say, its effects are plenty real and merit the best attention and contributions 
philosophers of science can give to it.  When debates turn on race’s candidacy 
as a natural kind, however, the argument space is dichotomized into biological 
and social realms of explanation, seriously circumscribing the potential 
contributions of each. A bit more explanation should clarify that claim. 
  
2.3 Three General Worries 
As Gannett acknowledges, the phrase “natural kinds approach” names not 
a single, unified strategy but a set of related (sometimes complementary, 
sometimes incompatible) metaphysical strategies.  In the next section, I detail 
Gannett’s analysis of several particular natural kinds approaches, but I first prime 
that topic with her three general concerns regarding natural kinds approaches to 
race.  
First, Gannett (2010) argues that any natural kinds approach to race 
“incorporates assumptions that structure the ways in which questions about 
genetics and race are asked, and…restrict the questions that are asked and the 
answers that are possible” (p. 365).  Crucially, Gannett implicates not only 
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natural kinds proponents who use it to explain race, but also opponents who use 
it to explain race away—many biologically-minded philosophers of race defend 
natural kinds explanations, of course, but social constructivists3 often invoke 
natural kinds reasoning, as well, to argue against race’s reality.  A common 
social constructivist argumentative strategy, an example of which appears later in 
the chapter, goes like this: Race is either biological or social.  In order for race to 
be biological, it would have to be a biological natural kind.  If it is not a biological 
natural kind, then biology has little or nothing to do with race.  Race is not a 
natural kind.  Therefore, race is a social phenomenon.   The worry, then, is not 
merely that philosophers of biology who take a natural kinds approach might be 
wrong about race’s reality.  It is rather that the question itself structures the 
parameters of race debates and limits the range of possible answers.  As such, it 
fuels the next of Gannett’s general concerns, the dichotomization of race. 
Gannett’s second general worry is that, among philosophers of science 
and media members alike, theoretical commitment to race’s candidacy as a 
natural kind “tends to involve a dichotomous framing of alternatives: race is either 
socially constructed or biological reality, a fiction like phlogiston or a genuine 
natural kind, a merely linguistic or a projectible predicate” (Gannett, 2010, p. 
364).  In short, debates involving race too often turn on whether race is a mind-
independent constituent of the biological world or an illusion created through 
classification schemes manufactured to make sense of (and often to exploit) 
                                                          
3  Authors vary in preference between the terms “constructionist” and “constructivist,” so 
the use of both terms is unavoidable in the dissertation.  I use “constructivist” in my own writing 




phenotypic difference among human populations.  Many scholars and media 
members interested in race entrench themselves on one side or the other of the 
metaphysical debate.  The focus on race’s status as a natural kind leads to a 
rivalry over the argumentative structure of race research, resulting in two 
apparently mutually exclusive sides—biological realism and social 
constructivism.  This strategic rivalry leads to Gannett’s final worry. 
Gannett’s third general concern is that the dichotomization at the 
conceptual level leads to undesirable consequences at the practical level.  The 
natural kinds approach structures the conceptual space, fueling the 
dichotomization of race and leaving “out many other worthwhile questions.”   
It is not simply that asking some questions inevitably leaves other 
questions unasked; rather, the traditional assumptions about 
natural kinds (‘the really real’) philosophers of science are likely to 
call on for guidance in determining whether race is socially 
constructed or biological reality actually foreclose the asking of 
certain questions, specifically those that matter most socially and 
politically. (Gannett, 2010, p. 365)   
 
Among the most crucial precluded questions are those involved in “the 
very context-specific ways in which biological and social factors interact” 
(Gannett, 2010, p. 375, emphasis added). Examples of those contexts are not 
difficult to imagine—many biomedical contexts, such as the ones centered on the 
aforementioned heart medication, BiDil, demand attention to both biological and 
social factors.  More generally, Gannett (2010) notes that “from the ‘biological’ 
perspective socio-cultural differences…structure the distribution of genetic 
variants in space and time” and from “the ‘social’ perspective, it should not be 
ignored that race is socially constructed by enlisting biological differences and 
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investing these with socio-cultural meaning” (p. 375).  Although Gannett 
concedes that some research questions might be appropriately confined to one 
or the other side of the dichotomy, she argues that “there are also research 
questions that cannot be satisfactorily addressed unless allowance is made for 
the causal interactions that occur among biological and social factors” (p. 
370).  According to Gannett (2010), then, the problem facing philosophers of 
science interested in race is this: The approach that generally structures their 
debates about race comes with undesirable consequences.  The most important 
philosophical consequence for this dissertation is that it generates a rivalrous 
dichotomy that “compromises the critical insight philosophers of science might 
otherwise contribute to the debate in the public sphere” (p. 365).  The challenge, 
then, is to recommend a strategy by which philosophers of science can 
contribute to race matters that have practical import. 
So, broadly speaking, Gannett’s analysis reveals a problematic conceptual 
dichotomy generated by dubious metaphysical framing, a situation that 
engenders many philosophical and practical problems involving race.  As the 
stakes of the debates increase, disputants tend to identify with either the 
biological or the social side, which serves to reinforce the rigid dichotomization of 
conceptual alternatives and preclude exploration of contexts in which biological 
and social factors might interact. Though it may seem counterintuitive, hyper-
commitment to the metaphysical status of race is detrimental to race 
scholarship.  In short, when philosophers of science obsess over whether race is 
really real, they limit their potential to contribute to more important 
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matters.  Again, I offer some examples to clarify these points.   
 
2.3.1 Essentialist Natural Kinds  
Each of the natural kinds approaches Gannett (2010) critiques belongs to 
one of two broad types: “natural kinds as essentialist” and “natural kinds as 
biologically real” (p. 365 ff.).  According to the essentialist natural kinds approach 
“membership in a kind is based on properties of individuals, usually assumed to 
be intrinsic, which serve as necessary and/or sufficient conditions for defining 
natural kind terms” (p. 365).  Today, few philosophers adopt this approach in 
support of race’s biological reality.  Instead, as a rule, “this approach has been 
used by philosophers to argue that races are not natural kinds” (p. 365).  Gannett 
names two: Naomi Zack (2003), who argues that no necessary and/or sufficient 
“racial characteristics, or genes for such a characteristic” are shared by every 
member of a proposed race, and Michael Root (2003), who argues that 
contemporary biologists’ general rejection of essentialist assumptions means that 
race in particular cannot be an essentialist natural kind (Gannett, 2010).  Several 
other influential philosophers of race make similar claims.  
In fact, this strategic use of the natural kinds approach is common enough 
that in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry “Race,” Michael James 
notes that the “ambiguities and confusion associated with determining the 
boundaries of racial categories have over time provoked a widespread scholarly 
consensus that discrete or essentialist races are…not biologically real” (James, 
2012, n.p.).  For example, Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006) says that “current 
biology, even after the genome project, is very unlikely to endorse race-like 
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categories that are essentialized” (p. 379).  Ron Mallon (2007), a central figure in 
the chapters to follow, argues that “nonessentialism is likely true of race and 
gender” and points out that essentialism is not a popular view for the category 
species, let alone for race.  “Philosophers of biology more or less universally 
reject the view that species are to be characterized by reference to an underlying 
essential property…importantly, however, the reasoning offered for being 
antiessentialist about race and about species is the same” (pp. 156, 158).  So, as 
Mallon (2006) says in an earlier paper, there is an “ontological consensus” 
against a view called “racialism—the view that there are racial essences” (p. 
528).  But, even though few if any philosophers invoke essentialism in their 
accounts of race, as later chapters reveal, the problem of racialism is not easily 
dispatched.  Even if biological essentialism is dead, its ghost haunts the 
racializing human mind.  That crucial problem is a topic for later chapters; for 
now, I proceed to the second natural kinds approach to race. 
Clearly, the virtual extinction of essentialist biology does not entail the 
extinction of the species concept, which remains a robust and informative 
biological category.  Analogously, the failure of racialism alone does not entail 
the end of speculation about ‘race’ as a biological category.  In fact, Gannett 
(2010) points out that several “philosophers have recently defended the 
biological reality of race in ways consistent with the modern evolutionary 
synthesis, by treating biological races in Homo sapiens as a kind of human 
population” (p. 367).  These realist, but nonessentialist, biological accounts of 
natural kinds enjoy two primary advantages over essentialist ones: They are 
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“better informed by scientific practice” and “less metaphysically invested than 
essentialist and reductionistic ones” (p. 367).  Despite those advantages, 
however, Gannett argues that nonessentialist biological accounts fare little better 
than their counterparts, since they discard the “really real” only to a limited 
extent.  As a result, they dead-end in virtually the same place as their essentialist 
predecessors—a conceptual space from which certain important social questions 
cannot be addressed.  To secure the argument, Gannett (2010) appeals to three 
realist positions on race that discard essentialism only to re-raise the once 
deflated metaphysical stakes in two specific ways: via “the monism-pluralism 
debate and dichotomization of the biological and the social” (p. 368).  The latter, 
in particular, motivates much of the present work, so I give it considerable 
attention below, but first I summarize Gannett’s description of the three biological 
realist positions on race and their relevance to the monism-pluralism debate 
about race. 
 
2.3.2 Nonessentialist, Biologically Real Natural Kinds 
 
To begin, Gannett (2010) describes Robin Andreasen’s cladistic account, 
which identifies races as clades, or “monophyletic groups; they are ancestor-
descendant sequences of breeding populations, or groups of such sequences, 
that share a common origin” (Andreasen, 1998, as cited in Gannett, p. 367).  So 
Andreasen accounts for race by appeal to common ancestry of breeding 
populations.  Philip Kitcher does something similar. As Gannett reports, Kitcher’s 
(1999) notion of race is “that of an inbred lineage, where the inbreeding may 
initially have resulted from geographical isolation that eventually gave rise to 
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differences in phenotype and to some interference in free interbreeding, even 
when the geographical isolation is overcome” (Kitcher, 2007, 296).  Kitcher 
conceives of race as a biological natural kind that results from division of a 
species into geographically isolated founder populations, and because of the 
isolation, “distinctive phenotypic traits arise and are transmitted from one 
generation to another” (Gannett, 2010, 367).  For both Andreasen and Kitcher, 
then, the biological reality of race is defensible by appeal to common ancestry.   
In contrast, according to Massimo Pigliucci and Jonathan Kaplan’s 
“ecotype” account, races “are local populations adapted to particular 
environments which differ genetically in many or only a few genes” (Gannett, 
2010, 368).  Gannett notes that this view does not make appeal to ancestral 
relations, instead explaining a shared racial trait, such as skin color, as indicative 
of “selective pressure, not common ancestry” (Gannett, 2010, 368).  These 
distinctions are not crucial here, however.  Instead, the examples speak to the 
diversity of opinions on race within biology and, more importantly, show that (at 
least some) philosophers of biology offer nonessentialist but nevertheless natural 
kinds explanations of race.  Neither type of natural kinds explanation—neither the 
two “phylogenetic” nor the “ecological” one—pacifies Gannett’s concerns, 
however. 
The point of offering these examples, then, is not to analyze their 
theoretical and strategic distinctions, but to show how, despite their rejection of 
essentialism, these biological approaches nevertheless result in common sets of 
undesirable consequences.  Even with the advantage of their closer affiliation 
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and greater consistency with modern biological practice, nonessentialist 
biological realism bogs race down in metaphysical quandaries, once again 
circumscribing the potential contribution of philosophy of science to race issues. 
As Gannett says, in the ensuing debates, the “‘really real’ is not discarded for 
long—once a biological basis for race is identified…the metaphysical stakes are 
raised yet again” (Gannett, 2010, 368).  So, despite some initial promise, 
nonessentialist biological realism fares little better in opening the intellectual 
space for philosophers of science to contribute to issues involving race.  Gannett 
shows this in the two aforementioned ways: via the monism-pluralism debate and 
via the dichotomization of race into distinct biological and social causal realms.   
 
2.3.3 The Monism-Pluralism Problem 
 
Given three (or more) distinct biological race concepts, disagreements 
about which gets race right are “inevitable.”  Moreover, says Gannett, these 
debates are bound to “be shaped by metaphysical assumptions about monism 
vs. pluralism” (Gannett, 2010, 368).  The contested question becomes whether 
‘race’, like ‘species’, admits of “competing definitions…appropriate for use in 
different areas of biology…or if instead there is one basic or authoritative race 
concept to which others are reducible” (Gannett, 2010, 368).  The source of the 
potential problems, then, is that one’s prior metaphysical commitment to either 
monism or pluralism will structure the way one conceives of race: If one is 
monist, one will be inclined toward monist definitions, and vice versa.  But, once 
again, circumscribing one’s explanation of race in that way means leaving out 




Although early on Kitcher (1984) defends a position on ‘species’ called 
“pluralistic realism,” by the time of the 1999 paper, he “admits of only a single 
race concept,” the aforementioned “inbred’ lineages” which are constituted by a 
“curiously gerrymandered” assortment of criteria, namely, “common descent, 
geographic isolation, and distinctive phenotype” (Gannett, 2010, p. 368).  To be 
sure, his view is more pliant than outdated essentialist ones, but Gannett charges 
that it “appears to satisfy common sense intuitions rather than theoretical 
demands” (Gannett, 2010, p. 368).  Taking that route means ignoring, among 
other things, “the genetic race concept which requires only genetic, not 
phenotypic, differences among groups” (Gannett, 2010, p. 368).  Kitcher is 
rendered silent here, and Andreasen, who also “appears to be a monist about 
race,” fares equally badly across many contexts.   
Andreasen champions genealogical definitions “because genealogy is 
used by systematists to define species and higher taxa” and because “when 
scientists debate the reality of race…they do so under the banner of systematics” 
(Gannett, 2010, p. 368).  Gannett is dubious: She notes, for example, that a 2004 
workshop resulting in the special Nature Genetics supplement, “Human Genome 
Variations and ‘Race,’” was bereft of systematists.  The practical consequence 
for Kitcher and Andreasen is that they set self-imposed limits on their potential 
influence in weightier racial matters.  Gannett says that “in order to address 
questions concerning race’s validity as a biomedical category and its biological 
reality at the level of the genome, philosophers of biology need to familiarize 
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themselves with what race concepts are in actual use in various areas of the 
biological and biomedical sciences” (p. 369).    
In contrast, Pigliucci and Kaplan “attend closely to ways in which biologists 
use the term ‘race’ in practice and therefore do not forego the ‘real’ of biology for 
the ‘really real’ of metaphysics” (Gannett, 2010, p. 369).  The pluralism that 
informs their ecotypes approach avoids the mistakes of the phylogenetic ones, 
but predictably brings its own baggage.  Ultimately, Pigliucci and Kaplan, too, re-
raise the metaphysical stakes because of their “implicit naturalistic 
assumption…that nonhuman biology exhausts the range of scientific race 
concepts that could legitimately apply to humans” (Gannett, 2010, p. 368).  So, 
despite their differences, each of these race scholars “are careful to distinguish 
their projects in philosophy of biology from the projects of social scientists,” and, 
as a result, each “contributes to the dichotomization of biological and social 
causation” (Gannett, 2010, p. 368).  Since the dichotomization of race into 
biological and social causal realms and the consequences that follow from it 
motivate my aims, I discuss it in great detail in the next section.  I begin with 
Gannett’s description of a debate between Andreasen and Joshua Glasgow, one 
she takes as paradigmatic of the troublesome dichotomization. One should not, 
however, be given the impression that the race dichotomy is merely special 
problem for two rival philosophers, so, at the end of this section, I briefly discuss 
several other examples that reveal how commonly scholars, scientist, media 




2.4 The “Dichotomous Framing of Alternatives” 
The “corrosive standoff,” as Gannett calls it, between Andreasen (1998, 
2005) and Glasgow (2003, 2009), who promotes a social constructivist definition 
of race, is representative of the sterile antagonism among philosophers of race.  
For her part, Andreasen aims to “challenge the trend to reject the biological 
reality of race by arguing that cladism (a school of classification that individuates 
taxa by appeal to common ancestry) provides a new way to define race 
biologically” (Andreasen, 1998a, p. S653).  She begins by recognizing the two 
main types of explanations of race—“biological realism and social 
constructivism”—which are generally considered “incompatible views about race” 
(Andreasen, 2000, p. S654).  Reaffirming the position in a later paper, Andreasen 
says “‘race’ is ambiguous between its scientific and [common sense4] meanings 
(with reasonable overlap between the two),” but “these meanings are relatively 
autonomous” (Andreasen, 2005, p. 104). “Today,” she concedes, “most theorists 
favor the view that races are social constructs” (Andreasen, 1998a, p. S654). 
The mass conceptual migration toward social constructivism was 
motivated by the failure of earlier attempts to establish the biological reality of 
race, but Andreasen argues that is because her predecessors relied on 
“phenetic” classification, that is, they attempted to define taxa—including, human 
race—on the basis of observable similarities and differences, not on 
“genealogical relations among organisms” (Andreasen, 1998a, p. 
                                                          
4 Although Andreasen here calls the rival to her cladistic definition a “common sense” 
definition of race, the latter is what is supposed to be captured by Glasgow’s constructivist 
definition, so “common sense” and “constructivist/constructionist” are functionally synonymous in 
the context of this debate. 
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S656).  Phylogeneticists, such as Andreasen, do not ignore observable 
characteristics, but pheneticists use “similarity to define its taxa,” while 
“phylogenetic concept…uses similarity as evidence for group membership” 
(Andreasen, 1998a, p. S656).  The basis of phylogenetic classification, then, is 
evolutionary history, not characteristic similarity, although the latter may inform 
the former.  Phylogenetic classification, with its greater predictive power, has 
virtually replaced phenetic classification for systematists, but oddly not always 
when racial classification is concerned.  Andreasen says that many biological 
theorists approach race as though “similarity ought to be the foundation of an 
objective classification scheme without considering the possibility that race can 
be defined historically” (Andreasen, 1998a, p. S656).  So, the point is that 
biological approaches to race need an update.  “Races can be defined in the way 
that cladistics determine its taxa, as sets of lineages that share a common origin” 
(Andreasen, 1998a, p. S655).   As a result, “Contrary to popular belief, there is a 
biologically objective way to define race,” but “races, if they exist objectively, 
ought to be defined historically” (Andreasen, 1998a, p. S657).  In sum, 
Andreasen argues that if attention is paid to the correct sets of facts—ones of 
ancestry, not observable similarity—one can give a viable definition of human 
race as a biological reality.  Doing so, however, generates surprising and 
controversial consequences.   
The racial categories Andreasen endorses, for example, do not match 
recognizable folk categories. “People standardly divide humans into three (or 
more) major races—Africans, Caucasians, Asians.  The cladistics concept of 
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race, however, results in racial categories that cross-classify these standard 
groupings” (Andreasen, 1998b, p. 212).  Her cladistic model, for example, 
delineates nine races, but the folk racial classification ‘Asian’ is not among 
them—“‘Asian’ is not a cladistic race” (Andreasen, 1998b, p. 212).  So there is a 
mismatch between folk and cladistic races, and this, at least for Glasgow, is 
where the trouble starts.  Glasgow attempts to undermine the cladistic and other 
“populationist” approaches in order to defend his “reconstructionist” definition of 
race (Glasgow, 2003, 2009).   
Glasgow (2003) “questions the viability” of populationist approaches, 
specifically taking on Andreasen’s cladistic race concept and, to a lesser extent, 
Kitcher’s inbred lineages. In particular, he objects to their dedication to meeting 
scientific demands without regard to common sense conceptions of race. 
Glasgow (2003) complains, for example, that “the folk notion of race does not 
normally contain the nine races identified” by Andreasen’s account (p. 458). 
Mismatches between folk and biological conceptions of race over issues such as 
the number of races and the identification of ‘Asian’ as a folk, but not cladistic, 
category prompt Glasgow (2003) to ask, “How revisionist can one be about the 
meaning of 'race' and still call it ‘race’?” (p. 462).  For Glasgow, the rejection of 
Andreasen’s cladistic definition goes hand-in-hand with prioritization of the folk 
race concept, which, for him, is fundamental.  Glasgow’s (2003) view, then, is 
that in order to count as theory of race at all, a biological account must “give a 
biological backing to our [folk] race talk” (p. 458).  We start, in other words, with 
the races that are recognized and sustained by the folk and then ask what 
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biology can say about those races. 
Andreasen (2005) counters that the “cladistic concept falls outside the 
race constructivist’s appropriate domain of inquiry” and suggests that the 
“disagreement between Glasgow and myself is over how meaning gets settled in 
the first place” (p. 102). Glasgow, she says, “defends the authority of [the 
common sense, or folk, concept of race] and argues that scientists are not the 
arbiters of the meaning of ‘race'” (Andreasen, 2005, p. 102). Andreasen(2005) 
responds that deviation from the common sense, or folk, concept of race 
provides no reason to reject the cladistic one (p. 102).  After all, scientific and folk 
definitions are often misaligned—the folks’ continuing to define whales as fish 
would not affect its scientific classification as a mammal.  
The Andreasen-Glasgow debate largely turns on what concept of race (if 
any) should be privileged.  That type of disagreement is common to philosophy, 
but this case is distinguished by its strange results.  Gannett (2010) reports that 
“Andreasen (2000) uses [Hilary] Putnam’s causal theory of reference to defend 
the autonomy and authority of the biological race concept” (p. 372).  For quick 
reference, philosophers Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke famously argued that the 
microstructural properties of a thing are what determine its natural kind-ship—
water’s being H20 is often taken to be paradigmatic.  In that vein, Andreasen 
(2000) claims the “objectivity of a kind, biological or otherwise, is not called into 
question by the fact that ordinary people have mistaken beliefs about the nature 
of that kind” (p. 662). Ironically, Glasgow also appeals to the Putnam-Kripke 
model, albeit to a different aspect of it.   
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Borrowing the language of Kripke, Glasgow charges that the cladistic 
approach “requires de-rigidifying ‘race’.  On [Andreasen’s] approach, ‘race’ no 
longer picks out the same macrophysical objects (say, the three major 
races)…Rather, Andreasen's approach picks out different objects entirely” 
(Glasgow, 2003, 468, emphasis added).  Let me quickly unpack that 
claim.  Glasgow’s reference is to Kripke’s explanation of a “rigid designator,” 
which is a term that picks out the same object in all possible worlds in which it 
exists.  On this account, “water” is a rigid designator for the chemical compound 
H2O.  This means that a differently constituted substance, even if it is otherwise 
identical to water, is not water—water just is H20.  So, Glasgow’s use of “de-
rigidification” is not just dramatic, but literal: He charges Andreasen with 
changing the subject.  Some quick elaboration on Glasgow’s general position will 
make this charge clear.   
Glasgow (2009) calls his approach “reconstructionism,” which he 
describes as a normative position that advocates neither complete elimination 
nor conservation of status quo racial discourse.  His “basic idea” is that “we 
should replace racial discourse with a nearby discourse” that shifts the 
conversation from (pseudo) biological categories to “wholly social categories” 
(pp. 2-3).  Of course, if he wants to revise race concepts, Glasgow (2009) must 
allow that they could have been and likely will continue to be revised in light of 
shifts in values and refinements in science and philosophy, but Glasgow (2009) 
thinks that Andreasen and other philosophers of biology shift race so far from its 
original folk meaning that they effectively change the subject.  Again, the worry is 
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that a switch to cladistic race precludes talking about important social issues.  If 
‘Asian’ is not a cladistic race, for example, then cladistics is rendered silent over 
social issues that result in oppression of Asian Americans, for example.  If that is 
right, one of Gannett’s worries is realized: Here is a case of a natural kinds 
commitment compromising the potential contributions of a philosopher of science 
to normative race issues.  Worse still, Glasgow (2003) reacts by digging in his 
heels.  The cladistic approach, he says, not only changes the subject, but also 
reinforces the wrong idea about race—that it is biological, not social (p. 
462).  Now, Gannett’s general worry is realized: At this point in the debate, the 
dichotomy is manifest.  Still, the debate escalates. 
Andreasen’s response to Glasgow is that that “de-rigidification” is not an 
issue; she “expects that ordinary usage, when mistaken, may be corrected to 
conform to scientific usage (like we now accept that whales are mammals, not 
fish)” (Gannett, 2010, p. 372).  In other words, when we discover that whales are 
mammals and not fish, we do not change the object of discussion (“That large 
aquatic animal…”); we just get better at talking about it (“…is a mammal, not a 
fish”).  Furthermore, she suggests Glasgow’s claim for the primacy of the 
common sense concept is arbitrary.  “It is likely that we do not know enough 
about the history of ‘race’ to know what was in the minds of speakers during the 
baptismal procedure” (Andreasen, 2005, p. 103).  For his part, Glasgow (2003) 
clearly wants to ensure that the “right” racial information gets tracked in order that 
those who are racially oppressed be correctly counted.  However, from a 
philosophical standpoint, Andreasen’s objections leave their mark.  Glasgow 
33 
 
(2003) does appear presumptive in staking his claim for the priority of folk 
race.  And even if he is right about the “baptismal moment,” all parties agree that 
‘race’ is a dynamic, fluid concept, one that we should not expect to corral by 
demanding its rigid designation.  Despite their best initial intentions, these 
scholars appear a bit derailed. 
Remember, Gannett is concerned not with which side is right but with the 
consequences of the assumptions and structure of the debate itself.  She 
appears right about at least this—as the combatants entrench themselves more 
deeply into their own positions, the metaphysical stakes are heightened and the 
important issues obscured. Initially, Andreasen hoped only “to challenge the 
trend to reject the biological reality of race,” but in the end, she pushes race from 
the social realm. Glasgow resists, aiming at a wholly social position in the face of 
renewed scientific interest in the possible connections between biology and 
race.  So, as racial tension increases in the United States and around the world, 
and as problems multiply and intensify, Andreasen and Glasgow mire 
themselves in metaphysical questions about microstructural properties and de-
rigidification!  Despite their connection to the highly influential work of Putnam 
and Kripke, talk of baptismal procedures and even microstructural properties 
ought to raise suspicion in the context of race.  In this case, the harm is evident—
the use of these hallowed philosophical concepts fosters an “unproductive, even 
corrosive, standoff” between Andreasen and Glasgow that clearly reveals the 
race dichotomy and its consequences (p. 365).   
The details of the Andreasen-Glasgow debate are instructive.  I have 
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tracked Gannett’s appraisal of their standoff because each directly addresses the 
other’s argument, which makes it easy to spot some of the consequences of 
raising the metaphysical stakes over the reality of race. Through Gannett’s 
narrative lens, one sees the dichotomy develop organically, revealing that 
Gannett’s poker allusion is apt—each scholar raises the other at different points 
in the game, and once the argument is mired in muddied disputes over baptismal 
procedures, it looks like both are bluffing.  This is not just a local problem, 
however.  While few of the arguments that sustain the dichotomy are as 
conveniently direct as this one, many scholars and media representatives 
promote conclusions that also (directly or indirectly) sustain the dichotomy.  I 
briefly survey a few of them before discussing some further consequences of 
dichotomization in the next section.   
Assumptions and arguments that sustain the dichotomy are relatively 
common to race debates.  In spite of the growing recognition of the complexity of 
race concepts, in one way or another, many philosophers reinforce the wall 
between biological and social accounts.  Andreasen, for example, does not 
merely fuel her side of the standoff; she proffers descriptions of “relatively 
autonomous” biological and social realms in which distinct, perhaps mutually 
exclusive, race concepts operate.  In other words, she advocates 
dichotomization, and this move is not uncommon among philosophers of 
race.  Michael Hardimon (2013b), a key figure in future chapters, does the same, 
arguing that “Confusions about the place of race in medicine result in part from 
failure to recognize the plurality of race concepts” (p. 6).  In a pair of 2012 
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papers, he focuses on two—“socialrace” (Hardimon, 2013b) and what he calls 
“the minimalist phenomenon of biological race,” which he virtually equates with 
populationist accounts (Hardimon, 2013a, p. 249).  As I discuss in outline below 
and in detail in the next chapter, Hardimon, like Andreasen, thinks these two 
types of race concepts are relatively autonomous and so assigns them different 
roles in addressing the aforementioned “confusions.”  Most philosophers 
interested in race, however, locate themselves on one side or the other.   
In their seminal book on racism, Racial Formation in the United States: 
From the 1960s to the 1980s, for example, the aforementioned Winant and 
Michael Omi (1986) introduce “racial formation theory,” a patently social 
conception of race.  They replace biological conceptions of race, which they 
consider little more than anachronistic, with the view that “the racial order is 
organized and enforced by the continuity and reciprocity between micro-level and 
macro-level of social relations" (p. 67).  Race, then, is not a biological 
phenomenon, but an “unstable and ‘de-centered’ complex of social meaning 
constantly being transformed by political struggle” (Omi & Winant, 1986, 68).  In 
part owing to the influence of Omi and Winant, Paul Taylor (2000, 2004) defends 
a view on race he calls “radical constructionism,” which forcefully rejects any 
biological account.  In fact, when Taylor (2004) mentions biology at all, it is only 
to point out the “failure of racial biology” and promote the thesis that “races are 
social constructs.  They are things that we humans create in the transactions that 
define social life” (p. 86).   
Similarly, in Philosophy of Science and Race, Naomi Zack (2002) 
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concludes that “Essences, geography, phenotypes, genotypes, and genealogy 
are the only known candidates for physical scientific bases of life.  Each 
fails.  Therefore, there is no physical scientific basis for the social racial 
taxonomy,” so race “is not biologically real as most people still think” (pp. 88, 
111).  Instead, it “is a construction requiring constant sorting and identification”; it 
“is a dynamic ongoing, performative process” (p. 115).  Charles Mills (1998) 
argues that there is no “conceptual room for the notion of race as ‘deep’ and 
‘metaphysical,’” concluding that “race as biology, race as destiny, has been 
discredited” (p. xiv).  Race, he says, is “socio-political rather than biological.  The 
cliché that has come to express this insight is that race is not natural but 
‘constructed’” (Mills, 1998, p. 86).  Despite the confident tone conveyed by some 
of these scholars, however, the conception of race as a completely social 
category has never been entirely secured.  While instances are rarer, some 
scholars have used the renewed interest in biological connections of race to 
argue for the biological reality of race. 
Of course, I talked above about Gannett’s description of three biological 
realists.  Andreasen, Kitcher, and Pigliucci and Kaplan each promote theories of 
race as a biological reality, all the while trying to circumvent the conclusion of the 
scientific racism of prior generations.  Other scientifically minded scholars, 
however, argue for both the biologically reality of race and some of its racist 
implications.  The most famous case involves The Bell Curve, the most 
controversial part of which centers on authors Richard Herrnstein and Charles 
Murray’s conclusions that Blacks are on average less intelligent than Whites and 
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that the reason for the difference is more likely genetic rather than social 
(Herrnstein & Murray, 1994).  Along the same lines, Neven Sesardic (2010) 
argues that, contrary to popular expert opinion, traditional racial categories do 
match what is in the biological world.  The “way ‘race’ was defined by biologists 
several decades ago (by [Theodosius] Dobzhansky and others) is in no way 
discredited by conceptual criticisms that are now fashionable and widely 
regarded as cogent” (p. 143). In Making Sense of Heritability, Sesardic employs 
an argumentative strategy similar to Herrnstein and Jensen’s to suggest that 
variation in average IQ among distinct racial groups is primarily attributable to 
biological difference.  
Gannett reports that Vincent Sarich and Frank Miele (2004) make similar 
claims.  In fact, Gannett (2010) says that her description of the dichotomous 
framing of alternatives “mirrors Sarich and Miele’s dichotomy of race as ‘a mere 
social construct’ or ‘an underlying biological reality’” (p. 382).  Their central claim 
is “that DNA data gleaned from the ‘latest genetic technologies’ provide decisive 
evidence for the biological reality of race” from which they conclude that 
“significant cognitive differences arising during the past 10,000 years…makes it 
inevitable that racial groups will be disproportionately represented at the 
extremes of values for traits like being a criminal or having a high-paying job” 
(Gannett, 2010, p. 381).  Gannett finds these conclusions “horrid,” but invokes 
them in order to reveal their role in sustaining the dichotomy, the effects of which, 




2.4.1 Consequence of Dichotomization 
The dichotomy is created in the academy, but the effects extend its 
boundaries.  One duty of the news media, for example, is to report provocative 
results of scientific and scholarly studies for consumption by the public.  Because 
of the technical nature of many studies, however, media reports often 
misrepresent scientific conclusions.  Gannett (2010) cites the case of New York 
Times science reporter Nicholas Wade, who following the New England Journal 
of Medicine publication of the BiDil results asked, “Is there a biological basis for 
race? If there is not, as many social scientists and others argue, how can a drug 
like BiDil work so well in one race?” (Wade, 2004, as cited in Gannett, p. 364). 
Among Wade’s errors, which he repeats in his 2013 book, A Troublesome 
Inheritance, is that his “focus on the question of the biological reality vs. social 
construction of race leaves many other more interesting and socially and 
politically important questions unasked” (Gannett, 2010, p. 364).  For example, it 
ignores Johnathan Kaplan’s charge that the approval of BiDil was commercial 
rather than biomedical.  In general, instead of casting wide conceptual and 
normative nets, reporters tended to react to the BiDil patent by highlighting 
combustible topics. New York Times reporter Robin Henig, for example, “touted 
[BiDil] as the first ‘ethnic drug’ in ‘the emerging field of race-based 
pharmacogenetics” (Henig, 2004, as cited on p. 364).  While Henig does not 
explicitly invoke the language of the dichotomy, terms such as “ethnic drug” and 
“race-based pharmacogenetics” do reify race as a natural kind.   
One result is a second, but closely related, sort of dichotomization, this 
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time between “scientist-expert and nonscientist-commonfolk conceptual 
schemes” (Gannett, 2010, p. 372).  The view that scientific and folk conceptions 
of race are wholly different gives the illusion that scientists and philosophers of 
science are limited in their potential contributions to social and political contexts 
in which folk conceptions of race operate, but “scientific and folk meanings are 
not wholly autonomous because science influences the folk meaning and the folk 
meaning often provides a starting point for scientists in their research” (Gannett, 
2010, p. 375).  So, however it manifests, the dichotomous framing of alternatives 
“compromises the critical insight philosophers of science might otherwise 
contribute to debate in the public sphere” (Gannett, 2010, p. 365).  In particular, it 
blinds them to certain sorts of questions.  Gannett (2010) concedes that “asking 
some questions inevitably leaves other questions unasked” (p. 374), but choice 
of research questions is not her concern.  The problem “involves more—it 
involves privileging a certain set of questions (theoretical, metaphysical, etc.) 
such that others (practical, evaluative, etc.) are not merely overlooked but 
systematically ignored” (p. 374).  In fact, “the dichotomizing of the biological and 
social as distinct causal realms…precludes investigating the very context-specific 
ways in which biological and social factors interact” (Gannett, 2010, p. 375).   
So, Gannett (2010) reveals a blind spot for philosophers of science, and 
this is unacceptable because “there are also research questions that cannot be 
satisfactorily addressed unless allowance is made for the causal interactions that 
occur among biological and social factors” (p. 370).  Even if some contexts 
demand only one or the other of the traditional accounts of race, many crucial 
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ones do not.  This is the very philosophical problem space in which I aim to work, 
so in the next section, I elaborate on the problem of biological-social interactive 
contexts and show where work is left to be done. 
 
2.5 How Gannett’s Critique Motivates the Dissertation 
Broad agreement exists that many important conceptions of race are 
complexes of apparently incongruous parts that frequently vary in proportion of 
influence from one context to the next. Gannett (2010) argues that our theories 
about race should accommodate that fact, and she takes to task those 
philosophers who sustain the dichotomy from the comfort of familiar theoretical 
bunkers when many contexts involve both sorts of causal factors.  The challenge, 
then, is to figure out how to accommodate the strange mix of causal 
constituents.  Even if 'race' talk is patently complex and multifactorial, explaining 
how and by what medium the disparate factors are put together has so far 
perplexed philosophers of race.  Even Gannett’s credulity is strained—again, 
Gannett charges Kitcher with conceptual gerrymandering even though his 
cocktail is limited to biological concepts.  Biological-social interactionist 
conceptions of race are even more confounding.  In defense of this point, 
Gannett cites sociologist Paul Gilroy, who  
conceives ‘race’ as ‘an active, dynamic idea or principle that assists 
in the constitution of social reality’: social groups are constituted by 
racializing some contingent combination of biological, cultural, and 
national differences as essential, hierarchical, primordial, authentic, 
historical, natural, discrete, absolute, fixed, static, immutable, and 
unbridgeable. (Gilroy, 2000, as cited in Gannett, p. 377)  
 
A crucial question for the dissertation, then, is how to account for that 
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dynamic interaction.  I agree with Gannett that the strategies that foster the 
dichotomy—more precisely, the aspects of those strategies that do—should be 
abandoned.  But Gannett is specifically interested “in how philosophers of 
science approach debates about genetics and race,” so while she focuses 
primarily on two related scientific issues—biomedicine and biological reality—in 
my view, the general problem Gannett describes pervades virtually all race-
relevant contexts.  So, my interests are more general than hers. Philosophers, 
scientists, and layfolk alike have difficulty reasoning about race largely because 
of its inherent complexity.  When we talk about race, we sometimes reason 
biologically, sometimes socially, usually both, and almost always 
inconsistently.  The vast array of both biological and social constructivist 
explanations of race often perpetuate confusion.  The lack of interaction between 
the camps blocks the path to new inquiry and, worse, retards progress toward 
practical solutions to contextual problems that involve race.  “Indeed,” says 
Gannett, “the statistical, contingent, accidental, localized, and interest-relative 
bases of such inferences serve to undercut the dichotomizing of race as either 
biological reality or social construct and favor the adoption of a pragmatic 
approach” (Gannett, 2010, p. 363, emphasis added).  A survey of existing 
theories on race, some of which I have mentioned already, suggests that we still 
lack a structure for that approach. 
 
2.5.1 Some Ways to Approach the Dichotomy 
Several of the positions described above hint at potential solutions to the 
dichotomy.  In her harder stance, for example, Andreasen argues that having two 
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mutually exclusive race paradigms is fine because each is usefully fit to its own 
realm of discourse.  At the opposite extreme, some have argued for the eventual 
elimination of “race” and all associated concepts.  Appiah (1995), for example, 
calls for the relative short-term elimination of race words (such as “Black,” 
“White,” “Asian”) because the “truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in 
the world that can do all we ask ‘race’ to do for us” (p. 75).  This solution is quite 
simple: no race, no race dichotomy.  Appiah holds an important position in the 
history of the philosophy of race, and his arguments have wielded tremendous 
influence, so although they appear to fail, they merit elaboration.   
Appiah arrives at the conclusion that there are no races via what Ron 
Mallon (2006) calls a “mismatch” argument, which holds that “the true account of 
the extension of a term or concept x would be sharply different from what is 
believed about the extension of x” (p. 533).  In the present case, Appiah holds 
that if race is real, it must be a natural (biological) kind, and since he does not 
recognize any tenable biological concept ‘race’, Appiah reasons that race words 
do not name anything in the world.  So, since there is a mismatch between the 
words we use and the things in the world, the words name nothing at all—so race 
is, as Gannett said, “a fiction like phlogiston.”  Combined with the pernicious 
history of race, that conclusion leads Appiah to argue that ‘race’ talk should be 
eliminated. Again, if Appiah’s view bears out, it would eliminate the dichotomy, 
since there would be no concept about which to contend, but Mallon argues that 
this “semantic approach”—in fact, any semantic approach—to race is 
problematic. That crucial topic is tabled until the next chapter, however, so that I 
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can discuss one other potential solution. 
A final, less advertised way to deal with the dichotomy is via what I will call 
a “matching” argument. While Appiah (1995) attempts to reveal a mismatch 
between our race vocabulary and what is in the world, Sesardic, as I said above, 
argues that our words do match what is in the world—this is what he means by 
saying that Dobzhansky’s classification has not been discredited.  What 
Dobzhansky said is in the world is in the world.  Arguably, Sesardic’s view, if 
proven correct, could eliminate the dichotomy as well—in this case by 
establishing the primacy of the biological conception.  I will argue that neither 
these nor any existing philosophical accounts provide a suitable response to the 




Gannett diagnoses the dichotomy as a problem grounded in metaphysics, 
and her analysis paves the way for the position I defend in the dissertation. So, it 
bears repeating that on Gannett’s analysis, the natural kinds approach to race is 
what “compromises the critical insight philosophers of science” and sustains the 
“unproductive, even corrosive standoff between biological realists and social 
constructionists” (Gannett, 2010, pp. 363, 365).  Neither natural kinds 
approach—essentialist or biological—helps us here, so Gannett (2010) is 
“skeptical that race fulfills these basic assumptions about natural kind…this 
suggests that race cannot do for us what it seems many have wanted it to do. 
Even if one is loathe to jettison natural kinds, the category of race as a postulated 
natural kind must go” (p. 378).   
44 
 
She concedes that “it would be very surprising if the statistically correlated 
DNA markers which so impress Sarich and Miele were not to be found” but 
argues they will not do the work that they and like-minded scholars think.  Among 
other things, she strongly suspects they will be “statistical not universal, interest-
relative not mind independent, dynamic not static, [and] indeterminate not 
determinate” (Gannett, 2010, p. 383).  So how do we proceed?  Gannett (2010) 
advises worrying “less about the ‘really real’ [natural kinds reasoning]” and urges 
that philosophers of science and of race “instead assess the appropriateness of 
group categories of classification relative to the purposes of specific research 
programs, [which] invites consideration of the social and political ramifications of 
drawing boundaries in one way rather than another” (p. 383). 
Gannett’s groundwork is crucial to my project.  By undermining the natural 
kinds approach to race by showing that it leads to a pernicious dichotomization of 
concepts, she has opened the space for more appropriate philosophical racial 
discourse.  I aim to locate race somewhere in that conceptual and metaphysical 
space between the “really real” reality of natural kinds and the “nothingness” of 
social construction5.  Following Gannett’s recommendation, I attempt to employ a 
“better argumentative strategy [that] recognizes that ‘race,’ as it is socially 
constructed, is essentialist” (Gannett, 2010, p. 371).  The position I advocate is 
quite close to that one, but there are other roadblocks, potential dead ends, and 
tempting wrong turns on the way to a pragmatically useful conception of race, so 
                                                          
5 As Millgram (2015) points out, “’constructivism’ has in recent years come to mean 
almost all things to all people,” so here I follow Millgram, who recommends the view on 
constructivism promoted by Rawls (1989).  
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I now I turn to a second fundamental problem for race scholarship, one that 
questions another revered philosophical strategy, what Mallon (2009) calls the 















In the preceding chapter, I detailed Gannett’s description of a set of 
closely related problems for philosophers of race.  She reveals that arguments 
over race’s status as a natural kind lead to a conceptual dichotomy constituted by 
mutually exclusive biological and social constructivist explanations of race.  The 
dichotomization of race, Gannett argues, precludes investigating important 
questions in contexts in which racial phenomena are constituted by the 
interaction of both social and biological factors.  In this chapter, I focus a bit more 
closely on the primary source of the dichotomy problem, namely, the battle over 
the methods of defining the concept ‘race’.  While Gannett effectively describes 
the pitfalls of natural kinds reasoning about race, Mallon critiques a different 
aspect of traditional philosophical analysis—the “project of semantic ascent,” 
which, according to its most general description, uses “the conceptual analysis of 
race (and related concepts) to teach us about what race must be (if it is anything 
at all)” (Mallon, 2009, p. 2).  Mallon charges that, despite its venerated status 
among philosophers, this “semantic strategy” offers little if anything to philosophy 
of race (Mallon, 2004, 2006, 2009).6 
                                                          
6 For a general treatment of semantic analysis in philosophy see Millgram (2015). 
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This might be surprising to many philosophers, since semantics has long 
enjoyed special status in philosophy—one of philosophy’s first demands, after all, 
is that crucial terms be defined.  In this context, then, it would seem only natural 
to begin with rigorous conceptual analysis to arrive at a proper definition of 
“race.”  Even Gannett appears to assume the primacy of semantics for race 
debates.  She begins the aforementioned paper by laying out various definitions 
in order to reveal the limitations of each, and, by the end, she advises 
philosophers “to familiarize themselves with what race concepts are in actual use 
in various areas of the biological and biomedical science” (Gannett, 2010, p. 
369).  So, even though Gannett clearly questions particular semantic approaches 
to race, and even though she hints at a more liberal approach allowing 
contributions from many sources, she never explicitly calls into question the 
semantic strategy itself.  Mallon does.   
In this context, Mallon is highly skeptical of any semantic approach, 
arguing that it is simply the wrong strategy for assessing race and issues 
involving race.  It is not merely that he is skeptical about the possibility of arriving 
at the right or best definition; rather, semantic analyses of “race,” even if correct, 
are unimportant, according to Mallon.  This conclusion is even more surprising—
shocking even—which is why I need to dedicate a large proportion of this chapter 
to describing multiple versions of the semantic strategy and the problems they 
face.  If Mallon is right—if the semantic approach7 fails—we will be left in need of 
a new medium for ‘race’ talk and new strategies for approaching it.  In short, the 
                                                          
7 I use “semantic strategy” and “semantic approach” interchangeably. 
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focus of this chapter is methodology.  The ultimate aim is to introduce Mallon’s 
methodological alternative, which he dubs the “evolutionary-cognitive 
program.”  A proper introduction of Mallon’s favored methodology, however, 
requires a detailed discussion of the entrenched methodology it is meant to 
replace.  I begin, then, with a description of the semantic strategy and Mallon’s 
critique of it.  
 
3.2 The Semantic Strategy, Its Problems, and Its Rivals 
In general terms, the semantic strategy involves the attempt to connect an 
analysis of the concept ‘race’ (or a definition of the word “race”) and certain 
metaphysical commitments via one or another theory of reference.  Very often, 
philosophers of race who employ this approach then use it to decide their 
normative stance on ‘race’ talk.  If this basic description seems a bit obscure, 
locating it within the broader structural context of philosophy of race helps make 
it clear.  In recent years, several philosophers of race have explicitly described a 
relatively “canonical” investigative structure that revolves around four 
interconnected questions: the normative question, the ontological question, the 
conceptual question, and the methodological question (Glasgow, 2009; Mallon, 
2004; Taylor, 2004).  
The normative question concerns whether we should “eliminate or 
conserve racial discourse and thought, as well as practices that rely on racial 
categories” (Glasgow, 2009, p. 2).  The two normative positions on race, then, 
are eliminativism—the view that ‘race’ talk should be removed from discourse—
and conservationism—the view that at least some form of 'race' talk should be 
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preserved (Mallon, 2006).  Many philosophers assume that the normative 
decision depends on the answers to the others.  As Mallon (2004) says, 
“Normative disputes give rise to a concern with the metaphysics of race because 
of the role metaphysical arguments play in supporting normative conclusions” (p. 
645). In other words, the answer to the ontological question is assumed to inform 
important aspects of the answer to the normative one.  Returning to an earlier 
example, Appiah argues for elimination of ‘race’ talk because of the combination 
of its pernicious past and, more to the point, the fact that it “makes reference to a 
set of racial properties that literally do not exist” (Mallon, 2004, p. 645).  In other 
words, Appiah supports his (normative) eliminativism by way of his 
(metaphysical) skepticism.  Gannett’s normative concerns inspired her survey of 
the metaphysical landscape, but that move lead her to urge a reversal of the 
traditional direction of fit by subordinating the latter question to the former.  
Appiah and Gannett provide illustrative examples of the other’s question as well. 
Crucial to Appiah’s ontological skepticism, for example, is his answer to 
the conceptual question.  He conceives of race in terms of “racialism,” which is 
“the view that there are racial essences” (Mallon, 2006, p. 528).  Hence, when 
Appiah denies the existence of race, he is denying racialist race, but I have 
already shown that there are other reasonable ways to conceive of race. 
Andreasen, for example, promotes a natural kinds view of race, but one that 
does not entail racialism—she, unlike Appiah, is a realist about race, but 
conceived cladistically, not “racialistically.”  Taylor (2000, 2004) is also a realist 
about race but in a sense different than Andreasen’s.  In explicit opposition to 
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Appiah’s skepticism, Taylor argues that race is real as a social construct, not as 
a biological kind.   
All of this is to say, of course, that philosophers’ ontological commitments 
are tied to their answers to the conceptual question, which simply involves 
attempts to determine the correct or best analysis of the concept ‘race’ or 
definition of the word “race.”  To review, for Appiah, the relevant race concept is 
racialist, for Andreasen cladistic, for Taylor social constructivist.  At first gloss, 
their respective methodological commitments appear as different as their 
conceptual conclusions.  Andreasen’s biological approach contrasts from 
Taylor’s constructionism as much as it does from Glasgow’s “reconstructionism.”  
A broader look, however, reveals that each approaches the methodological 
question via some version of the semantic strategy. 
For philosophers, this likely seems natural enough: Normative concerns 
drive the conversation, and philosophers choose a methodology for defining 
contested terms so that we may determine whether those terms describe 
something in the world.  After we arrive at answers regarding our conceptual and 
ontological positions, we return to our normative concerns, and using our newly 
formed analytic tools, determine our normative stance.  It hardly seems 
controversial, yet Mallon shows this revered strategy fails to advance the agenda 
on race.  The problem, according to Mallon (2006), is the semantic strategy itself, 
which he details in step-wise fashion.  First, one “connects metaphysical claims 
and linguistic-conceptual practices with the assumption of a particular theory of 
reference for the word” (Mallon, 2006, p. 527).  Then, from these assumptions, “it 
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is concluded that racial terms or concepts appropriately refer (or fail to refer) to 
some or other metaphysical features of the world” (Mallon, 2006, p. 527).  Finally, 
as I indicated above, these conclusions are often used to determine one’s 
normative stance on ‘race’ talk.  Crucially, then, both the arguments generated by 
this strategy and the normative consequences that flow from them turn on 
disagreements concerning either “the metaphysical features of the world…or the 
appropriate theory of reference for race terms/concepts” (Mallon, 2006 ,p. 527).   
Think again of Appiah’s “mismatch argument,” a paragon of the semantic 
strategy.  Appealing to his racialist conception, Appiah argues that there are no 
races because nothing that exists does or even can fulfill the conditions of 
racialism.  There is, he says, “nothing in the world that can do all we ask ‘race’ to 
do for us” (Appiah, 1995, as cited in Mallon, 2006, p. 525).  Appiah’s conceptual 
choice is not arbitrary.  For him, it is the appropriate conception because it is the 
one we have inherited and the one operative even today.  It is W.E.B. Du Bois’ 
conception of race, which was established at a particular time—the late 19th and 
early 20th  centuries—in reaction to particular events—the lasting consequences 
of racist European and American colonialism.  So, like Andreasen and Glasgow, 
Appiah thinks Kripke and Putnam’s causal-historical theory is more appropriate 
than descriptivism for racial contexts, albeit for the purpose of showing that race 
does not exist.  Since I have previously discussed some problems with this 
approach to race, I needn’t dwell on it here.  It suffices to say that Appiah offers a 
version of the now familiar argument that the causal-historical account best 
represents the ordinary or folk concept and that he then argues that the folk 
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concept attempts to pick out biological populations that do not exist. According to 
Appiah, however, no matter what theory of reference one chooses, racialist race 
fails to refer to anything real.  Even if one switches to a “descriptivist” approach, 
according to which a “term or concept is associated with a description: a 
proposition or set of propositions about the properties of the referent” (Mallon, 
2006, p. 530), Appiah concludes that “race” describes nothing at all.  Appiah’s 
skepticism is secured, then, because no theory of reference picks out an object 
to which “race” (so conceived) refers.  Again, the result is a mismatch between 
our vocabulary and what is really in the world.  Appiah is alone neither in 
approach nor conclusion.  In Philosophy of Science and Race, for example, 
Naomi Zack argues that “the only known candidates for physical scientific bases 
of race…fails.  Therefore, there is no physical scientific basis for social racial 
taxonomy” (Zack, 2002, 88).  In short, she says, “The ordinary concept of race in 
the United States has no scientific basis” (Zack, 1993, 18).   
This line of argument has a deep intuitive pull and a rich 
history.  Gannett’s earlier allusion to phlogiston provides a useful example.  
“Phlogiston” is the name given in the 18th century to a theoretical element 
intended to explain combustion.  By the turn of the 19th century, however, 
phlogiston theory had been abandoned and, quite naturally, “phlogiston” 
eliminated from discourse.  So it is hard not to be surprised when Mallon argues 
that the semantic strategy is irrelevant for race.  Nevertheless, this “venerable 
strategy,” he says, “is problematic…race theory ought not to rely on finding the 
correct theory of reference to determine the appropriate use of ‘race’ talk,” largely 
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because it sustains unnecessary and unhelpful metaphysical disputes (Mallon, 
2006, p. 528).  Once again, the previous chapter provides an illustrative 
example—Andreasen and Glasgow began with promise for a productive debate, 
but it devolved into unhelpful squabbles over race’s “baptismal 
procedures.”  Given missteps like this, Mallon regards the normative question, 
rather than the conceptual or metaphysical questions, as primary.  Spelled out 
this way, Mallon’s objection is made more intuitive, but comprehending its full 
effect requires elaborating on its fine points. 
Mallon’s (2006) sustained attack on semantic approaches begins with an 
appraisal of the state of play in metaphysics of race.  There is, he says, an 
“ontological consensus” that racialism is false; “there is now widespread 
agreement among philosophers, social theorists, anthropologists, and biologists 
that races do not share…biobehavioral essences” (p. 529).  Even if molecular 
genetics provided the last “hope” for a source of racial essence, “studies of 
human genetic diversity suggest that genetic variation within racially identified 
populations is as great as or greater than diversity between populations.  Thus, it 
is very unlikely that any interesting genetic ‘essence’ will be shared by all and 
only members of a race” (p. 529).  As a result, the contemporary debate has 
splintered into the three metaphysical positions on race: racial skepticism, racial 
constructionism, and racial population naturalism (pp. 525-526).  I have already 
introduced each position and some of its supporters: Appiah and Zack, as I just 
showed, are skeptics; Glasgow and Taylor are constructionists; Andreasen, 
Kitcher, and Pigliucci and Kaplan are population naturalists.  At first blush, the 
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“three groups…seem to disagree fundamentally on the metaphysical character of 
race,” but Mallon argues that much “of the apparent metaphysical disagreement 
over race is an illusion,” that the semantic strategy sustains that illusion, and that 
the semantic strategy is, therefore, problematic (Mallon, 2006, pp. 527-528).  I 
elaborate on each point.   
Mallon regards the metaphysical disagreement as illusory because 
despite their differences, the competing camps actually “share a broad base of 
agreement regarding the metaphysical facts surrounding racial or racialized 
phenomena that suggests their views are complementary parts of a complex 
view incorporating biological, social, and psychological facts” (Mallon, 2006, 
528).  Mallon (2006) thereby expands the ontological consensus by divorcing 
metaphysical facts from “questions regarding the use of racial terms or 
concepts,” a move which results in “an almost banal list of observations”: that all 
parties agree that racialism is false, that there is a plurality of operative racial 
concepts, that a common set of criteria are used to ascribe persons to a race, 
and that racial classification affects persons “in both superficial and profound 
ways” that are sometimes “profoundly oppressive” (p. 545).  Virtually everyone 
also agrees that past “geographic distribution of populations” likely resulted in a 
“significant degree of reproductive isolation,” which is “partially responsible for 
the geographic distribution of superficial bodily features associated with race,” 
and that racial classification affects marriage and reproduction rates (p. 546).   
In fact, if theorists did broadly disagree in their metaphysical 
commitments, one would expect arguments to revolve around those 
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disagreements, but Mallon shows that disagreements about race tend to center 
on the appropriateness of ‘race’ talk, rather than race’s metaphysical status.  For 
example, even though “Appiah thinks races do not exist…he offers an account of 
racial identification to account for the constructionist intuition that racial 
classifications is causally important” (Mallon, 2006, p. 546).  Again, racial 
skeptics, such as Appiah, are skeptical about racialism in particular, but so is 
everyone else, constructivists and populationists included.  Mallon (2006) 
concludes that if such broad metaphysical agreement exists, “it is mistaken to 
view dispute among constructionists and naturalists as primarily metaphysical in 
character” (p. 547).  As a consequence, “for a variety of important questions of 
public policy and applied morality, the questions may be restated without 
important metaphysical disagreement within different idioms of ‘race’ talk” 
(Mallon, 2006, p. 547).  For example, despite disagreement over the existence of 
race, skeptics and constructionists alike can justifiably “call for rectification of civil 
rights violations in twentieth-century America” (Mallon, 2006, p. 547).  So exactly 
what is the fuss? 
Mallon argues that the problem is this very strategy of debating the 
semantics of race under the guise of metaphysical disagreement: “in the absence 
of substantial metaphysical disagreement, racial theorists have achieved 
alternative conclusions by making different assumptions about the correct 
semantics for racial terms” (Mallon, 2006, p. 547).  It makes no difference 
whether semanticists opt to “decide which theory of reference is correct and 
decide what auxiliary assumptions regarding the application of such a theory are 
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needed to determine the correct referents of racial terms and concepts” or to 
“take Appiah’s strategy and attempt to justify a conclusion in terms of every 
plausible theory” (Mallon, 2006, p. 548).  Choosing a particular theory of 
reference “is obfuscating because…it makes philosophical debate over the 
reference of racial terms and concepts appear as a genuine metaphysical 
disagreement” and “ineffective because it is unlikely to be fruitful in resolving how 
we ought to use ‘race’ talk” (Mallon, 2006, p. 548). Appiah’s alternate strategy of 
arguing that “one’s conclusions follow from all the plausible candidate theories of 
reference” seems to offer hope, but to no avail.  To do as Appiah wishes, “we 
need to be able to separate the plausible from the implausible candidates” of 
theories of reference, but even if “we can decide on the plausible candidates, 
there is no reason to believe that all the plausible candidates converge on a 
single answer regarding whether or how race exists” (Mallon, 2006, p. 549).  So, 
the semantic strategy’s viability is dubious already, but Mallon isn’t done.   
Suppose, he says, that we “arrived at a correct account of the reference of 
racial terms…yielding a definitive account of what (if anything) race is” (Mallon, 
2006, p. 549).  Even in that unlikely event, “it is not clear that the semantically 
correct account of ‘race’ talk ought to dictate our use” (Mallon, 2006, p. 
549).  Despite the intuition that answering the normative question depends on 
answering the others, Mallon (2006) shows that “semantic arguments regarding 
the referents of ‘race’ talk need not dovetail with other sorts of argument” (p. 
549).  Mallon’s analysis makes this point surprisingly easy to swallow.  If we 
decide that “‘race’ talk is deeply oppressive, no argument to the effect that such 
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talk refers to a biological population or a social construction would be of sufficient 
weight to merit the continuation of this practice” (Mallon, 2006, p. 549).  On the 
other hand, even if it does not refer to anything in the world, we still might decide 
that ‘race’ talk is morally required for addressing existing oppression.  Mallon 
(2006) clearly shows there is no necessary relationship between the normative 
and other questions, arguing that “the attempt to link the [normative and 
metaphysical questions] via the semantic strategy has…resulted in an illusion of 
metaphysical disagreement and a misplaced emphasis on metaphysical and 
semantic concerns” (p. 550-551).  Even so, “profound disagreement” remains 
regarding the moral status of ‘race’ talk, but in place of the semantic strategy, 
Mallon (2006) recommends “a complex assessment of many factors, including, 
the epistemic value of ‘race’ talk in various domains, the benefits and costs of 
racial identification and social enforcement of such identification…the role of 
‘race’ talk in promoting or undermining racism” and so on (p. 550).   
It appears, then, that the semantic approach to race produces little of 
value, even if it hits its intended target.  Still, not everyone is convinced—the 
semantic strategy was not abandoned after the publication of Mallon (2006).  I 
now turn to two more recent analyses of “race,” each of which represents one the 
two general types of semanticism about race.  I first introduce rationalist 
semanticism via the work of Michael Hardimon, and then turn to Glasgow’s 
empirical semanticism.8  Despite renewed vigor among these semanticists, 
however, none appear to overcome Mallon’s objections to the semantic strategy 
                                                          
8 Glasgow makes this distinction as well, but in terms of what he calls “armchair” and 
“empirical” analysis.  I choose “rationalist” as a more neutral representation of the former. 
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for race.   
 
3.2.1 Michael Hardimon’s Rationalist Semanticism 
Appiah (1985) describes a view according to which “Understanding the 
idea of race involves grasping how people think about race: what they take to be 
central truths about races; under what sorts of circumstances they will apply the 
idea of race; what consequences for action will flow from that application” 
(Appiah, 1985, 56).  Appiah calls this the “’ideational’ view of meaning,” and it is 
where I locate the rationalist semantic approach.  The chief proponent of this 
approach with regard to race is Michael Hardimon.   
Hardimon’s foray into philosophy of race begins with a 2003 paper in 
which he aims at “providing a general answer to the question: What is the 
concept of race?” (Hardimon, 2003, p. 437). Like most race theorists, Hardimon 
recognizes the existence of a multiplicity of race concepts, conceding that there 
“is no single concept of race that deserves the honorific ‘the’” (Hardimon, 2012, 
6).  Nevertheless, Hardimon (2003) initially focuses on a single one, the 
“important and poorly understood” ordinary or folk concept of race, which 
“corresponds (roughly) to the meaning of the ordinary word ‘race’…[and] bears 
the imprint of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century attempts to develop a scientific 
concept of race” (p. 437).  Unlike Glasgow, however, Hardimon (2003) aims 
neither “to rehabilitate the word ‘race’,” nor “propose to introduce a new sense of 
the word”; instead, his approach “takes the form of reflection on an already given 
concept” (p. 440).  Hardimon (2003) concedes that his strategy “carries with it a 
certain ineliminable element of rationalization,” but that means accepting only 
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“the familiar methodological assumption that appeals to intuition are a legitimate 
and inescapable component of the articulation of ordinary concepts” (p. 441).  To 
even get off the ground, he says, “we must suppose that at least some of our 
intuitions about the concept of race are correct” (Hardimon, 2003, p. 441). 
 His methodology, then, is to analyze ‘race’ to its “logical core,” that is, its 
“intelligible nucleus...characterized by three basic theses” that are conjunctively 
“necessary and sufficient for constituting the content” (Hardimon, 2003, pp. 441-
442).  It should be obvious that Hardimon’s methodology is both rationalist and 
semanticist—rationalist by explicit admission, semanticist by virtue of its attempt 
to arrive at and proceed from a definitive meaning of ‘race’.  According to 
Hardimon (2003), the “concept of race is the concept of a group of human beings 
distinguished from other human beings by visible physical features of the 
relevant kind…whose members are linked by common ancestry” originating “from 
a distinctive geographic location” (pp. 442, 445, 447).  In sum, Hardimon’s 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for division of human populations by 
the logical core of ‘race’ are (1) physical appearance, (2) shared ancestry, and 
(3) shared geographic origin.   
Hardimon (2003) says that the first condition “captures the basic intuition 
that race is essentially manifest,” which means that the “ordinary concept of race 
requires that the distinction between racial groups be visibly marked in some way 
or other” (p. 442).  Any explanation of race that leaves this feature out 
necessarily fails.  “The very notion of a visually indistinguishable racial group 
runs counter to the idea of race” (Hardimon, 2003, p. 442).  Hardimon attempts to 
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secure the point through a thought experiment intended to show that some 
physical features—say, skin tone—are racial, while others—such as the 
presence of an Adam’s apple—are not.  Hardimon concludes that “Racial groups 
are distinguished from one another by visible physical features that are racial,” a 
claim that is supposed to be saved from the charge of tautology by the fact that 
“the relevant physical features of race can be picked out ‘directly’ through 
ostension…Pointing allows us to escape the circle of words” (Hardimon, 2003, 
pp. 444-445).  So, Hardimon (2003) does not delineate the kinds of features he 
takes to be racial, but he apparently knows them when he sees them. Despite its 
importance to the core, however, Hardimon stresses that this first thesis should 
not be taken to “suggest that race is a matter of physical appearance merely” (p. 
445).   
Race “is also a matter of ancestry: who one’s parents are, who their 
parents are, and so forth” (Hardimon, 2003, p. 445).  That is, the second 
condition of the logical core is that to be considered a race, a human group must 
share a common ancestry.  Although different conceptions of race might yield 
different “details of the nature of the ancestry that racial identity involves,” 
Hardimon (2003) reasons from the etymological link between the words “race” 
and “lineage” that “it is possible to extract from the concept a number of structural 
features” (Hardimon, 2003, p. 445).  First, the race of an individual is determined 
by one’s “immediate ancestors: his or her parents” (p. 446).  In addition, races 
proceed from “founders” whose line is “maintained through inbreeding. 
Endogamy is thus a structural characteristic of race” (Hardimon, 2003, p. 445).  
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So far, then, to qualify as a “racial lineage,” a human group must have founders 
that “exhibit distinctive visible features of the relevant kind or possess alleles for 
such features”; a group does not count as a race unless its members “resemble 
one another in their visible features” (Hardimon, 2003, p. 447).  
Finally, the combination of shared visible features and lineage entail the 
third necessary and sufficient condition of the logical core—that the members of 
the group “originate form a distinctive geographic location” (Hardimon, 2003, p. 
447).  Hardimon (2003) again appeals to etymology and intuition to establish this 
point: The connection between race and geography “can be seen in the names 
major writers on race in the seventeenth century assigned to racial groups” (p. 
447).  Furthermore, this “lexical link between race and geographical area reflects 
the intuitive idea that racial groups have their origin in different geographic 
locations” (Hardimon, 2003, p. 447).  Any supposed race, then, must be 
distinguished by “a specific geographical location…uniquely associated with it” 
(p. 447).  In sum, the ordinary concept ‘race’ corresponds to the meaning of the 
folk term “race,” which Hardimon defines as a human group or population that is 
distinguished by visible physical features (“of the relevant kind”) and a common 
ancestry uniquely associated with a geographic region. 
Noticeably absent is the racialist aspect of race that concerned Appiah 
and others.  That omission is one that Hardimon vigorously defends—he 
intentionally deflates ‘race’ in part to distance it from racialism.  To this end, 
Hardimon (2003) devotes significant effort to distinguishing the race “concept’s 
logical core and the racialist development of that core” (p. 442). His “minimalist” 
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account, he says, arises out of his more general philosophical commitments, the 
most crucial of which is a distinction between concepts and conceptions. “The 
ordinary concept of race and the ordinary conception of race are two different 
things,” though they “operate in tandem.  The concept of X specifies what X is.  A 
conception of X indicates how the concept of X is to be understood” (Hardimon, 
2003, p. 440).  So, Hardimon allows that “thicker” explanations of race exist, but 
argues that they are constructed upon the foundation of the logical core—that is, 
as conceptions built upon the concept of race.  He further claims that this 
distinction “makes it possible to see that much of what is commonly presented in 
the literature as a discussion of the ordinary concept of race is perhaps better 
understood as a discussion of the ordinary conception of race” (Hardimon, 2003, 
p. 440).   
The ordinary concept answers to the “logical core [and] does not require 
that races have essences.  The ordinary concept is not essentialistic” (Hardimon, 
2003, p. 449).  This, argues Hardimon, is not a bug but a feature because it 
means the concept “is compatible with the modern view that there are no…sharp 
divisions between racial groups.  More precisely it does not demand that each 
race…possesses some unique property…(visible or hidden) or set of properties ” 
(Hardimon, 2003, p. 449).   So, since racialism is a “species of essentialism,” 
‘race’ (the concept) is not properly perceived as racialist. The association with 
racialism, says Hardimon, is an accident of history.  “When the logical core first 
entered the historical scene, it was already articulated by the racialist 
development.  The step from the logical core to racialist development…is 
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historically contingent” (Hardimon, 2003, p. 453).  Since nothing about the 
“logical core necessitates this step, [it] could have appeared without the racialist 
development, if world history had gone differently” (Hardimon, 2003, p. 
453).  Because of the way things did go historically, however, “the logical core 
and racialist development appear to be a unity” (Hardimon, 2003, p. 453).   The 
“ordinary conception of race,” which appends racialism to the ordinary concept, 
results from that apparent unity (Hardimon, 2003, p. 451, emphasis added).  In 
other words, Hardimon argues that while the ordinary concept ‘race’ is not 
racialist, the ordinary conception of race is. 
Of course, all of this predates Mallon’s 2006 attack on the semantic 
strategy, but in a spate of more recent papers on the same topic, Hardimon 
stands his ground.  The thesis of his 2003 paper is foundational to a 2013 paper, 
for example, in which he argues that the failure to distinguish the ordinary 
concept from the racialist conception is what leads to “Confusions about the 
place of race in medicine” (Hardimon, 2013, p. 6).  In fact, much of his other 
recent work on race centers on practical benefits of distinguishing concepts and 
conceptions of race.  In contrast to Gannett, who argues that we must find ways 
to talk about racial contexts in which social and biological factors interact, 
Hardimon (2013) attributes the difficulty of applying racial concepts in practical 
contexts to the “erroneous belief that there is an amorphous thing race that is 
(somehow!) both social and biological” (p. 6).   
Race, Hardimon argues, “is not one thing.  The social and biological 
phenomena of race are two different things” that require “two technical race 
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concepts, one registering the social phenomenon…and the other registering the 
possible biological phenomenon” (Hardimon, 2013, p. 7).  Neither is identical with 
the ordinary concept. “Socialrace”—roughly, the concept of socially constructed 
race—is racialist and, therefore, different from the ordinary concept (Hardimon, 
2014, p. 75).  But, while the populationist concept is not quite equivalent to the 
ordinary one, it is “continuous with” it.  Defined according to “the fact that human 
beings exhibit morphological differences…statistically associated with differences 
of geographical ancestry,” the populationist concept, or “minimalist phenomenon 
of biological race,” is a “scientization” of the ordinary one (Hardimon, 2013, p. 
18).  
The point of these elaborations on Hardimon’s stance is twofold.  First, 
many of them are relevant to later parts of the chapter and dissertation, so their 
introduction here primes their future roles.  More importantly, though, at virtually 
every stage, the extended version of Hardimon’s story depends on the semantic 
strategy, as evidenced by his explicit use of “conceptual analysis of the concept 
race (and related concepts) to teach us about what race must be (if it is anything 
at all)” (Mallon, 2009, p. 2).  One could hardly generate more accurate general 
description of Hardimon’s approach.  Although he recognizes a “plurality” of race 
concepts, Hardimon’s project is founded on an attempt to cull the logical core 
from what is common to all ordinary conceptions of race.   
The relevance of Mallon’s objections is obvious, and recognizing this line 
of criticism, Hardimon offers a curious response.  He essentially bites the 
bullet.  In the 2003 paper, he says one “of the most striking results of our account 
65 
 
of the logical core of the ordinary concept of race is that race turns out to be 
relatively unimportant” (Hardimon, 2003, p. 451).  In 2012, he echoes this 
sentiment: “it is crucial to distinguish the question concerning the reality of race 
from the question concerning its importance” (Hardimon, 2012, p. 269).  
Hardimon’s motivation is not hard to guess.  A deflated race concept bereft of 
racialist baggage improves the odds of preserving ‘race’ talk without racist 
baggage.  This is something for which Hardimon clearly aims—his link between 
the ordinary and populationist concepts culminates with an attempt to show that 
latter can be of use in medicine without fostering racism (Hardimon, 2012). Even 
so, as Mallon’s arguments reveal, one can accept all that Hardimon has claimed 
and still take whatever normative position on the use of ‘race’ talk one wants. 
But Hardimon’s is not the only available semantic approach to race.  The 
history of philosophical rivalry is rife with opposing rationalist and empiricist 
explanations of the same phenomenon, and this context provides another 
example.  I turn now to the empiricist semanticism of Joshua Glasgow. 
 
3.2.2 Joshua Glasgow’s Empirical Semanticism 
Glasgow (2009) defends a position on race according to which we would 
neither “out-and-out eliminate race-thinking, nor…wholeheartedly conserve it” (p. 
2).  Instead, we would “replace racial discourse with a nearby discourse,” that is, 
we would “stop using terms like ‘race,’ ‘Black,’ and ‘White,’ and so on to purport 
to refer to biological categories, as we currently do, and instead use them to refer 
to wholly social categories” (Glasgow, 2009, p. 2).  The folk biologically informed 
concept ‘race’, he argues, should be replaced by his new “de-biologized” concept 
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“race.”  In other words, Glasgow’s goal is to redefine the folk race concept 
because it has been historically misconceived as biological. As a result, Glasgow 
(2009) considers his view neither eliminativist nor conservationist; instead he 
calls for “racial reconstructionism” (p. 2).  Even this brief description already 
suggests that his methodology is semantic; the detailed description cements it.   
Contra Hardimon, Glasgow (2009) argues that what he calls the 
“armchair” approach (what I’ve called the “rationalist approach”) is “misguided… 
[so] we should focus our attention squarely on how racial terms are used in 
contemporary mainstream discourse” (p. 8).  In lieu of reflecting from his 
armchair, Glasgow opts for “the ‘experimental approach,’ which holds not only 
that the meanings of racial terms are…at least partially fixed by common sense, 
but also that we should inform our analysis of folk racial discourse with data 
gathered from actual empirical research conducted in a manner consistent with 
the practices of the social sciences” (Glasgow, 2009, p. 8).  His approach joins a 
“growing experimental philosophy movement in insisting that we accommodate 
empirical data when doing conceptual analysis” (Glasgow, 2009, p. 39).  The 
data to which he appeals reveal interesting, if not entirely conclusive, results. 
Empirical research on race does converge on some relatively consistent 
claims.  It lends evidence to what Glasgow (2009) calls the “biosocial complexity 
of racial discourse,” which amounts to the claim that “folk racial concepts…are 
composed of biological elements and sometimes also social elements” (pp. 10, 
78).  The data say that “phenotype is in some sense central to race, without 
going so far as to say that one’s race will always be dictated by the way one 
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looks” (Glasgow, 2009, p. 78).  Despite these and several other statistical truths, 
Glasgow concedes that we must “settle for an incomplete analysis of” the 
concept ‘race’ (Glasgow, 2009, p. 78).  Whatever we decide the concept ‘race’ 
includes—whatever, that is, the empirical results show—Glasgow answers the 
ontological question in the negative: “race is not real” (Glasgow, 2009, p. 8).  For 
Glasgow, the “upshot” is that race is neither socially nor biologically real.  Like 
Appiah, then, Glasgow is a skeptic; unlike Appiah, he is not an eliminativist. 
Despite advocating antirealism about race, Glasgow warns that “we’d be poorly 
advised to simply get rid of racial discourse” and suggests that we opt for his 
“purely social” revisionist concept (Glasgow, 2009, p. 8).   
Just as Hardimon does, then, Glasgow utilizes a semantic strategy.  To 
review, Glasgow argues on the grounds of empirical research that the folk 
conceive of race in a certain way.  He then argues that what the folk think race to 
be has no concomitant “object” in the world, so race is not real in the “relevant” 
sense.  We have another mismatch argument.  What distinguishes Glasgow from 
Appiah, then, is not the method but the conclusion.  Glasgow thinks the 
mismatch between ‘race’ and the world should motivate us to reconstruct, not 
eliminate, it.   
Mallon’s general objection to the semantic strategy barely needs 
repeating.  In fact, by agreeing with Appiah ontologically but disagreeing with him 
normatively, his own commitments appear to show “the semantics of ‘race’ 
doesn’t really matter to normative debates” (Mallon, 2009, p. 1).  In his 2009 
commentary on Glasgow’s A Theory of Race, Mallon doubles down on his 
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critique of the semantic strategy.  To make the case, Mallon explicitly stipulates 
“that Glasgow’s own analysis is correct”—that is, he concedes for the sake of 
argument that the meaning of the folk term “race” is the correct term of analysis 
and that the term entails some sort of biological element (Mallon, 2009, p. 2).  As 
a result, any “concept (e.g., Glasgow’s race*) that does not entail biological 
reality of a certain sort is thereby a different concept” (Mallon, 2009, p. 2).  From 
there, he argues that Glasgow’s “correct” analysis nevertheless fails to lead to 
any interesting normative results.  Consider one of Mallon’s examples.  
Dealing first with the normative question, Mallon points out that Glasgow 
shares commitments with both eliminativists and conservationists.  On one hand, 
he shares the eliminativist view that “the folk term ‘race’…entails something 
untrue,” namely, the claim “that race has an ‘adequate biological basis’” (Mallon, 
2009, p. 2).  On the other, Glasgow endorses a view Mallon calls “practice 
conservationism”: Glasgow’s reconstructionism “involves combining relatively 
conservative reform of existing sociolinguistic practices with an anti-realist 
metaphysics” (Mallon, 2009, p. 3).  The rub, says Mallon (2009), is that a 
“conservationist might combine the same reform with a realist metaphysics” (p. 
3).  Despite their differences, all parties could agree that “‘race’ used to entail 
belief in a biological kind” and “‘race’, henceforth means a social kind” (Mallon, 
2009, p. 3).   
 According to Mallon, Glasgow and traditional conservationists disagree 
only about “whether the folk term ‘race’ already refers to a social kind, perhaps 
because they disagree about whether the common but false folk belief in racial 
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biology is constitutive of the meaning of ‘race’ or not” (Mallon, 2009, p. 3).  But 
this is just the sort of disagreement that Mallon thinks “makes no difference in 
practice” (Mallon, 2009, p. 3).  Mallon uses a similar strategy to questions 
Glasgow’s semantic approach to the metaphysical question, so I skip the details 
here; it suffices to say that Mallon argues Glasgow’s answer to the metaphysical 
question does not lead to any substantial conclusions or distinctions.  Mallon 
says that Glasgow’s conclusion leads to nothing more than “a disagreement 
about the meaning of words (and not one that makes a difference to practice)” 
(Mallon, 2009, 4).  Glasgow (2009) responds that his answer to the conceptual 
question “does...make a difference to practice, concerning what we should do 
with racial discourse” (p. 13).   
As the many racially charged events of 2014 and early 2015 suggest, race 
is not going away.  So if it turns out that Mallon is right, and the semantic strategy 
is misguided, we will not be able to just stop talking about race.  We will need a 
methodological alternative to advance the discussion.  Mallon offers one based 
on what he calls the “evolutionary-cognitive program” (Mallon, 2010, 2013).   
 
3.3 The Evolutionary Cognitive Program 
Given that Mallon charges the semantic strategy with inefficacy, one 
would expect him to offer a methodological alternative that does matter to 
normative concerns, which is just what he does in a recent series of related 
papers.  As a preview, the methodological shift Mallon favors is, like Glasgow’s 
reconstructionism, informed by empirical, social scientific data, but Mallon makes 
quite different use of it.  To this point, I have dealt only with the two most 
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commonly cited sets of race-relevant facts—the biological and the social—but 
Mallon complements the list with a third, the psychological.  This move is the key 
to his methodological alternative to semanticism, so the rest of the chapter is 
devoted to introducing and motivating what Mallon calls “the evolutionary-
cognitive program” (henceforth, ECP) for philosophy of race.  I proceed as 
follows.   
First, I review two of Mallon’s recent attempts to explain ECP and the 
challenges it poses for social constructionism, which is the foundation of the 
received view in philosophy of race.  I then conclude the section by introducing a 
collaborative effort between Mallon, Dan Kelly, and Edouard Machery in which 
they defend ECP’s normative import by spelling out its implications for the 
ongoing debate between ‘race’ talk eliminativists and conservationists.  These 
combined efforts suffice to show ECP’s greater potential to relevantly impact the 
normative debate than its rivals.  To be clear, I use this final section to motivate 
inclusion of psychological research in our investigations of race; the detailed 
description and analysis of psychological research and its impact on philosophy 
of race come in the next chapter.   
To begin, Kelly, Machery, and Mallon note that “contemporary race theory 
is nearly devoid of effort to engage the burgeoning literature from social 
psychology and cognitive science on racial categorization and racial prejudice” 
(Kelly et al., 2010, p.  433).  In “contrast to the attention paid to anthropological 
and historical factors, the philosophical literature on race fails to consider 
whether and how psychological factors could affect the feasibility of the various 
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normative proposals” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 466).  Taylor, in fact, not only ignores 
ECP but explicitly challenges its normative significance.  Given the “centuries of 
cultural and social transformation during which we built up and forcefully 
promulgated comprehensive conceptions of human racial difference,” Taylor 
wonders “why we need to appeal to some hard-wired mechanism that routinely 
cranks out organisms that indulge in racist exclusions” (Taylor, 2005, p. 
38).  Although I don’t directly address Taylor’s concern in what follows, showing 
that ECP impacts normative considerations in a way that semanticism cannot 
carries an implicit response—if its advocates can prove its normative weight, 
then Taylor’s challenge is answered.   
Mallon, of course, takes the stance opposite Taylor’s, arguing (both 
independently and collaboratively with Kelly and Machery) that understanding the 
“hardwiring” of racial cognition could be crucial to answering the normative 
question.  Kelly, Machery, and Mallon deem the willful disregard of innate 
psychology in race theory “unfortunate” and “unjustified…[because] empirical 
research on racial cognition is directly relevant to the goals held by normative 
racial theorists” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 433).  They seek to rectify this omission by 
exploring “the intersection of…normative proposals with recent empirical work on 
psychology of racial cognition” and “aim…to demonstrate the need for normative 
racial philosophy to more closely engage contemporary psychology of racial 
categorization and racial prejudice” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 433).   
Mallon (2010) advances the discussion in that direction, arguing that ECP 
disrupts the status quo.  The “evolutionary-cognitive research program poses a 
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challenge to the received view about racial classification in social theory” (Mallon, 
2010, p. 273).  The positions that subscribe to the “received view,” Mallon says, 
“share a commitment to ‘social constructionism” (Mallon, 2010, p. 272).  This 
much is well-known; what is often missed is that “two quite distinct senses” of 
social construction operate within in race theory.  The first, which Mallon calls 
“anti-racialism,” is committed to the view “that race (the subject of racial 
classification) does not exist as a biological kind in the way ordinary or folk ideas 
of race seem to assume and is therefore ‘merely a construction’” (Mallon, 2009, 
p. 3).  Of course, ECP theorists are a part of the ontological consensus against 
racialism, that is, they are as constructionist as anyone in this sense.  The 
interesting sense of constructionism for this context, then, is the second.  
“Representational constructionism,” Mallon says, “holds that racial 
classification itself is primarily the product of social and cultural practices” 
(Mallon, 2010, p. 272).  In other words, work “in social philosophy on racial 
classification” is generally committed to the view that “we (as individuals and as 
cultural groups) have the theoretical representations we do, rather than some 
other theories or no theories at all because of historically and culturally specific 
conventions, decisions, practices, and so forth” (Mallon, 2010, p. 272).  So, this 
type of social constructionism advances an empirical claim about how races and 
systems of racial classifications are formed. 
The evolutionary-cognitive program promotes a different explanation for 
racialized phenomena.  So, to be clear, the issue at stake is an explanation of the 
root cause of human racial classification, and social theory and ECP are 
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committed to rival explanations of racialized phenomena.  “Recent work by 
evolutionary and cognitive psychologists, anthropologists, and philosophers has 
posed a challenge to representational constructionism” by explaining “folk racial 
theories at least in part as the result of cognitive mechanisms which are culturally 
canalized, species-typical, and domain-specific” (Mallon, 2010, p. 272).  This 
claim is crucial to ECP and receives thorough examination in the next chapter; 
here, a brief sketch of each characteristic suffices to motivate ECP’s potential to 
contribute to race theory.   
First, a “culturally canalized” cognitive mechanism is one that has a 
property associated with (and often considered a condition for) innateness” 
(Mallon, 2010, p. 272).  In contrast to social theory, which focuses on variation 
within classification schemata, ECP predicts that mechanisms associated with 
racial classification “develop stably across a wide range of different cultural 
environments” (Mallon, 2010, p. 272). Accordingly, in spite of variation in 
particular racial classification schemata, one should expect also to find among 
them many core commonalities.  Second, the cognitive mechanisms implicated 
for race are also “species-typical” in that, “like having two arms and legs, eyes, 
ears, hair, and so forth, these cognitive capacities are traits that humans typically 
possess” (Mallon, 2010, p. 272).  That is, being human, according to ECP, 
means coming equipped with a capacity and tendency to classify 
racially.  Finally, “to say that they are ‘domain-specific’ is to say that, unlike 
domain-general cognitive capacities (like memory, attention, or perception) that 
are employed across a wide range of problem domains, these mechanisms are 
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specialized for solving a particular sort of problem” (Mallon, 2010, p. 272).  If, for 
example, human memory served only numerical recall, it would be domain-
specific; since it instead allows recall of numbers, words, images, sounds, 
feelings, and so on, it is domain-general.  To say, as ECP does, that the 
cognitive mechanisms underwriting racial classification are domain-specific is to 
say that they are “specialized for a particular sort of problem” (Mallon, 2010, p. 
272). It is not to say, however, that they are adaptations specifically for racial 
cognition.  As a matter of fact, the consensus within ECP is that the mechanisms 
are exaptations or “by-products of a mechanism that is adapted for something 
else” (Mallon, 2010, p. 272).   
Since the study of racial cognition has quickly become “an exceedingly 
complex affair...rife with controversy,” in lieu of attempting to rule out all 
alternatives, Mallon (2010) offers a “series of considerations that illustrate and 
look to favor the idea that core aspects of racial cognition emerge stably in much 
of human development” (Mallon, 2010, p. 273).  While Mallon says this is a 
“modest aim,” his list raises significant obstacles for alternative approaches, 
which would have “to explain away” the predictive and explanatory advantages of 
ECP.  As before, I simply introduce and briefly summarize them here, saving 
significant elaboration for the next chapter. 
First, Mallon (2010) reveals “a number of striking parallels” between folk 
biological and folk racial thinking.  For example, research indicates that folk 
theories treat both biological kind membership and racial membership as 
“independent of superficial but prototypical properties” (Mallon, 2010, p. 
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274).  Here, Mallon appeals to the work of Frank Keil (1989), who shows that 
preschool-aged children understand that a zebra dressed up to look like a horse 
remains a zebra (Mallon, 2010, p. 274).  This style of essentialist biological 
judgment, which humans retain throughout adulthood, runs parallel to racialist 
judgments described earlier.  Mallon (2009) offers another striking example: 
“seeming to have surface properties of one race but really being a member of 
another race is precisely what makes ‘passing’ as a member of another race an 
apparently coherent idea” (p. 276).  Racial “passing” occurs when a person of 
one race has features that give him or her the appearance of a member of 
another race, allowing that person to be accepted as a member of that other 
race.  Following emancipation, for example, some light-skinned African 
Americans were able to “pass as White,” conferring on them a measure of White 
privilege. Mallon’s point, then, is that the phenomenon of passing makes sense 
only if judgment of racial membership runs deeper than the skin.  The parallel 
with the zebra-horse example is patent.  Folk biology says that the zebra remains 
a zebra, even if its appearance is that of a horse; species-typical human racial 
cognition says that a person of race R1 remains a member of R1, even if that 
person has the appearance of a member of R2.   
Given the vanishingly low probability of these parallels arising accidentally, 
Mallon (2010) suggests a more likely explanation: that they are “underwritten by 
a common mechanism” (p. 277).  If that is the case, then long-established 
“evidence for the cross-cultural and early emergence of folk biology is also 
evidence for the canalization, domain-specificity, and species typicality of 
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mechanisms underlying aspects of folk racialism” (Mallon, 2010, p. 
277).   Despite its opposition to the received view, this agenda “is already being 
fruitfully pursued by evolutionary-cognitive theorist” in ways that motivate further 
study.  I return to this topic at the beginning of the next chapter, so let me move 
on to ECP’s second apparent advantage. 
The next consideration in favor of pursuing ECP is evidence “supporting 
the development of group cognition in advance of mastery of visual markers of 
groups” (Mallon, 2010, p. 280).  Here, Mallon references two lines of work, one 
from Katherine Kinzler and her colleagues, whose conclusions I set aside for 
now. The other is from Lawrence Hirschfeld, whose work I briefly introduce here 
largely because of its impact on later chapters.  Hirschfeld’s studies result in an 
“extended argument that children’s conceptual understanding of racial types 
seems to outstrip their ability to categorize people into race” (Mallon, 2010, p. 
279).  For example, data show that children misidentify their own race 
membership in perceptual tests using dolls, but not in verbal tests using 
labels.  Furthermore, “children use race as a category in free sorting tasks, and 
also as a basis for racial prejudice, but they do not use racial categories in the 
selection of playmates” (Mallon, 2010, p. 279).  Contra Hardimon, Hirschfeld 
believes these results suggest “children do not acquire knowledge of races by 
constructing categories based on perceptual difference”; instead they come 
equipped with a propensity that “leads them to acquire and organize beliefs 
regarding human groups well in advance of their ability to coordinate them with 
perceptual learning or with action” (Mallon, 2010, p. 280).  ECP’s innate cognitive 
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mechanism offers an explanation of the Hirschfeld data, and again, it is not clear 
how a social constructionist theory could accommodate this result. 
The third consideration in motivating ECP is that it provides an explanation 
for what Mallon calls “cross-cultural racialism” (Mallon, 2010, p. 277).  Among 
social philosophers and social scientists, there is a “remarkable consensus” that 
racial classifications are temporally and geographically particular.  This is a 
strong version of Michael Root’s claim that “Race does not travel,” by which he 
means things such as the fact that some “men who are Black in New Orleans 
now would have been octoroons there some years ago or would be White in 
Brazil today.  Socrates had no race in ancient Athens” (Root, 2000, pp. S631-
S632). Or did he? 
Mallon (2010) thinks it more likely than Root because “across a broad 
range of (though not all) cultures, some human groups have been ‘racialized’ in 
the sense that they have been seen as self-reproducing populations of 
individuals whose kind-typical differences are explained by unseen 
commonalities” (p. 277).  To this end, Mallon (2010) makes a compelling “prima 
facie case that there are common, cross-cultural patterns of classification and 
inference” (p. 277)  For example, in spite of apparent differences between 
ancient classification schemes and our own,  
ancient Greeks and Romans did label specific human 
groups…Crucially, even when theorists endorsed quite different 
accounts of the origin of human difference, they recognized that 
these differences were preserved in inheritance from parents to 
children over many generations. (Mallon, 2010, p. 277)  
 
Similarly, Medieval Europeans “recognized distinctive, reproducing human 
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groups, and they debated whether racial differences were evidence of multiple 
creations” (). Mallon cites similar attitudes in non-Western cultures, including 
evidence that historically both Chinese and Indian cultures exhibit deep 
similarities in racial thinking.   
These claims cast “some doubt on the thesis that genuinely racial thinking 
is a culturally local invention” (Mallon, 2012, p. 77).  While social scientists tell 
stories about racial representations that appeal to “their cultural predecessors, 
historical and institutional context of their emergence, and theoretical and 
practical choices people have made regarding how to represent humans as 
members of groups,” ECP “tells a different story, one on which essentialist 
thinking about human groups is itself, or is a product of, a psychological 
mechanism” with the aforementioned properties—innateness, domain-specificity, 
and specialization (Mallon, 2012, p. 77).  
So, in many cases, ECP displays more explanatory value than its social 
theoretical rival, which is a crucial point in its own right, but the question this 
chapter is intended to address remains: Mallon objected to the semantic strategy 
because it is normatively unimportant, even if explanatorily right.  He offers an 
alternative approach—ECP.  Let’s assume it’s right.  Would that matter? 
Mallon and his collaborators say yes.  “While interesting in its own right, 
the research on racial categorization in evolutionary psychology shows that there 
are some specific obstacles to the feasibility of eliminativism and 
conservationism that have been ignored by race theorists” (Kelly et al., 2010, 
448).  Kelly et al. (2010) note that arguments between the two “typically involve 
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evaluations of the costs and benefits attached to those agendas...which 
invariably involve background assumptions regarding the feasibility of the 
proposals” (pp. 433-434).  While feasibility arguments are common along 
economic, legal, and social dimensions, ironically, “one dimension that is rarely 
considered in these assessments is their psychological feasibility, the ease with 
which eliminativists and conservationists goals can be reached given the 
psychological facts about human racial cognition” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 438). If, 
for example, humans have evolved with species-wide innate mechanisms that 
are exapted for racial classification, then our ability to eliminate ‘race’ talk might 
be compromised (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 438)  So, Kelly et al. conclude that given 
the common goals of normative race theory,  
work on the psychology of racial categorization and racism is 
obviously relevant to assessing the ease with which (or the extent 
to which) such ideals can be realized. Moreover, if it turns out that 
certain ideals cannot be realized, that same psychological work will 
be useful in determining what sort of less-than-ideal goals are more 
attainable. (p. 433) 
 
So far, it seems ECP can do what the semantic strategy cannot—impact 
the normative question. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
I have covered a lot of ground in this chapter, so a quick review is in order.  
Mallon charges that the semantic strategy is a misguided one for race theory.  In 
particular, it does not seem to bear on the most important questions about race, 
the normative ones.  Left with a strategic void, Mallon (2010) recommends the 
evolutionary-cognitive program, which appears to this point at least to offer “an 
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explanation of important components of contemporary racial classification…that 
should be of interest to philosophers of race” (p. 273).  So, in outline, the moves 
in this chapter are quite simple and straightforward, but the devil is in the details, 










OPAQUE PSYCHOLOGY I: INNATE  
 




The previous two chapters were dedicated primarily to stating the negative 
(or critical) case that motivates my project.  In the first chapter, I appealed to 
recent work by Gannett to show that both scholarly and folk racial discourse is 
“gappy”—the structure of current racial discourse is such that some important 
questions are precluded.  In the second, I used a series of arguments raised by 
Mallon and other like-minded philosophers to show that one of philosophy’s most 
venerated methodologies, the semantic strategy, cannot adequately address our 
normative concerns over race at the most general level—it does not, Mallon 
shows, significantly impact the question of whether to eliminate or conserve 
‘race’ talk.  Of course, these gaps open space for alternate strategies that can 
bear the normative load.  At the end of the last chapter, I introduced Kelly, 
Machery, and Mallon’s collaborative philosophical work on the psychology of 
racial categorization and evaluation to transition to the positive phase of my 
dissertation, which aims at describing a conceptual framework for race that can 
do normative work.  Before I can get there, though, I need to dedicate this and 
the next chapter to laying its foundation, which is informed by two distinct but 
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related bodies of research on the psychology of race.  Specifically, the focus of 
Chapter 4 is the psychology of racial categorization, and of Chapter 5, the 
psychology of racial evaluation.  To be clear, the former deals with the 
mechanism that lead humans to create racial classes and categorize individuals 
according to their relationship to those classes; the latter goes further, 
investigating how people judge the groups and individuals so categorized.  To be 
clear, while the former appears to be subserved by an innate mental mechanism, 
the latter has no obvious connection to nativism.  For convenience, however, I 
group them together under the heading “opaque psychology,” owing to the fact 
that at least part of the tendencies both to classify and to evaluate by race 
operate outside of the conscious awareness of the agent. After laying out the 
evidence relevant to each topic, I conclude with a summary of consequences for 
the normative question.   
At minimum, last chapter’s preview of Kelly, Machery, and Mallon’s 
position supplied sufficient reason to further investigate possible influences of 
innate human psychology on racial cognition. To review, drawing on Mallon’s 
earlier work, Kelly et al. (2010) tidily structure the normative debate in terms of 
two opposed camps, ‘race’ talk eliminativism and ‘race’ talk conservationism. 
Each promotes precisely what its name suggests: Eliminativists favor the relative 
short-term elimination of 'race' talk; conservationists counter that conserving 
racial categorization, albeit with modification, better serves our normative 
aims.  In spite of their fundamental disagreement, then, both “are best thought of 
as revisionists: both suggest we reform our current practices of racial 
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categorization, but differ in whether it would be best to eliminate or rehabilitate 
them” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 436).  Casting the normative debate in this way yields 
dividends. Consider the following examples. 
First, the eliminativist-conservationist framing adds clarity to Gannett’s by 
now familiar dichotomy concern.  Since the dichotomy prevents investigation of 
contexts in which biological and social factors causally interact to constitute 
racialized phenomena, Gannett (2010) urges that we explore new, more 
versatile, context-sensitive ways of talking about race.  So, in her treatment of the 
problem, Gannett promotes conservation with revision.  She is, by all 
appearances, a pragmatic conservationist—conservationist because she clearly 
believes that ‘race’ talk is still valuable, and pragmatic (at least in part) because 
she urges philosophers of science to de-emphasize metaphysics “and instead 
assess the appropriateness of group categories of classification relative to the 
purposes of specific research programs” (Gannett, 2010, p. 383).  In sum, 
Gannett can be understood as assuming conservationism and moving on to ask 
“How or in what form(s) should ‘race’ talk be conserved?”  That is the primary 
question the dissertation aims to address. 
Second, Kelly et al. (2010) supply a normative framing that provides a 
proving ground on which the philosophical relevance of psychological research 
on race can be tested.  If it could be shown that innate psychology significantly 
impacts racial cognition and, ipso facto, the eliminativist-conservationist debate, 
we would have at least one reason to think psychology of race is philosophically 
interesting.  The choice between the two might hinge, for example, on whether 
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either normative position is even psychologically feasible.  To take an extreme 
case, if the human propensity to classify by race runs so deep that it precludes 
elimination, then it is not clear that ‘race’ talk eliminativism is a viable option.  In 
other words, if racial cognition is psychologically ineliminable, then we might 
decide that ‘race’ talk is normatively ineliminable.  The central impediment to the 
normative aim, as I have shown, is the lack of a conceptual apparatus that can 
handle it.  It is along these lines that I proceed in this and the next chapter. 
I begin this chapter with a more detailed delivery of the most important 
features of the evolutionary-cognitive program.  First, I relate the conditions of its 
break from the social constructivist “received view” and then transition to some of 
the research from evolutionary psychology that informs ECP.  I then consider 
both what appears to be the chief obstacle to ECP and Mallon’s response to 
it.  Finally, I review—in light of framework from Kelly et al. (2010)—the normative 
consequences of some of ECP’s most robust conclusions about race.    
 
4.2 Explanations of Racial Classification 
In the previous chapter, I introduced Mallon’s claim that “the evolutionary-
cognitive research program poses a challenge to the received view about racial 
classification” (Mallon, 2010, p. 273).  According to the “received view,” race is a 
representational construct—that is, “a product of social and cultural practices” 
(Mallon, 2010, p. 273).  More specifically, a consensus exists among social 
constructionists that “our racial representations are best understood by 
considering their cultural predecessors, the historical and institutional context of 
their emergence, and the theoretical and practical choices people have made 
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regarding how to present humans as members of groups” (Mallon, 2012, 
77).  Indeed, just as Mallon suggests, this view has long been 
orthodox.  Consider another passage James’s Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy entry on race 
The ambiguities and confusion associated with determining the 
boundaries of racial categories have over time provoked a 
widespread scholarly consensus that discrete or essentialist races 
are socially constructed, not biologically real…[but] scholarly 
debate exists concerning the formation and character of socially 
constructed, discrete racial categories. (James, 2012, n.p.) 
 
Yet, if Mallon, Kelly, and Machery are on the right track, the received view 
can’t be the whole story. 
Kelly et al. (2010) concede that the ubiquitous tendency of humans to 
categorize by race “presents a puzzle for evolutionary-minded psychologists and 
anthropologists” (p. 439).  The general modus operandus of evolutionary 
psychology involves describing evolved, innate, mental modules that explain 
some universal aspect of human behavior.  The problem is that although people 
classify themselves and others by “putative racial properties” as a rule, 
evolutionary psychologists are highly dubious of the existence of a “race 
module”—that is, “an evolved cognitive system devoted to race and racial 
membership”—both because it is unlikely that morphologically different 
populations of humans came into frequent contact with one another and because 
it is “difficult to identify a selection pressure that would have driven early humans 
to pay attention to physical properties now associated with racial phenomena” 
(Kelly et al., 2010, p. 439).  Given the unlikeliness of a mental module specifically 
devoted to race, evolutionary psychologists argue that racial cognition must be 
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“subserved by a module, but that the module in question was initially selected for 
some function…not related to race” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 439).  As such, 
disagreements among evolutionary psychologists generally range “over the 
nature and proper function of the cognitive system that now underlies racial 
thinking” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 440).  In general, then, they do not disagree about 
whether racial cognition is subserved by an innate psychological 
mechanism.  So, even though details remain open for debate, ECP can and does 
proceed along the lines of this fundamental agreement and, as a result, “stands 
in contrast to previous explanations of racial categorization that have been 
offered in psychology and the social sciences” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 440).  The 
details of that contrast are informative and invite further analysis. I begin with the 
analysis of the received view supplied by Kelly et al. (2010).   
 
4.3 Race on the Received View: Social Science Explanations 
According to Kelly, Machery, and Mallon, the social scientific paradigm of 
racial classification is supported by three types of explanation: socialization, 
perceptual salience, and group prejudice.  All remain prominent in the social 
sciences, and, as such, provide the foil against which ECP is evaluated.  
The first and most recognizable social scientific explanation of racial 
categorization, socialization, posits that “children are either explicitly taught to 
draw the distinctions used in racial categorizations, or that they easily pick them 
up from the general social environment,” even with no one “explicitly instructing 
them in the use of racial categories” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 440).  On this view, 
humans are racial blank slates at birth but learn, by both direct and indirect 
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means, to classify people by race.  In essence, this view casts humans as 
products of the racial cultural environment in which they are born and 
mature.  Without inculcation of culturally-specific classification schemata, folks 
would not classify by race simply because they would not recognize it. 
Second, some social constructivists claim that racial classification is a 
special case of a more general tendency to sort by “perceptually salient features” 
of the objects to be classified.  A common strategy among perceptual salience 
proponents is to argue that “since color is a salient visual property, skin colors 
trigger this domain-general categorization system, and as a result, people form 
and rely on racial categorization” (Kelly et al., 2010, 440).  Again, this theory is 
somewhat intuitive and popularly received. Recall from the previous chapter, for 
example, that the first of Hardimon’s necessary conditions at race’s logical core 
is distinction among humans by visible physical features of the relevant kind.  In 
short, the view is that ‘color’ (to name just one example) is an importantly 
meaningful category to humans, so since humans come in different colors, and 
since we place heavy importance on color, we tend to classify and judge 
racially.    
The final prominent social scientific explanation for racial classification 
centers on “a general tendency to form group prejudices about social groups, be 
they women, races, or social classes” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 440).  Importantly, on 
this view, race is no different from other human-kind categories.  All result from a 
domain-general human propensity to sort ourselves and others by groups and to 
judge individuals based on the assumed group membership.   
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Mallon (2012) argues that each of these social constructivist explanations 
appeals, in one way or another, to what he calls the “Conceptual Break 
Hypothesis” (CBH), according to which,  
sometime in or since the Renaissance, some fundamental change 
occurred in the European and American tradition of thinking about 
the human groups that we now call ‘races’—a change in the 
concept, meaning, or theory by which people represent those 
groups. (p. 77)   
 
The change in meaning “involves failure of conceptual identity among 
older and newer concepts of human groups” owing to the fact that newer ones 
reflect the now largely entrenched belief that “in recent centuries individuals in 
the European-American cultural tradition began to conceive of race in an 
essentialist manner” (Mallon, 2012, p. 77).  ECP proponents deny—in part or in 
whole—each of these social constructivist claims, including the three 
explanations of race and CBH, offering in their stead a significantly different 
approach. 
 
4.4 Race on the ECP View 
In spite of a significant base of shared fundamental commitments, among 
evolutionary psychologists, “disputes have emerged about the specific character 
of our capacity to make racial classification” (Kelly et al., 2010, 445).  So, even 
though evolutionary psychologists share a commitment to an innate, species-
wide mental mechanism, they promote different evolutionary stories about its 
origin and function.  This debate is not trivial: Kelly et al. contend that “resolution 
of their disagreements may have an impact upon the debate between 
eliminativism and conservationism” (p. 445). To see how, I briefly consider 
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evolutionary psychology’s three most prominent explanations of racial cognition.  
 
4.4.1 Races as Coalitions 
First, Robert Kurzban, John Tooby, and Leda Cosmides (2001) 
“hypothesize that the (apparently) automatic and mandatory encoding of race 
is...a byproduct of adaptations that evolved for an alternative function,” namely, 
“detecting coalitions and alliances” (p. 15387).  According to Kurzban et al. 
(2001), our human ancestors “would have benefited by being equipped with 
neurocognitive machinery that tracks...shifting alliances” so long as it was 
“sensitive to two factors: (i) patterns of coordinated action, cooperation, and 
competition; (ii) cues that predict—either purposefully or incidentally—each 
individual’s political agendas” (Kurzban et al., 2001, p. 15387).  Because the 
hypothesized mental “circuitry detects correspondences between allegiances and 
appearance, stable dimensions of shared appearance...emerge in the cognitive 
system as markers of social categories” (Kurzban et al., 2001, pp. 153487-
15388).  So, just like other “ethnographically well-known examples” of observable 
features (such as dress, manner, or gait), race markers (such as skin color) 
“acquire social significance and cognitive efficacy when it validly cues patterns of 
alliance” (Kurzban et al., 2001, pp. 153487-15388).  On this line, then, “racial 
categorization results from a cognitive system whose function is to track 
coalitions (i.e. groups of individuals who cooperate with each other) in a given 
social environment,” and since it tracks “coalitions in the social environment, it 
picks out races in those modern societies” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 445).  
Moreover, according to Kelly et al. (2010), Kurzban and colleagues 
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“provide some intriguing evidence that adults’ encoding of skin color and racial 
membership is influenced by whether racial membership is a relevant cue to 
coalitional membership” (Kelly et al., 2010, 446).  In their experiments, Kurzban 
et al. (2001) showed test subjects photographs of individuals paired with a 
sentence uttered by that individual.  They were then informed that each pictured 
person belongs one of two basketball teams that engaged in a fight with the other 
in the previous season.  The subjects were then asked to “form an impression of 
the target individuals as they viewed the photos” by attempting to accurately 
match the individual to his or her uttered sentence.  To test the coalitional effect, 
Kurzban et al. (2001) then surveyed each subject’s mistakes to determine 
whether the subject erred in ascribing the utterance to a player of the same race 
or to one on the same team (Kelly et al., 2010).   
The results of the experiments tended to support the hypothesized 
conclusion.  When team membership “was not emphasized, participants implicitly 
categorized the individuals involved in the verbal exchange according to race” 
(Kelly et al., 2010, p. 446).  When members of each multirace team were given 
distinctively colored jerseys, however, “participants appeared to rely much less 
on race” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 446).  So, Kurzban and colleagues conclude that 
“in the absence of any obvious indicators of coalitional boundaries, racial 
membership is often taken to be a cue to coalitional membership” (Kelly et al., 
2010, p. 446).   
This phenomenon is likely quite familiar to those who, like me, are either 
from or have connections to the United States’ southeastern region.  I can report 
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(anecdotally, of course) that many Southern folks capable of expressing the most 
racist attitudes seem not to mind or even notice that the player who just put their 
favored football team ahead is from a different race.  To this point, Kelly et al. 
(2010) say that the coalition “hypothesis explains why, when other indications of 
coalitional membership are made particularly evident or social environments 
make coalitional boundaries more salient, people are less prone to classify into 
races” (p. 446).   
 
4.4.2 Races as Ethnies  
A second hypothesis about innate features of racial cognition comes from 
Francisco Gil-White, who is motivated by a worry that “establishing the 
ontological fact” that races are not discrete biological natural kinds “may have 
clouded our understanding of local epistemologies” so that we “may be failing to 
take seriously that ethnic actors are themselves essentialists” (Gil-White, 2001, 
p. 515).  In other words, Gil-White warns that the ontological consensus against 
racialism does not obviate the “need to investigate why ordinary people often 
believe” in racialism.  The failure of biological essentialism about race does not 
render racialism moot.  In fact, Gil-White’s investigation leads to the hypothesis 
that social categories, including race, “are processed by the machinery which 
evolved to deal specifically with ‘natural living kinds’ of the ‘folk-species’ rank-
level such as BEAR or MOUSE” (Gil-White, 2001, p. 517).  In other words, Gil-
White concludes that “evolution has selected for an ethnic cognitive system, that 
is, a cognitive system whose evolved function is to identify ethnic groups” (Kelly 
et al., 2010, p. 446).  As a result, “humans process ethnic groups...as if they were 
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‘species’” (Gil-White, 2001, p. 515).  Kelly and colleagues offer a brief but 
instructive synopsis of Gil-White’s central argument.  Gil-White’s story centers on 
“ethnies,” or ethnic groups, which “are in the first instance collections of 
individuals sharing a common self-ascription, but with no necessary relation to 
any particular content” (Gil White, 1999, p. 792).  In the recent evolutionary past, 
human ancestors lived in ethnies “made up of (at least) several hundred or 
thousand culturally homogeneous members,” who represented their ethnie 
membership “by means of specific ethnic markers” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 
456).  Gil-White “maintains that it was important for our ancestors to map this 
dimension of the social world” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 447).  In addition, he points 
to evidence that suggests humans “have a privileged biological domain of 
cognition,” more specifically, that we have a “living-kinds mental module” (Gil-
White, 2001, p. 519).  From there, he argues that “folk biology—the set of 
commonsense beliefs about animals and biological kinds together with the 
cognitive systems responsible for classifying and reasoning about animals and 
biological kinds—was recruited or ‘exapted’ for the purpose” of navigating the 
social world by discerning ethnie-membership (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 447).  In the 
past, when “a human perceived an ethnie, it counted it and processed it as a 
species.  Over time...the brain evolved to...make ethnies part of the ‘proper 
domain’ of the living-kind module, completing the exaptation” (Gil-White, 2001, p. 
519).  Since this living-kind module “essentializes the entities it classifies, we now 
tend to essentialize the groups we discern on the basis of these ethnic markers” 
(Kelly et al., 2010, p. 447).  The human mind perceives ethnies as species and 
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races as ethnies, so since “skin color and other racial properties (such as body 
type) are often taken to be ethnic markers...races can be mistaken for ethnies by 
the ethnic cognitive system, despite the fact that they are, in general, not ethnies” 
(Kelly et al., 2010, p. 447).  Just like the Kurzban et al. presentation, Gil-White’s 
conclusions support familiar intuitions about racial thinking, most importantly, its 
close similarity and connection to biological thinking. 
 
4.4.3 Race as Interactive 
Finally, Lawrence Hirschfeld (1996) offers an interactionist account of 
racial classification influential enough to warrant extra attention.  He begins with 
a description of “some contradictory aspects” of race, namely, that classification 
often involves both “contrived taxonomies of difference directly linked to specific 
cultural, political, and economic traditions” and “robust, seemingly self-evident, 
widely rehearsed, and highly shared beliefs about the meaning and nature of 
human difference” (Hirschfeld, 1996, p. 2).  In short, Hirschfeld (1996) reveals 
something akin to a paradox—racial classification schemes are clearly marked 
by both culturally particular and species-universal aspects.  Since investigations 
of these apparently antinomous aspects of racial classification “remain largely 
independent of each other,” Hirschfeld aims “at two principal goals: to reinterpret 
the tension between the universal and the specific in race and to provide an 
account of racial thinking that adequately captures both of these characteristic 
qualities” (Hirschfeld, 1996, p. 2).   
Hirschfeld’s investigation is informed by his experimental research on the 
racial attitudes of young children, which he uses to argue that racialized 
94 
 
phenomena result from an “interaction of an innate, evolved capacity for folk 
sociological thinking, on the one hand, and the specific social structure in which it 
is operating on the other” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 445).  Noting that racial thinking 
stabilizes “quickly and seemingly effortlessly in the minds of children” (Hirschfeld, 
1996, p. 2), Hirschfeld argues that his research indicates that “3- to 7-year-old 
preschoolers treat skin color differently” from other characteristics (Kelly et al., 
2010, p. 445). He attributes this phenomenon to an innate folk sociological 
mechanism, whose function “is to identify the social groups in the social 
environment,” an ability that was most likely selected for given the importance for 
humans to map their social world (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 445).  One of the most 
important aspects of this mechanism “is that it essentializes whatever groups are 
salient in a given social environment” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 445).  As a result, 
“membership in these groups is associated with a set of immutable properties 
thought to be cause by some essence common to all group members” (Kelly et 
al., 2010, p. 445).   
While the first part of Hirschfeld’s story of racialization centers on an 
innate, folk-sociological, essentializing mental mechanism, the second involves 
the particular environmental stimuli introduced to the innate mechanism.  Putting 
these together, Hirschfeld argues that when “societies are divided along racial 
lines, the folk sociological mechanism guides us in the identification and 
essentialization of these groups” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 445).  Again, two causal 
factors—one internal, one external—interact to inform racial thinking.  The social 
structure of a given society works in conjunction with the innate psychological 
95 
 
mechanism to determine which “different social groups will be picked out and 
essentialized” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 445).  While Hirschfeld (2001) acknowledges 
that it “is widely believed that the notion of race derives directly from the 
spontaneous perception of physical variation,” he argues that “the idea of race 
involves more than an awareness of surface differences” (p. 1).  The complexity 
of the idea of race demands “an epidemiology of racial representations,” which 
constitutes a “first step in a jointly psychological and cultural account of why 
racial ideas come to be widely distributed, easily transmitted, and predictably 
transformed” (Hirschfeld, 2001, pp. 3, 2).   
Hirschfeld’s epidemiology of racial representations suggests that even 
before humans are cognitively capable of reflecting on race, racial cognition 
covertly manifests as a sort of social competence.   
The kind of people there are is largely a function of community, and 
much of our social life turns on acquiring the dispositions, 
sentiments, and predilections (to name versions of the same thing) 
of the communities to which we belong.  Relying on a vision too 
narrow or parochial—or too broad and too deracinated—one risks 
incorrectly inferring the community-based conventions, standards, 
and practices that apply. (Hirschfeld, 2012, p. 27) 
 
Again, this competence does not result, as some proponents of the 
received view suggest, from mere generalization over particular visual 
representations of race.  Instead, children come to racial knowledge via both “a 
predilection to attend to input relevant to community standards and conventions” 
and “the agency of low levels of attention and engagement” (Hirschfeld, 2012, 
pp. 22-23).  Moreover, children do not require socialization; they “seem to 
develop this knowledge largely on their own and do it without committing social 
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(as opposed to cognitive) resources” (Hirschfeld, 2012, p. 26).  Citing a debt to 
Hirschfeld, Stephen M. Quintana and Clark McKown (2008) corroborate these 
claims, arguing that “children have an innate inclination to perceive grouping in 
their social environment” and that race “appears to be one of the more important 
groups into which children naturally sort their social world” (p. 17, emphasis 
added).   
 
4.4.4 Common Themes for ECP 
Although significant disagreement remains regarding how the “cognitive 
system believed to now underlie racial categorization is structured, and what it 
initially evolved to do,” the three positions limned above share a robust core of 
common commitments (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 447).  At the most general level, for 
example “each of the evolutionarily informed positions...sees racial categorization 
as a by-product of a fairly specialized cognitive system that evolved to deal with 
some specific aspect of the social environment” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 441).  But 
there are other, more specific points of comparison.    
The first is one that, perhaps surprisingly, ECP shares with the received 
view: the recognition of the tendency of race to be essentialized.  The question of 
the origin or cause of the essentialist thought, however, generates considerable 
debate.  In spite of broad scientific rejection of biological essentialism, “the folk 
belief that racial groups…have essences is widespread,” so any viable account 
of race must be able to account for that belief (Hirschfeld, 2008, p. 41).  Again, 
according to the conceptual break hypothesis favored by social constructionists, 
“essentialist thinking about race is a relatively recent phenomenon” resulting from 
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“a culturally local product of the modern era” (Mallon, 2012, p. 78). This 
constructivist consensus “suggests that our racial representations are best 
understood by considering their cultural predecessors, the historical and 
institutional context of their emergence, and the theoretical and practical choices 
people have made regarding how to represent humans as members of groups” 
(Mallon, 2012, p. 78). In contrast, ECP predicts that racialism “should emerge 
relatively robustly across human cultures and history” instead of being “a 
culturally and historically local product of modern European and American 
thought” (Mallon, 2012, p. 78).  Clearly, then, the ECP account of racial 
essentialism “is at odds with understanding the content of a Conceptual Break as 
essentialist,” a fact that fosters “reason to doubt the truth of the Conceptual 
Break Hypothesis” (Mallon, 2012, p. 79).  Essentialism is a foundational 
component of racial categorization for each account, but their differential causal 
stories predict different outcomes.  A consequence of this is the creation of a 
standard by which we may adjudicate between the commitments of the 
competing research programs: if the empirical evidence better supports one or 
the other, we will have a basis upon which to choose (at least preliminarily).  
Tabling that point for the moment, I can move to the more detailed account of the 
core commitments of ECP, namely, the three properties of the posited innate 
mechanism that I previewed in the last chapter. 
To review, the evolutionary-cognitive program characterizes the mental 
module in question “at least in part as the result of cognitive mechanisms which 
are culturally canalized, species-typical, and domain-specific” (Mallon, 2010, p. 
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272).  First, a mechanism that is culturally or environmentally canalized is one 
that is “roughly speaking...the same across different environments and 
environmental variables” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 444).  Or, as Mallon (2010) says, 
calling “them culturally canalized here is to say they have a property associated 
with (and often considered a condition for) innateness: they develop stably 
across a wide range of different cultural environments” (p. 272).  To be clear, 
however, innateness does not entail immutability.  To say that the mechanism is 
“innate is not to say that it is unchangeable. ‘Innateness’ concerns only the 
process by which a trait develops or is acquired” (Mallon, 2012, p. 78).  Although 
it is true that assertions of innateness are meant to communicate “a strong 
degree of developmental invariance across a range of cultural environments,” 
Mallon says that “such invariance says nothing about whether the process or 
processes that produce it can be interrupted or their outcome altered” (Mallon, 
2012, p. 78).  This, of course, could turn out to be important for normative 
concerns.   
Second, ECP holds that the mental mechanism implicated in racialization 
is domain-specific.  As I indicated in the previous chapter, racialization is in this 
respect unlike domain-general cognitive capacities, such as memory, attention, 
or perception, in that it is “specialized for solving a narrower problem or 
problems” (Mallon, 2010, p. 272).  The faculty of attention, for example, is 
designed to make us aware not only of potential threats to our lives (from 
predators, say), but also to keep us alert to potential mates or beautiful vistas or, 
later on, conceptual problems.  The mental mechanism that gives rise to racial 
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cognition, in contrast, appears to be designed for a small, closely related set of 
problems (such as categorizing organisms in terms of usefulness), even though 
racial categorization was not among the original set of problems.  Lastly, being 
equipped for racial cognition is, according to ECP, little different from having “two 
arms and legs, or eyes, or ears, or hair”—they are, in other words, species-
typical (Mallon, 2010, p. 272).  Put simply, the cognitive capacities in questions 
are ones “that humans usually possess” (Mallon, 2010, p. 272).  With these 
properties described and with the controversy over the sources of racialism 
established, I can now turn to the advantages that ECP appears to hold over the 
received view. 
 
4.4.5 The Verdict 
In promoting ECP, Kelly et al. (2010) offer “five lines of argument that 
undermine the socialization, perceptual salience, and group prejudice 
explanations” (p. 441).  This section is devoted to a review each. 
I begin with the argument from Kelly et al. (2010) that “group prejudice is 
unable to account for the differences between different types of social 
classification and the different types of prejudices associated with each” (p. 
442).  Recall that group prejudice explanations count racial cognition as a 
subspecies of more a general classification strategy that picks out social 
groups.  Kelly et al. argue that if such a domain-general capacity accounted for a 
broad range of social groupings, one would expect uniform stereotypes for each 
group, but this is not what one finds.  Instead, “stereotypes about social groups 
vary substantially from one type of group to the next” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 442). 
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For example, the stereotypes associated with racialized groups and political 
groups bear little in common—races are “thought to be biological kinds,” while 
Democrats and Republicans are not.  In a paper linking implicit attitudes, 
epidemiological studies, and physician recommendations, Kevin Schulman and 
colleagues provide additional prima facie evidence for this distinction, 
arguing  that “the race and sex of a patient independently influence how 
physicians manage chest pain” (Schulman, 1999, p. 618, emphasis added).  So, 
even the two most prominent social categories, race and sex, appear to generate 
different stereotypes.   
This important point has lurked behind the scenes since the more general 
discussions of social construction in the first two chapters.  Borrowing from that 
language, the very structure of many things social theorists treat as 
representationally constructed appears different, but the group prejudice 
explanation is “unable to account for the different types of social classification 
and the different types of prejudices associated with each” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 
442).  As a result, saying that race is socially constructed is explanatorily 
insufficient because races are imbued with far different properties than (say) 
bankers, an uncontroversially constructed kind.  In sum, “if all prejudicial 
stereotypes were produced by a unique cognitive system, or were driven by a 
single, general tendency to form stereotypes about social groups, we should not 
expect to find such differences” as ones between race and political parties, 
bankers, and so on (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 442).9 
                                                          
9 We tend to use the term “stereotype” as though it were only one sort of thing and 
stereotyping one sort of process, but as these distinctions show, “stereotype” is not univocal.  In a 
101 
 
Second, and surprisingly, in spite of the universal association between 
race and skin color, perceptual salience explanations fare little better than group 
prejudice explanations, primarily because “they take for granted one of the very 
things they are supposed to be explaining, namely why people classify each 
other on the basis of phenotypic properties like skin color” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 
441).  Recall that, like group prejudice, perceptual salience theories invoke 
domain-general human tendencies to explain the propensity to classify racially.  
Again, color is an important general category to humans—I have favorite colors, I 
favor certain colors of cars or houses or shirts, and at the market, I select 
produce (in part) by its color.  Perceptual salience theories explain racial 
categorization in like manner: since color is an important general category, the 
facts that humans sort by color and come in different colors make racial 
categorization virtually inevitable: “since color is a salient visual property, skin 
colors trigger this domain-general categorization system, and as a result, people 
form and rely on racial categorization” (Kelly et al., 2010, 440).  But, Kelly et al. 
counter that color “is not always intrinsically salient, or an important feature for 
categorization purposes” (p. 443).  They point out that even when we “pay 
attention to the color of artifacts, we rarely treat it as a property that is important 
for classificatory purposes” and that children trained to use a tool of a particular 
color generally show a preference for tools of similar shape, rather similar color 
                                                          
forthcoming paper, Erin Beeghly offers both a perspicuous account of four (relatively) distinct 
scholarly explanations of stereotypes and a compelling argument, based on her “descriptive 
account,” that stereotyping is not intrinsically morally objectionable.  I say more about this point in 
the next chapter, which centers on implicit bias and so offers a better context in which to discuss 
some finer points of about stereotypes. 
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(Kelly et al., 2010, p. 443).  Given the inconsistency of color’s status as a 
categorization stimulus, “the salience and importance of skin color needs to be 
explained, not assumed” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 443).   
Hirschfeld (2012) makes a similar claim, calling the reduction of race to 
skin color and other salient physical properties the “perceptual myth” and arguing 
that children do not “discover race by opening their eyes and looking” (p. 22). 
Naturally, Hirschfeld (2012) does not deny that visual input is relevant.  “It is not 
that perceptual input is completely irrelevant to emerging racial categories. 
Rather...in building racial categories, obvious surface cues like skin color or the 
shape of the facial features or qualities of hair are not defining for young children” 
(p. 32).  So, perceptual cues matter to racial cognition, but “they simply 
underdetermine them” (Hirschfeld, 2012, p.32).  Although anecdotal evidence 
about children’s reactions support this “myth” and despite the fact that “the idea 
that race is a visual phenomenon is almost universally held,” Hirschfeld says, 
“there are few studies actually assessing whether visual information is initially 
relevant to learning about race” (Hirschfeld, 2012, p. 23).  In fact, his own 1993 
study suggests another environmental cue to racialization: children appear to 
attend more closely to linguistic than to visual information regarding race 
(Hirschfeld, 2012, p. 23).  While interpretations of that study are many and 
controversial, Hirschfeld says, “early representations of race seem to be based 
on information children acquire by listening to those around them talk about 
social differences rather than by attending to physical differences that ‘cry out to 
be named’” (Hirschfeld, 2012.). 
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Third, Kelly et al. (2010) use ECP to challenge the view that children 
classify racially because they are socialized to do so.  A common intuition along 
these lines is that children simply adopt the racial classification schemes of their 
parents, but the evidence suggests otherwise.  If socialization were the correct 
explanation, “one would expect children’s beliefs about races to be similar to their 
parents’ beliefs.  However, this is not true” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 441).  Again, 
Hirschfeld corroborates the claim.  “Several research studies have demonstrated 
that children’s racial and ethnic biases are not reliably associated with the beliefs 
and attitudes of parents or peers.  Parents and teachers, in this case as in 
others, wildly overestimate their influence in shaping children’s beliefs” 
(Hirschfeld, 2008, p. 42).  Of course, the “dissociation between parents and their 
children constitutes…evidence against socialization explanations of the 
dispositions to categorize racially” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 441).  
Furthermore, in “Seven Myths of Race and the Young Child,” Hirschfeld 
reports that we tend to overestimate children’s racial naiveté, thinking that 
children are “by nature innocent of race,” that “even if they are aware of race, 
they are without prejudice,” that they “have to be taught prejudice,” and that they 
“believe race is a superficial quality, literally just skin deep” (Hirschfeld, 2012, pp. 
22-28).  But research in cognitive psychology suggests instead “that this portrait 
of young children’s beliefs about race grossly underestimates what young 
children understand about race” (Hirschfeld, 2012, p. 28).   
Fourth, Hirschfeld’s research on children’s understanding of race provides 
compelling and provocative evidence that skin color is a special property for 3-to 
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7-year-old preschoolers, who “treat skin color differently from other properties—in 
particular, they expect skin color to be constant over lifetime” (Kelly et al., 2010, 
p. 443).  Echoing a claim in the previous section, Hirschfeld argues that the 
special status children confer to race reflects “a kind of intuitive essentialism” 
(Kelly et al., 2010, p. 443), even though, as Hirschfeld (1996) says, “we now 
know that one that cannot explain a racialist mode of thought is the phenomenon 
of race itself.  Humans are not discriminable into discrete, self-evident biological 
kinds” (p. 3).   
Finally, ECP’s most controversial commitment is to innate psychology, 
which is supported by evidence for culturally-canalized racialism, which in turn 
suggests that “some aspects of contemporary racial representations are 
developmentally invariant across cultures” both geographically and temporally 
(Mallon, 2012, p. 78). Proponents of the received view struggle to account for this 
aspect of racial cognition for the very reasons named above.  Given their 
commitment to CBH, social constructionists explain racialism by appeal to 
“cultural, historical, and institutional contexts, and the theoretical and practical 
choices people intentionally make in representing others and themselves as 
members of groups” (Mallon, 2012, pp. 77-78).   
Recall that this claim has been cited twice already in different forms: 
Gannett highlights the argumentative advantage of the claim that race as it is 
socially constructed (rather than biologically constituted) is essentialist, and 
James references the scholarly consensus that “essentialist races are socially 
constructed, not biologically real” and another, closely related, consensus about 
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the modern invention of race, given the presumed fact that references to race 
concepts are absent from ancient cultural and religious traditions.  None of these 
groups, says James, “sought to classify humans into discrete racial 
categories...differences such as skin color and hair texture were noticed but did 
not ground discrete categories of biological difference” (James, 2012, n.p.).   
ECP is committed to the opposite claim, however.  “Evolutionary 
psychologists hold that people in many cultural and historical epochs...have 
relied on classifications that are similar to modern racial categories” (Kelly et al., 
2010, p. 441).  Those classifications are similar in that they are “supposed to be 
based on phenotypic properties” and are “assumed to map onto biological 
categories” (Kelly et al. 2010, p. 441).  In short, a large number of current and 
historical cultures “have relied on skin color and other bodily features to classify 
their fellows, and have further believed that such classifications also group 
together people who share underlying biological commonalities” (Kelly et al., 
2010, p. 441).  To be clear, Kelly, Machery, and Mallon are not blind to variations 
in racial categorization; instead, they want only to stress that “core elements of 
racial categorization are not a merely parochial cultural phenomenon” (Kelly et 
al., 2010, p. 442).  Given its commitment to innate, species-wide tendencies to 
racialize, the universal aspects of racial cognition are just what ECP would 
predict, while “socialization accounts cannot explain why these core elements 
should recur across times and cultures,” and, as a result, the received view is “at 
best incomplete” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 442).   
To summarize, evidence generated by the evolutionary-cognitive program 
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suggests, in direct opposition to the received view, that racial categorization 
“develops early and reliably across cultures…does not depend entirely on social 
learning…[and] is, in some respects, similar to biological classification” (Kelly et 
al., 2010, p. 443).  In other words, the evidence “is best explained by the 
hypothesis that racial categorization results from a specialized, species-typical 
system underlying racial thought” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 444).  Kelly et al. do not 
deny “that socialization plays some role”; they only “insist it is not the whole 
story” (p 440).  The other part of the story, of course, is that racial classification 
“is underwritten by an evolved cognitive system, whose development in children 
is to a large extent independent of teaching and socialization” (Kelly et al., 2010, 
p. 440).  In addition, they recognize the importance of perceptual salience in race 
thinking but object to “the idea that racial categorization can be explained merely 
by the perceptual salience of skin color” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 441).  Finally, even 
allowing that nonracial social classifications share many properties with racial 
ones, they question the general group prejudice explanation, arguing “that not all 
social classifications and prejudices behave the same” and “that racial cognition 
should be distinguished from other forms of group-related cognition” (Kelly et al., 
2010, p. 441).  In place of these explanations, ECP favors ones that describe the 
human propensity to categorize racially as resulting from “a cognitive system that 
has evolved to deal with a specific domain in the social world, rather than with 
categories or perceptual salience in general” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 440). 
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4.4.6 Normative Consequences of ECP 
My primary focus in this dissertation is, of course, the conceptual question, 
but, unlike Hardimon, I aim to develop a conceptual framework in such a way that 
it can be used to address the normative question. So, even though I only touch 
on some specific normative issues and only at the very end, it is worth reiterating 
that Kelly, Machery, and Mallon are offering not merely an account of racial 
classification, but also an investigation of whether and how ECP impacts the 
normative debate between eliminativists and conservationists.  I covered the 
general outline of this argument in the previous chapter, so I will not rehearse it in 
its entirety here.  In general, it should suffice to say that our ability to eliminate, 
conserve, or revise ‘race’ talk depends on the psychological feasibility to do so 
(Kelly et al., 2010, p. 448).  If the innate structures that inform racialization are 
ineliminable or unrevisable, then eliminativist aims will be moot, but Kelly and 
colleagues hasten to add that “without further argument, such an evolutionary 
account of racial categorization in no way implies that racial categorization 
cannot be eliminated or modified” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 444).  By way of 
comparison, they point out that the human taste for sweetness, although innate, 
species-wide, and domain-specific, does not entail that a “person’s taste for 
sweetness is...inevitable or completely impervious to modification” (Kelly et al., 
2010, p. 444).  Lots of things, many of which are under my control, will determine 
how much I can control my sweet tooth.   
Remember also, however, that there is not just one evolutionary story; 
there are (at least) three, and, although the “dust has not settled yet...the 
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resolution of the [ECP theorists’] disagreements may have an impact on” the 
resolution of the normative question.  Since Hirschfeld’s and Gil-White’s 
respective views “suggest that racial categorization and essentialism...are the 
product of the same cognitive system...conserving racial categorization while 
reforming its normative connotations may be hindered by the nature of the 
evolved cognition system” (Kelly et al., 2010, pp. 450-451).  In contrast, since 
Kurzban et al. (2001) argue that essentialism and the salience of racial properties 
result from distinct cognitive mechanisms, there is nothing in “the nature of 
human psychology to prevent the dissociation between racial categorization and 
its essentialist implications” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 451).  Since each view 
implicates innate structures in racialization, however, each has similar 
implications for eliminativism. 
 
4.4.7 A Challenge for ECP 
As I suggested in the last chapter, the evolutionary-cognitive program 
faces significant resistance—recall that Taylor (2005) depicts it as a red herring 
of sorts, something that distracts us from real-world individual and institutional 
racial oppression.  There is admittedly something counterintuitive and even off-
putting about the notion that my behavior is influenced by something that 
originates in me but resides outside of my consciously aware “self.”  Answering 
Taylor’s criticism is an aim of the dissertation itself, so I forestall its direct address 
for later.  Counterintuition and queasiness are not genuine objections, of course, 
but they can serve as useful alarms, so before shifting the subject from racial 
classification to racial evaluation, I want to consider a couple of challenges to the 
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story so far presented. 
The most obvious concern is that evolutionary psychology is itself very 
controversial, so positions that depend on its results inherit that 
controversy.10  The rebuttal is simply that mine is not one of those 
positions.  Although I do draw on evolutionary psychology, the position that I 
promote is dependent neither on its general program of research nor on any of its 
particular theses.  For my purposes, any theoretical successes of evolutionary 
psychology program would bolster my position, but it depends only on convincing 
evidence of universal aspects of human schemes of racial categorization, and 
that much, I believe, has been secured.  For reason made clearer in later 
chapters, even the unlikely event of the absolute failure of evolutionary 
psychology would not doom my position.   
The more interesting and formidable challenge results from cultural 
variation in racial classification.  That such variation exists is indubitable.  
Misalignment between U.S. and Brazilian racial classification, for example, has 
been well-rehearsed at least since the Carl Degler’s 1971 Pulitzer-Prize-winning 
study, Neither Black nor White.  The problem this poses for evolution-based 
solutions is patent: ECP posits a species-wide racializing mechanism despite the 
existence of multifarious racial schemata.  The uncontroversial fact of cultural 
variability poses the biggest challenge to ECP.   
                                                          
10 For details of those controversies, see Stephen Downes’ lucid treatment of 
evolutionary psychology in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Especially informative is 
his fourth section, “Philosophy of Biology vs. Evolutionary Psychology,” in which he notes that 
most critics of the latter are “philosophers of biology who argue that the research tradition suffers 
from an overly zealous form of adaptationism” (Downes, 2014, n.p.).  Among other things, 
Downes notes that “Many philosophers object to evolutionary psychologists’ over attribution of 
adaptations on the basis of apparent design” (Downes, 2014, n.p.).  
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At first blush, Mallon’s response is shocking.  He does not, per impossible, 
try to talk away the variation.  He instead, embraces it, arguing that “cultural 
variation is to be expected on (some versions of) the evolutionary-cognitive 
account” (Mallon, 2012, p. 85).  ECP, in other words, accommodates cultural 
variability.  Mallon’s defense of this claim is formidable.    
He begins by appealing to considerable evidence of parallels between 
biological and racial cognition—most importantly, each involves “assumptions 
about underlying essences…[and] inheritance thinking” (Mallon, 2012, p. 
81).  That is, both prescientific biological cognition and racial cognition assume “a 
wide range of different kinds have ‘underlying’ natural properties” that are passed 
from generation to generation (Mallon, 2012, p. 85).  While it is possible that 
these shared assumptions developed independently, a more plausible 
explanation is that a single psychological mechanism generates both.  Mallon 
(2012) suggests, for example, that “whatever mechanism underlies racial 
cognition was initially adapted to thinking about (certain kinds of) biological kinds, 
and then perhaps later exapted for thinking about social kinds” (p. 85).   Mallon 
(2012) then asks us to suppose that the proposed mechanism “was originally 
adapted to thinking about members of fully or largely reproductively isolated 
biological populations” so that its “proper domain” is “classic species” (p. 
85).  Now, in contrast to the proper domain of the mechanism (again, species), 
“humans of different races are not members of different species” because 
“although human populations sometimes exhibit partial reproductive 
isolation...human populations frequently and readily interbreed” (Mallon, 2012, p. 
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85).  So, on Mallon’s interpretation, “the mechanism is originally adapted to 
populations that rarely interbreed [species], but it is being applied to populations 
that frequently interbreed [human races]” (Mallon, 2012, p. 85).  As a result, folk 
racial classifications mirror folk biological classifications, even though human 
races do not mirror species, and this mismatch helps to explain universal aspects 
of human racialization.  “Evolutionary cognitive accounts suggest that we ought 
to expect strong overlap in classification judgments of nonmixed race persons 
between the United States and Brazil, and this is just what we find” (Mallon, 
2012, p. 85).  For example, in each country “a child of two parents of the same 
race is typically classified as a member of that race” (Mallon, 2012, p. 85).   
Culturally variant racial classification is real; nevertheless, a “number of 
experiments suggest that lineage essentialism exists in a range of cultures” 
(Mallon, 2012, p. 85).  One could take the acknowledgement of this variation as 
vindicating “social constructionist explanations at the expense of evolutionary 
psychological ones,” but although evolutionary psychologists insist “on a kind of 
developmental regularity...they need not insist that this regularity cannot be, and 
is not sometimes altered” (Mallon, 2012, p. 86).  In short, ECP predicts broad 
regularities in cross-cultural racial classification without denying that social 
practices, historical accidents, and political dynamics (to name a few factors) 
could forge particular differences among the schemata.  This alone should 
secure the point that ECP (and, hence, psychological constructivism) and social 
constructivism are not mutually exclusive research programs.  I pick this crucial 
point back up in Chapter 6. 
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Here (as well as in number of other cases), it is useful to compare race to 
language.  Recognizing universal regularities among human languages and even 
positing, as Noam Chomsky does, a species-typical language-generating 
mechanism in no way entails a denial of the differences among particular 
languages.  In fact, given our understanding of human evolution and the partial 
isolation of populations throughout human development, an evolutionary-
universalist linguist is bound to predict differences in languages despite their 
shared evolutionary origin.  Likewise, an ECP theorist should expect racial 
classifications to reflect differences in detail to be constructed upon broadly-
shared foundations.   
As Mallon (20012) says, “evidence shows that the fact of cultural variation 
by itself does not undermine the evolutionary-cognitive thesis that the mind is 
evolved with a predisposition to essentialize such identities” (p. 85).  ECP 
theorists recognize that “a wide range of factors determines what individuals and 
groups believe and do, but influence by the sort of mechanisms posited by 
evolutionary-cognitive theorists is surely one of them” (Mallon, 2012, p. 
86).  Mallon (2012) neatly summarizes the situation: “In effect, the content of our 
racial representations is determined by a range of forces that include both 
domain-specific predispositions to believe (of the sort evolutionary-cognitive 
theorists emphasize), but also cultural and social forces (of the sort that social 








Many of the general conclusions that I want to draw on for the position I 
defend are also informed by the content of the next chapter, which switches from 
racial classification to racial evaluation. Because of that, I delay many of the 
important conclusions until then. For now, a summary of the commitments 
commonly shared amongst ECP theorists will suffice.  First, humans appear to 
be biological essentialists about race despite the fact that biology does not 
support essentialism.  Moreover, evidence suggests the tendency to racialize is 
subserved by a mental mechanism that is culturally-canalized (or innate), 
domain-specific, and species typical.  Although each claim informs my position, it 
will turn out that even they are more specific than my thesis necessitates.  As I 
will show at the end of the next chapter, I need to establish only that a significant 
part of racial cognition, representation, and classification is caused by 
mechanisms and processes that operate outside of human consciousness so 











OPAQUE PSYCHOLOGY II: IMPLICIT  
 




In the previous chapter, I focused on the relationship between innate 
psychology and racial categorization.  Another interesting set of questions at the 
nexus of psychology and race concerns racial evaluation, that is, judgment, bias, 
and stereotype with regard to race.  Especially interesting are the cases in which 
those attitudes are implicit rather than explicit. 
 
5.2 Explicit and Implicit Bias 
Most of us are familiar with explicit racial bias, which is marked by a range 
of intentional, conscious attitudes—explicit biases are just those that “can be 
consciously detected and reported” (Amodio & Mendoza, 2010, p. 355).  Explicit 
bias is “controllable, intended, made with awareness, and requires cognitive 
resources” (Nosek, 2007, p. 65).  To take an obvious example, Klu Klux Klan 
members exhibit explicit racial bias in favor of Whites and against non-Whites.  
Explicit bias is generally measured directly through self-report questionnaires, 
such as the one that informs the “Modern Racism Scale,” which “poses 
statements explicitly about racial issues...and allows participants to react to each 
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statement by selecting, at their leisure, one of the responses, which range from 
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree” (Kelly et al., 2010, 455).  Research on 
explicit bias is important, of course, but direct measures have significant 
shortcomings.   
According to Ohio State University’s Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race 
and Ethnicity, the “downfalls of self-reports have been well-documented” (Staats, 
2013, p. 15).  In general, the aims of self-reports are frustrated by “impression 
management,” which arises from “the desire to be perceived positively” and “can 
influence people to distort their self-reported beliefs and attitudes” (Staats, 2013, 
p. 15).  Impression management is “particularly likely when individuals are 
questioned about politically or socially sensitive topics such as interracial or 
intergroup behaviors” (Staats, 2013, p. 16).  So, although early research on race 
and ethnicity relied on self-report, “as norms discouraging prejudice gained 
society traction, straightforward approaches to measuring bias became less 
useful and increasingly suspect” (Staats, 2013, p. 16).  In spite of those norms 
against prejudice, racism and racial tension persists, of course, so the 
unreliability of explicit measures necessitates complementary measures—indirect 
ones that aim at uncovering implicit bias.      
Implicit attitudes are those that are not explicit, that is, ones that are not 
intentional or consciously made.11  Harvard University’s Project Implicit treats 
                                                          
11 In a 2015 paper, Christopher Jenson reports that psychological studies informed by 
self-report and nonverbal behavior indicate that “‘belief is fragile,” that is, “multiple independent 
means of detecting them produce highly variant results,” which makes ‘belief’ “a strong candidate 
for elimination...from cognitive science” (Jenson, 2015).  Of course, Jenson’s thesis, if vindicated, 
could bear on what is said here about the connections between race and implicit attitudes.  For 
now, however, I proceed with the standard conceptual vocabulary, including “belief.” 
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implicit attitudes as “positive and negative evaluations that occur outside of our 
conscious awareness and control” (https://implicit.harvard.edu).  The Kirwan 
Institute adds that the “main distinction between implicit and other types of bias 
centers on level of awareness” (Staats, 2013, p. 12).  So, while subjects can 
consciously detect and report on explicit biases, implicit biases “occur without 
introspective awareness”—they are, for the person experiencing them, 
undetectable and, therefore, unreportable (Staats, 2013, p. 12). 
Since the experiencer cannot detect them, researchers attempt to reveal 
implicit bias through indirect measures, that is, “techniques...that do not rely on 
introspection or self-report” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 452). Indirect measures are 
intended to “bypass” the obstacles to conscious and authentic self-report, such 
as the aforementioned impression management phenomenon (Kelly et al., 2010, 
p. 452).  The following two examples—one informal and intuitive, the other formal 
and analytic—illustrate the difference and bring clarity to the phenomenon of 
implicit attitudes.    
For the first example, imagine that I’m hosting a company picnic in San 
Luis Obispo, a town on California’s Central Coast, roughly equidistant from San 
Francisco (to the north) and Los Angeles (to the south).   For the example, it is 
important to know that baseball fandom in SLO is roughly evenly divided 
between the noble and mighty San Francisco Giants and the lowly and iniquitous 
Los Angeles Dodgers.  As a loyal Giants fan, I am, of course, honor-bound to 
“hate” the Dodgers, and so I occasionally and in jest exhibit explicit bias in favor 
of the Giants and against the Dodgers, just as I did when I described them above 
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as “noble” and “iniquitous,” respectively.  Suppose the guests at my picnic, like 
the town itself, are split evenly with regard to their loyalty to one or the other of 
these bitter baseball rivals.  Now, I love baseball and especially the Giants, but I 
maintain a reasonable attitude toward those affections—baseball is 
entertainment; it is not to be taken too seriously.  As a result, I don’t make 
conscious decisions to favor one person over another based on the team they 
choose to support (even if it is the Dodgers).  In fact, I’m so off put by aggressive 
sports fan behavior that I amend the company’s bylaws to formally eliminate 
obnoxious fan-based favoritism.  I tease my Dodger-fan co-workers and friends, 
but I do not take their fandom into account when I hire, fire, promote, praise, or 
criticize, nor do I choose friendship with Mr. Matthewson over Mr. Robinson 
simply because the former loves the Giants and the latter the Dodgers. 
To my shock, however, Dodgers fans at my picnic notice a troublesome 
trend: Many little things seem to at least slightly favor the Giants fans in 
attendance.  It’s a hot day, for example, and the Giants are seated in the shade.  
Though I did not consciously intend it, for some reason or another, the Giants 
fans are generally first in line and get the better food choice.  Worse, all disputes 
in the sack race, three-legged race, and balloon toss are adjudicated (by me) in 
favor of teams composed of Giants fans.   
Even more disturbingly, in the days after the picnic, some folks begin to 
notice subtle forms favoritism at work—Giants fans who need office equipment, 
for example, receive their wares on average 24 hours before Dodgers fans 
do.  Even if I can honestly say that—to the best of my knowledge—I do not make 
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professional decisions based on team preference, the more I look, the more I 
discover gaps in treatment.  So, what gives?  How can I explain this pattern of 
outcome, if it is granted that I’m being honest about my explicit attitudes, and if I 
make explicit effort to promote justice at work, in life, and when officiating 
competitive picnic games?  One possible and increasingly momentous 
explanation is that while I do consciously avoid Giants-fan favoritism, I might hold 
and act on unconscious or implicit attitudes about Giants and Dodgers fans.   
Project Implicit offers a similar, simpler example:  “Even if you say that you 
like math (your explicit attitude), it is possible that you associate math with 
negativity without knowing it. In this case, we would say that your implicit attitude 
toward math is negative” (https://implicit.harvard.edu).  I might even be good at 
math, be on the math team, and sport T-shirts emblazoned with the explicit 
identifier “MATHLETE.”  And, yet, I might also unthinkingly shudder when 
Lumosity.com presents me with math games and routinely opt for its linguistic 
and spatial alternatives.  Despite these intuitive examples, the very notion of 
attitudes invisible to the bearer may initially appear too ethereal to matter, but a 
mounting body of evidence suggests that implicit attitudes can be dissociated 
from explicit attitudes, can be measured, and are implicated in important ways in 
human behavior.  These three points are crucial to my purposes, so I elaborate 
on each.  
 
5.2.1 Are Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Dissociable? 
First, in order to talk substantively about implicit attitudes, they must be 
dissociable from explicit attitudes.  Evidence suggests that they are: The claim 
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that “implicit and explicit attitudes do not align” is supported by a “vast body of 
empirical literature” (Staats, 2013, p. 13).  Patricia Devine (1989), for example, 
offers a dissociation model that distinguishes between automatic processes that 
are “unintentional or spontaneous” and controlled processes that are “intentional 
and require...active attention” (pp. 5, 6).  Devine’s research shows that 
“automatic and controlled processes can be dissociated” (Staats, 2013, p. 13).  In 
fact, at this point, the dissociability thesis has been so thoroughly corroborated 
that it is taken for granted.  As Kelly and colleagues say, “the fact that implicit and 
explicit...biases can be dissociated is no longer the subject of much controversy” 
(Kelly et al., 2010, footnote 23).  But dissociability entails neither measurability 
nor consequence.  These questions about implicit bias remain open and require 
separate justification.   
 
5.2.2 Can Implicit Attitudes Be Measured? 
The primary difficulty in measuring implicit biases is patent:  If they are 
invisible even to their bearer, then self-report will be inefficacious.  The hidden 
attitudes must be teased out.  If this challenge could be met, however, indirect 
measure would result in several significant advantages over direct ones.  Again, 
direct measures of explicit attitudes can be corrupted by insincerity of self-report, 
self-deception, and incapacity for clear introspection.  Since indirect measures, 
by contrast, are “measurement methods that avoid requiring introspective 
access, decrease the mental control available to produce the response, reduce 
the role of conscious intention, and reduce the role of self-reflective, deliberate 
processes” (Nosek et al., 2007, p. 267), they have “the advantage of bypassing 
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all three of these obstacles” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 452).  Even so, measuring 
implicit bias remains quite challenging.  As a result, researchers have invented 
sophisticated measurement methods, three of which—physiological approaches, 
priming methods, and Implicit Association Tests (IATs)—have contributed 
significantly to race scholarship.  Because of its influence and popularity both 
within the academy and in the media, I begin with the last, focusing on it before 
briefly returning to the others for purposes of comparison. 
Kelly, Machery, and Mallon describe the IAT as essentially a “sorting task” 
that involves making associations between two pairs of dichotomous categories, 
the “target concepts” and the “attribute dimensions” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 
453).  For example, race IATs might pair the target concepts ‘Black’ and ‘White’, 
represented by pictures of Black and White faces, with attribute dimensions 
‘good’ and ‘bad’, represented by individual words such as “wonderful” or 
“terrible,” respectively.  Subjects are given multistage tests in which they “sort the 
exemplars from the four categories using only two responses” (Kelly et al., 2010, 
p.453).  In the first stage, subjects might be prompted to press keyboard letter “e” 
when shown either a Black face or a good attribute or “i” when shown either a 
White face or bad attribute.  “Crucial to the logic of the test” is that in subsequent 
stages, the response options (the “e” and “i” keys) are assigned to different 
categories” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 453). Subjects are directed to answer and 
correct sorting errors as quickly as possible before moving on to the next prompt.  
The test computer measures and records reaction times.   
Nosek and colleagues explain that “the logic of the IAT is that this sorting 
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task should be easier when two concepts that share a response are strongly 
associated” and that “ease of sorting can be indexed both by speed of 
responding (faster indicating stronger associations) and the frequency of errors” 
(Nosek et al., 2007, p. 270).  In short, differences in response times and 
accuracy are correlated with magnitude of bias, and “This is called the IAT effect” 
(Kelly et al., 2010, p. 453).  Since IATs bypass the subject’s conscious 
awareness—and so, for example, remain “resistant to social desirability 
concerns” (Staats, 2013, p. 25)—“the associations thus revealed are taken to be 
indicative of processes that function implicitly and automatically” (Kelly et al., 
2010, p. 453).  For example, if a subject consistently sorts more quickly and 
accurately when White faces, rather than Black faces, are paired with good 
attributes, the result “is interpreted as an indirect measure of a stronger 
association between the two categories good and White, and hence an implicit 
preference for White, or, conversely, an implicit bias against Black” (Kelly et al., 
2010, p. 453).   
Other indirect measurement techniques corroborate IAT results.  As 
Mahzarin Banaji reports, “the family of implicit attitude measures is becoming 
increasingly diverse” (Banaji, 2001, p. 122).   In addition to IATs, experimenters 
use the startle eyeblink test, which measures affective responses by determining 
the magnitude of eyeblink response to a given stimulus, and priming tests.  In 
addition to the IAT, Banaji focuses on evaluative priming.  In evaluative priming, 
a subject is shown an object (a “prime”) about which s/he has pre-established 
attitudes (Banaji, 2001, p. 122).  The prime is presented to the subject for a brief 
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time and is “followed by an evaluatively congruent or incongruent but 
semantically unassociated a target,” that is, an evaluative word such as “good,” 
“enemy,” “anguish” (Banaji, 2001, p. 123).  The point is to reveal the extent to 
which the prime “influences how an individual later responds to a different 
stimulus” (Staats, 2013, p. 24), and, just as with the IAT, the “speed to judge the 
target is taken as an indicator of the strength of evaluative association between 
attitude object and evaluation” (Staats, 2013, p. 24).  The foundational 
assumption of evaluative priming “is that if an attitude object (e.g., flowers, ice 
cream) evokes a positive evaluation, it should facilitate response to other 
evaluatively congruent (i.e., positive) co-occurring information” and vice versa 
(Banaji, 2001, p. 122).  The interpretation of priming techniques as a measure of 
“automatic attitude,” says Banaji, appears “to be well accepted” (Banaji, 2001, 
p.122), and Kelly et al. (2010) report that “a wide variety of other indirect 
measures, including evaluative priming…the startle eyeblink test...and EMG 
measures” support IAT data (p. 456).   
Mention of electromyography (EMG), which tracks facial movement in 
response to a given stimulus, supplies a segue to physiological approaches, the 
last of the aforementioned indirect measures. EMG and other physiological 
measures “assess bodily and neurological reactions to stimuli” (Staats, 2013, p. 
22).  Eric Vanman and colleagues, for example, “investigate the relationship of 
implicit racial prejudice to discriminatory behavior” by showing subjects “photos 
of Blacks and Whites” and using EMG to measure movements in muscles used 
in smiling and frowning (Vanman et al., 2004, p. 711).  Another common 
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physiological technique uses functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to 
record correlations between strategically selected stimuli and activation of the 
amygdala, a part of the brain implicated in decision making, memory, and 
emotional learning and evaluation (Staats, 2013, p. 22).  Elizabeth Phelps and 
colleagues, for example, show “that representations of social groups that differ in 
race evoke differential amygdala activity and that such activation is related to 
unconscious social evaluation” (Phelps et al., 2000, p. 733).  Phelps’ study 
reveals that “members of Black and White social groups can evoke differential 
amygdala activity” (Phelps et al., 2000, p. 734), and, more specifically, that 
“White subjects generally showed greater amygdala activation when exposed to 
unfamiliar Black faces compared to unfamiliar White faces” (Staats, 2013, p. 
22).  Despite differences of opinion over cause and consequence, additional 
studies once again corroborate this result—distinct racial stimuli yield different 
strengths of amygdala activation, although the subject remains unaware of 
it.  Moreover, researchers have revealed correlations between fMRI data on 
amygdala activation and other measures of race evaluations.  Phelps et al., for 
example, were the first to relate “indirect behavioral measures of social 
evaluation to neuronal activity,” showing that “the strength of amygdala activation 
to Black-versus-White faces was correlated with...indirect (unconscious) 
measures of race evaluation,” including IATs, “but not with the direct (conscious) 
expression of race attitudes” (Phelps et al., 2000, p. 734).  The point of all this 
detail is, of course, to show that implicit attitudes can be measured in a variety of 
ways which yield relatively consistent results.  
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5.2.3 Do Implicit Attitudes Affect Judgment and Action? 
As Kelly et al. (2010) say, “a natural question to ask...is whether or not the 
biases revealed by indirect measurement techniques have any influence on 
judgments or ever lead to any actual prejudicial behavior, especially in real world 
situations” (p. 456).  Skepticism over this issue manifests in two ways: dismissal 
as “mere linguistic associations or inert mental representations” and, even to 
those congenial to indirect measures, doubt that implicit biases “are powerful 
enough to make any practical difference in day-to-day human affairs” (Kelly et al., 
2010, 456).  Kelly et al. argue “that such skepticism is unjustified” (p. 
456).  Indeed, as I hinted above, indirect measures are in many cases 
complementary and mutually corroborative.  Moreover, indirect measures of 
racial bias, in particular, offer explanations of continued racial problems, despite 
apparent decreases in explicit racial bias.  Likely more important, however, is 
“evidence of race and racial bias influencing real-world situations” that measures 
of explicit bias are at a loss to explain. 
One of the most popular and accessible examples of this effect is Joseph 
Price and Justin Wolfers’ 2007 statistical analysis of National Basketball 
Association (NBA) officials.  Price and Wolfers discovered that in the NBA, the 
world’s top professional basketball league,  
more personal fouls are called against players when they are 
officiated by an opposite-race refereeing crew than when officiated 
by an own-race crew. These biases are sufficiently large that we 
find appreciable differences in whether predominantly Black teams 
are more likely to win or lose, based on the racial composition of 
the refereeing crew. (Price & Wolfers, 2007, p. 1859)  
   
Specifically, the study, which traced foul calls over 12 seasons, “found 
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evidence that White referees called slightly but significantly more fouls on Black 
players than White players, as well as evidence of the converse” (Kelly et al., 
2010, p. 457).  
Price and Wolfers argue that this effect is explained by implicit bias.  
Indeed, a good case can be made for ruling out widespread explicit bias.  First, 
the NBA is a highly multinational, multiracial, multiethnic professional 
entertainment organization that far outpaces its industry rivals in socially relevant 
ways.  For example, the University of Central Florida’s Institute for Diversity and 
Ethics in Sports’ “2013 Racial and Gender Report Card” awarded the NBA an 
overall grade of 90.7 (out of 100), including an A+ for racial hiring practices and 
B+ for gender hiring practices (Lapchick, 2013, p. 1).  Lapchick et al. say that “the 
NBA remains the industry leader among the men’s sports for racial and gender 
hiring practices.  No one else reaches the same points for race, gender or the 
combined score” (Lapchick, 2013, p. 1).  Moreover, although more than 70% of 
NBA players are African American, the NBA boasted a record 101 international 
players representing 37 countries and territories on the opening day of the 2015 
season (nba.com).  So, few explicit racists would likely pursue a career in such 
an organization; ones who did would likely be quickly discovered and ousted.  In 
addition, NBA “referees are subject to constant and intense scrutiny by the NBA 
itself, so much so that they have repeatedly been called ‘the most ranked, rated, 
reviewed, statistically analyzed and mentored group of employees of any 
company in any place in the world’ by [former] commissioner David Stern” (Kelly 
et al., 2010, p. 457). 
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Finally, even if that thinking appears naïve, explicit attitudes likely do not 
impact the foul rates simply because of the speed at which the game is played 
and officiating decisions must be made.  Implicit bias is a more likely cause of the 
racial disparities because of the “types of split-second, high-pressure evaluations 
required of NBA referees” (Price & Wolfers, 2010, p. 1861).  Initially, Price and 
Wolfers defend the somewhat modest claim that “these results...are at least 
suggestive that implicit bias may play an important role” (Price & Wolfers, 2010, 
p. 1885).  By the next year, however, Price and Wolfers are ready to put their 
money where their thesis is, joining co-author Tim Larsen in arguing that “in 
games where the majority of the officials are White, betting on the team expected 
to have more minutes played by White players always leads to more than a 50% 
chance of beating the spread” (Larsen et al,. 2008, p. 1).  They add that the 
“probability of beating the spread increases as the racial gap between the two 
teams widens” (Larsen et al., 2008, p. 1).  Later studies promote similar 
conclusions.  For example, Christopher Parsons and colleagues found that Major 
League Baseball (MLB) “umpires express their racial/ethnic preference when 
they evaluate pitches.  Strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do 
not match race/ethnicity” (Parsons, Sulaeman, Yates, & Hamermesh, 2011, p. 
1410).  Just as in the NBA case, explicit bias is an unlikely culprit here.  Both by 
rule and in practice, the boundary between a ball and strike is vague, so in many 
cases, MLB umpires must make instantaneous judgments of borderline pitches, 
all under close official scrutiny. 
Studies like these both reaffirm the (now largely uncontroversial) view that 
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implicit and explicit attitudes are dissociable and support the view that the former 
as well as the latter impact behavior.  So, they are important.  They also come 
with limits.  Both leave open several questions important to the dissertation topic.  
Even after establishing the potency of implicit bias in real-world contexts, both 
the NBA and MLB studies are silent with regard to the controlled, clinical settings 
of indirect measures.  In short, these studies suggest that implicit judgments 
affect behavior but leave open the question whether the attitudes they reveal are 
related to those uncovered by IATs.  Perhaps the two data sets are unrelated. 
Investigation into a possible connection between real-world settings and 
IAT performance suggests the opposite, however.  In fact, researchers have 
been successful in forging connections between investigations like the NBA 
study and data from indirect measurements.  “Indeed, the sorts of real-world 
findings coming from these sorts of statistical analyses and field studies, on the 
one hand, and the types of automatic and implicit mental processes revealed by 
the likes of the IAT, on the other, appear to complement each other quite nicely” 
(Kelly et al., 2010, p. 457).  Furthermore, “researchers have begun to...explicitly 
link indirect measures with behavior in controlled settings” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 
457).  A striking example involves evidence that research subjects are “more apt 
to misidentify a harmless object as a gun if they are first shown a picture of a 
Black, rather than a picture of a White” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 457).  B. Keith 
Payne argues that this phenomenon, now known as the “weapons bias 
effect…correlates with performance on the racial IAT” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 
458).  Echoing earlier claims, Payne (2005) reports that “several lines of research 
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have shown that group stereotypes may be activated outside the awareness and 
may influence behavior without the knowledge or intent of the perceiver” (p. 
181).  Payne supplements that research with his own by integrating “insights and 
techniques from social and cognitive psychology to help understand” important 
real-world issues, including weapons bias.  This particular real-world effect allows 
me to steer back my primary target—the relevance of implicit bias to race 
matters. 
 
5.3 Implicit Attitudes, Indirect Measures, and Race 
Today there is broad scholarly agreement that IATs reveal attitudes that 
affect real-world outcomes.  In fact, legal scholar Jerry Kang and psychologist 
Kristin Lane say that “After a decade of research, we believe that the IAT has 
demonstrated enough reliability and validity that total denial is implausible” (Kang 
& Lane, 2010, p. 477).  Moreover, Greenwald, Banaji, and Nosek’s meta-
analyses of earlier and apparently contradictory studies reveal that the IAT effect 
is “large enough to justify concluding that IAT measures predict societally 
important discrimination” (Greenwald et al., 2015, 559).  IAT analysis implicates 
implicit attitudes as factor in several important areas, including formation of 
political attitudes (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012) and voting decisions (Friese et al., 
2012), in choice of college major (Greenwald & Nosek, 2009), and probability of 
receiving research grants from the U.S. National Institute of Health (Ginther et 
al., 2011).  This delivers us to the heart of the present matter—the connection 
between implicit attitudes, IATs, and race.   
The connection is robust.  “Some of the first and most consistently 
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confirmed findings yielded by these tests...center on racial bias” (Kelly et al., 
2010, p. 455).  In fact, some of those findings are now decades old.  Spurred by 
the fact that racial stereotypes persist even as they “become more subtle” 
(Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983, pp. 29-30), Samuel Gaertner and John 
McLaughlin, for example, show that “research subjects, regardless of their 
personal prejudices, were reliably faster at pairing positive attitudes with Whites 
than Blacks” (Staats, 2013,p. 13) and that “negative traits are more highly 
associated with BLACKS than positive traits are, while the reverse is true for 
WHITES” (Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983, pp. 29-30).  Later studies reveal similar 
effects in a broad range of racialized contexts, some of the most important of 
which have already come up—weapons bias and research grant approval, to 
name two examples.  So, when it comes to the connection between implicit bias 
and race, the “real-world effect…is increasingly difficult to deny” (Kelly et al., 
2010, p. 459).  Furthermore, since “it is psychologically possible to be, and many 
Americans actually are, explicitly racially unbiased while being implicitly racially 
biased” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 450), exploring the connection could add clarity to 
remaining mysteries surrounding racial inequality and disparity in treatment 
between Whites and racial minorities.  This sort of investigation could, for 
example, “help explain familiar anecdotes of sincerely egalitarian people who are 
surprised when they are called out for racist behavior or biased decision-making, 
especially when such accusations turn out to be legitimate” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 
459).  They have the potential to explain even more serious matters.  I elaborate 
on three: implicit bias in criminal justice, in health and health care, and in 
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education.  These are among the most salient contexts and are crucial to the 
development of the position I develop in final chapter. 
 
5.3.1 Implicit Bias in Health Care 
The first context of concern, health care, should come as no surprise.  The 
opening chapter dealt with Gannett’s concerns over race in biomedical contexts.  
Health care is an increasingly salient issue both in the U.S. and internationally, 
and, at least in contemporary America, the effect of race on health and health 
care is a growing concern.  As Staats (2013) reports, “The presence of 
prevalence of racial disparities in health and health care across a wide array of 
ailments have been documented extensively” (p. 47).  The effect likely results 
from a combination of several factors—lifestyle choice, biomedical factors, and 
social/environmental factors (Staats, 2013, p. 47).  The Kirwan Institute report 
that Staats authors focuses on the last of those factors because they provide the 
initial medium through which implicit bias is realized in real-world medical 
situations.   
Substantial research backs correlations between implicit bias and racial 
disparities in health and health care.  Michelle van Ryn and colleagues, for 
example, report that “thousands of studies have demonstrated that Blacks 
receive lower quality medical care than Whites” and that “Despite this, there has 
been little progress toward eradicating these inequalities” (van Ryn et al., 2011, 
pp. 199-200).  Crucially, according to van Ryn et al., these disparities “might be 
influenced by implicit racial biases,” as empirical evidence shows that White 
medical clinicians “hold negative implicit racial biases...that persist independently 
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of and in contrast to their explicit (conscious) racial attitudes” and that White 
clinicians “can be influenced by racial bias in their clinical decision making” (van 
Ryn et al., 2011, p. 200).  Moreover, just as in the criminal justice context, 
“studies have documented the presence of implicit bias in a variety of facets of 
the health/health care industry” (Staats, 2013, p. 47).   
In a 2009 study, for example, Janice Sabin and colleagues argue that 
health care providers’ “implicit attitudes about race contribute to racial and ethnic 
health care disparities” (Sabin et al., 2009, p. 897).  According to Sabin et al. 
(2009), studies show that “internal medicine and emergency medicine physicians 
hold strong implicit attitudes favoring White Americans over Black Americans” (p. 
898).  In particular, multiple studies have shown that physicians implicitly 
associate Black patients with being “less cooperative” and/or White patients with 
being “compliant” (Sabin et al., 2009, p. 898).  Gordon Moskowitz and Jeff Stone, 
along with colleague Amanda Childs, found that doctors show “an implicit 
association of certain diseases with African Americans.  These comprised not 
only diseases African Americans are genetically predisposed to, but also 
conditions and social behaviors with no biological association” (Moskowitz et al., 
2012, p. 996).  They conclude that “diagnoses and treatment of African American 
patients may be biased, even in the absence of the practitioner’s intent or 
awareness” (Moskowitz et al., 2012, p. 996). 
Staats (2013) reports that studies also support the conclusion that “implicit 
biases have been shown to affect the type(s) and quality of care that patients of 
various races receive” (p. 48).  Among the most interesting is Alexander Green 
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and colleagues’ use of the IAT to supply “compelling evidence of implicit bias 
among physicians” (Staats, 2013, p. 49).  Green et al. argue that IAT scores 
used to measure physicians’ implicit race bias predict differential racial 
treatment.  “As physicians’ proWhite implicit bias increased, so did their likelihood 
of treating White patients and not treating Black patients with thrombolysis” 
(Green et al., 2007, p. 1231).  Similar results hold in studies of pediatricians’ 
treatment recommendations for pain, urinary tract infection, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, and asthma (Sabin & Greenwald, p. 2012).  Finally, 
implicit attitudes appear to factor in “doctor-patient communication” (Staats 2013 
p. 50) with studies linking unconscious bias to “White physicians’...less positive 
interactions with Black patients” (Staats, 2013, p. 50). Again, in at least some 
cases, IAT results are consistent with real-world outcomes.   Lisa Cooper and 
colleagues use two IATs to show that “Among Black patients, general race bias 
was associated with more clinician verbal dominance, lower patient positive 
affect, and poorer ratings of interpersonal care” among other things (Cooper et 
al., 2007, p. 979).  Adding all this together, Staats says the “impact of implicit 
biases in healthcare should not be understated” (Staats, 2013, p. 51).   
 
5.3.2 Implicit Bias in Criminal Justice 
The second contextual issue, implicit bias in criminal justice, is the most 
topical and inflammatory.  From 2014 to 2015, there were several highly 
controversial cases of unarmed Black men being killed by White police officers in 
various U.S. cities.  Although the police harassment and brutality of Blacks and 
other racial minorities is nothing new in the United States, the heightened 
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publicity fueled by bystander smartphone videos of these most recent cases has 
finally brought the issue to the forefront, increasing both racial awareness and 
racial tension at the national level.  In this section, I focus on the role implicit 
racial bias plays in the differential treatment of racial minorities, especially Black 
males, in the U.S. criminal justice system.  Before getting to the role of implicit 
bias, however, I am compelled to say a word about recalcitrant explicit bias. 
By focusing on implicit bias, I do not wish to reinforce the misguided view 
that explicit racism is virtually extinct.  Though it is arguably to some extent 
muted in contemporary American culture, explicit racism remains rampant.  A 
striking and representative example is supplied in the Department of Justice’s 
report on the Ferguson, Mo. Police Department after the murder of Michael 
Brown, an unarmed Black man, by a White police officer:  
Ferguson’s law enforcement practices are shaped by the City’s 
focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs.  This 
emphasis on revenue has compromised the institutional character 
of Ferguson’s police department, contributing to a pattern of 
unconstitutional policing, and has also shaped its municipal court, 
leading to procedures that raise due process concerns and inflict 
unnecessary harm on members of the Ferguson community. 
Further, Ferguson’s police and municipal practices both reflect and 
exacerbate existing racial bias, including racial 
stereotypes.  Ferguson’s own data establish clear racial disparities 
that adversely impact African Americans.  The evidence shows that 
discriminatory intent is part of the reason for these disparities. 
(United States Department of Justice, 2015, emphasis added)   
 
Clearly, explicit bias remains operative, and each source of racial bias 
merits attention and analysis.  But, while vigilance against explicit racism is now 
the norm—the fact that the U.S. Justice Department publicly addressed the 
Michael Brown incident is testament to that—the role of implicit attitudes, by 
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contrast, has been almost entirely neglected, particularly outside of the 
academy.  Evidence suggests that we neglect that effect to our detriment. 
The case for implicit bias as a causal factor in police action and criminal 
justice is robust and broad.  I have already touched on the most famous of these 
cases—the weapons bias effect, which, again, is the tendency of both Whites 
and Blacks to misidentify harmless objects as weapons if held by a Black rather 
than White subject.  But the concern runs much deeper.  Staats reports that 
implicit bias “can surface in the criminal justice system in a variety fashions, all of 
which may potentially taint the prospect of fair outcomes” (Staats, 2013, p. 
36).  What is worse, implicit bias can have a cumulative effect in the criminal 
justice system so that “even small implicit biases can accumulate over the course 
of legal proceedings, thereby amplifying the effect” (Staats, 2013, p. 36).  Kang et 
al. (2012) report that that within the criminal justice system “implicit bias is 
pervasive...and predicts certain kinds of real-world behavior” (pp. 1130-
1131).  Even when these “effects are deemed ‘small’ by social scientists,” they 
“may nonetheless have huge consequences for the individual, the social 
category he belongs to, and the entire society” (Kang, et al., pp. 2012 
1143).  Implicit bias can intervene during the initial police encounter and 
accumulate through the charge and plea bargain phase, and the trial phase—via 
both jury and judge—all the way through sentencing.  “In each of the stages of 
the criminal trial process...the empirical research gives us reason to think that 
implicit biases...could influence how defendants are treated and judged” (Kang et 
al., 2012, p. 1151).  In sum,  
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For a single defendant, these biases may surface for various 
decision makers repeatedly in policy, charging, bail, plea 
bargaining, pretrial motions, evidentiary motions, witness credibility, 
lawyer persuasiveness, guilt determination, sentencing 
recommendations, sentencing itself, appeal, and so on.  Even small 
biases at each stage may aggregate into a substantial effect. (Kang 
et al., 2012, p. 1151) 
 
Moreover, Kang et al. (2012) indicate through “meta-analysis of IAT 
studies...that implicit attitudes as measured by the IAT predicted certain types of 
behavior, such as anti-Black discrimination or intergroup discrimination, 
substantially better than explicit bias measures” (p. 1131).  Although work 
remains, it appears safe to conclude both that implicit bias is relevant to racial 
dynamics in the criminal justice system and that IATs at least partially track its 
effects.  This relatively moderate conclusion will turn out to be sufficient for my 
purposes, so I turn now to the last of the contexts. 
 
5.3.3 Implicit Bias in Education 
Finally, the effects of implicit attitudes are relevant to educational contexts, 
and just as before, implicit bias appears to affect educational settings in several 
ways, “all of which can yield disadvantageous consequences for students of 
color” (Staats, 2013, p. 30).  This topic centers on three key themes: “teacher 
expectations of student achievement, teacher perceptions of student behavior, 
and students’ self-perceptions” (Staats, 2013, p. 30).  Since this topic is 
organized as those above, I limit my explication of each to a few brief 
conclusions. 
Staats (2013) reports that a Dutch study12 combining teacher self-reports 
                                                          
12 See van den Bergh et al. (2010). 
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and IATs indicates both that teachers tend to have “differential expectations of 
students from different ethnic groups” and that “implicit attitudes were 
responsible for these differential expectations as well as the ethnic achievement 
gaps” (p. 31).  Another13 reports that teachers tend to hold lower expectations” 
for non-White children, a phenomenon that has been tied to academic 
performance (Staats, 2013, p. 31).14  With regard to teacher perception of 
student behavior, Staats reports studies have associated implicit bias with 
negative evaluations of “Black walking style” and with the perception that Black 
students are more threatening than White students (Staats, 2013, p. 32).15  
Moreover, these attitudes “may be further amplified by a cultural mismatch that 
exists between Whites and their students of color, and this mismatch can lead to 
teachers misinterpreting student behavior (Staats, 2013, p. 32).  Finally, says 
Staats, studies suggest that fears “of being viewed through the lens of negative 
stereotype,” a phenomenon known as “stereotype threat,” manifest in “lower 
performance by the stereotyped group, even when the stereotyped group and 
non-stereotyped group...have been statistically matched in ability level” (Staats, 
2013, p. 33-34).16  In sum, students, like medical patients and persons subject to 
the criminal justice system, are susceptible to not only individual, but also 
cumulative effects of each vector of implicit bias. 
Clearly, the list of studies backing the real-world effects of implicit bias is 
                                                          
13 See Tenenbaum & Ruck (2007). 
14 See Rosenthal & Jacobson (1968). 
15 See Neal, McCray, Webb-Johnson, & Bridgest (2003) and Hugenberg & Bodenhausen 
(2003). 
16 See Steele & Aronson (1995) and R.F.  Ferguson (2003). 
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impressive, but all parties concede that implicit attitude research is still new and 
its conclusions relatively tentative.  Much work remains.  “To be forthright, the 
psychological story is still far from complete, and in a number of ways” (Kelly et 
al., 2010, p. 460).  Open questions include the generalizability of IAT results from 
culture to culture and beyond Black and White, ontogenesis of implicit bias, and 
the details of the cognitive architecture, including whether implicit biases of 
different types (e.g., race, gender, and age biases) are generated by the set of 
mechanisms (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 461).  Even so, the empirical research 
establishes a number of claims: 
A large body of evidence indicates that implicit biases exist, and are 
fairly prevalent…[that] They are different from, and can coexist with, 
their explicit counterparts…[and that] field studies...complement 
work done in controlled experimental settings, strongly suggesting 
that implicit biases indeed affect judgment and behavior, even in 
real-world situations. (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 462) 
 
Implicit bias almost certainly affects racial judgments that causally 
contribute to race-relevant actions, which suggests that they are normatively 
relevant.  
 
5.4 Normative Consequences 
In some ways and to some extent, then, the normative case makes itself. 
Discrepancies in treatment and care that lead to oppressive and unequal 
outcomes based on morally arbitrary features such as race are simply intolerable 
to a society that aims at any significant level of egalitarianism.  But, while specific 
study results, like those addressed above, importantly spark and fuel normative 
concerns, I want to redirect the course of the dissertation back to more general 
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normative concerns.  That aim can be facilitated, of course, by returning to Kelly 
et al. (2010) who just as before describe the normative consequences of the 
connection between implicit attitudes and race in terms of the consequences for 
eliminativists and conservationists. 
Recall that the conclusions of ECP appeared to raise greater problems for 
eliminativism than conservationism—if humans are equipped to categorize by 
race, then it’s not clear that eliminativism is even possible.  Moreover, eliminating 
or even sublimating 'race' talk if racial categorization is in some measure 
inevitable appears to carry substantial risk—we might worry, for example, that it 
would be easier to implement racist policy if we don’t track racial demographic 
information. Although Kelly et al. (2010) strike a balanced chord, mostly resisting 
advocacy of either normative positions, eliminativism appears less tenable in light 
of similar evidence regarding racial attitudes.  Unless the case can be made that 
eliminating ‘race’ talk substantially decreases troublesome implicit racial bias, 
eliminativism is difficult to defend.  Even though these results “tilt the balance of 
consideration toward conservationism,” Kelly et al. (2010) caution that “the 
conservationist goal of reducing negative racial evaluations has problems of its 
own—problems that the disregard of psychology has kept from being addressed” 
(p. 452).  Broadly speaking, “to the extent that implicit biases have not been 
systematically taken into account, the feasibility of achieving [conservationists’] 
professed ideals remains largely unknown” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 462). 
There is potential payoff, however, for those conservationist who do take 
implicit bias into their accounts because implicit biases appear relatively 
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manipulable.  While “implicit biases operate beyond the direct conscious control 
of the participants themselves, they can be rather dramatically influenced by 
manipulating aspects of a person’s immediate environment” (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 
459).  Priming persons with faces of admired “other-raced” individuals—
celebrities such as Denzel Washington, for example—appears to decrease 
implicit bias, and persons appear to be able to exert a measure of self-control 
over implicit bias once it is revealed (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 49).  That conclusion is 
supported by Stone and Moskowitz’s aforementioned study of measures to 
reduce implicit bias in medicine, which concludes that “Contemporary training in 
cultural competence is insufficient to reduce these problems...However, these 
problems can be reduced by workshops and learning modules that focus on the 
psychology of non-conscious bias” (Stone & Moskowitz, 2011, p. 768).  In short, 
implicit bias affects judgment and action and is, therefore, “directly relevant to the 
normative debate over race, and is especially important for conservationists” 
(Kelly et al., 2010, p. 465).  Since it is, furthermore, measurable and manipulable, 
the (first) trick is simply to pay attention to it. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
It might appear, at this point, that I have arrived at yet another pernicious 
dichotomy—this time between social constructionism and evolutionary-cognitive 
explanations of race—but that conclusion is too quick.  It is crucial to my thesis 
that innate psychological structures are the foundation of the human tendencies 
to racialize and racially evaluate.  But in spite of that commitment and the 
challenges ECP poses for the received view, I resist the claim that innate 
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psychology completely accounts for racial cognition and evaluation and that 
social constructionism simply gets it wrong.  Fortunately, that claim is rather 
easier to resist than one might think, primarily because the theorists who defend 
ECP present a more inclusive view than their constructivist rivals.   
As many of the protagonists of this and earlier chapters say, at least some 
aspects of the evolutionary-cognitive and social constructionist models of race 
appear to be resolvable into complementary pieces of a more complete and 
versatile picture of race.   Mallon (2012), for example, might be the received 
view’s most critical antagonist, but his view is that the “content of our racial 
representations is determined by a range of forces that include both domain-
specific predispositions to believe (of the sort evolutionary-cognitive theorists 
emphasize), but also cultural and social forces (of the sort that social 
constructionist theorists emphasize)” (p. 86).  As one would expect, Kelly et al. 
(2010) draw a similar conclusion, saying that “racialized phenomena result from 
an interaction of an innate, evolved capacity for folk sociological thinking, on the 
one hand, and the specific social structure in which it is operating on the other” 
(Kelly et al., 2010, p. 445).   
In a slightly different tone, Kang (2012) suggests that “even if nature 
provides the broad canvas, nurture paints the detailed pictures—regarding who is 
inside and outside, what attributes they have, and who counts as friend or foe” 
(p. 134). Now, one could take Kang, as Staats does, as taking “sides with 
nurture” over nature—or in this context, constructivism over nativism—in 
explaining racialized phenomenon.  Given the evidence from ECP and implicit 
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attitude research on race and Kang’s reliance on it, however, I think he is likely 
doing something more similar to what Mallon is doing, namely, pointing out that 
neither innate psychological structures nor historical practices tells the entire 
story.  But it is Hirschfeld who advances the most forceful presentation of the 
interactionist thesis.  
Hirschfeld (2008) argues that racial cognition, just like all other all other 
“special purpose competencies,” depends on the presence of “relevant input” (p. 
38).  So, even if we are naturally equipped to racialize, actual schemata of racial 
classification and the evaluations they invite will depend in detail on certain types 
of environmental input.  Drawing on Hirschfeld’s conclusions, Quintana and 
McKown (2008) conclude that “Children’s developmental understanding of race 
appears to be a dynamic interaction of their natural curiosity about their social 
world and the complex ways in which they are exposed to race” (p. 17, emphasis 
added).  In sum, while humans have an “innate inclination” to sort themselves 
into groups, only through interaction with certain localized input do robust 
conceptions of race form. So, in fact, ECP reflects the need for the second part of 
the equation. 
In the next chapter, I operate in philosophical space created by the 
combination of overwhelming evidence for the role of opaque psychological 
structures in racialization in conjunction with the “concession” that innate 
psychology can’t explain everything.  Mallon says that ECP scholarship should 
be of interest to philosophers, and along with Kelly and Machery, looks to “help to 
shape novel suggestions proposed in the conservationist spirit” (Kelly et al., 
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2010, p. 435).  I provide my novel suggestion—a shift from social to 
psychological constructivism—in the next chapter.  There, I argue that to the 
extent that races are constructed, they are constructed on a foundation formed 















With the four foundational chapters in pocket, the time has come to 
describe and defend my thesis. Having covered so much ground and so many 
topics, ones that might appear only loosely related, however, I will begin with a 
brief synopsis of what has already come.  Since all the topics hover over race, 
there are, no doubt, many ways to connect the major topics of the preceding 
chapters.  Of course, I have written them with a particular set of questions in 
mind, so I present them here with an eye not only toward the content, but also 
the intended trajectory of the content of the first four chapters.  So, I open this 
final substantive chapter with a bit about how I have arrived and where I intend to 
go. 
I began with a problem—a conceptual dichotomy, to be precise—that 
generates additional pernicious philosophical and practical (that is, real-world) 
consequences.  Recall from the opening chapter that Gannett (2010) argues that 
race scholarship, especially among philosophers of science, involves “a 
dichotomous framing of alternatives” by which “race is either socially constructed 
or biological reality, a fiction like phlogiston or a genuine natural kind, a merely 
linguistic or a projectible predicate” (p. 364).  Unfortunately, the conceptual rivalry 
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that ensues circumscribes our investigations of race concepts, especially with 
regard to finding a reasonable middle ground or advancing robust interactionist 
proposals.  Those philosophical limitations, in turn, burden our practical aims.  In 
particular, Gannett says, they preclude asking important questions about race, 
including—crucially—those that would inform our investigation of contexts in 
which biological and social causal factors interact to give rise to race.  Intuitively, 
it seems patent that our working conceptions of race recruit both biological and 
social factors and that if we demand that race be either biological or social, we 
blind ourselves to interactive contexts.  Even recognizing these intimately related 
problems, however, it is difficult to say how they could be addressed.  Several of 
the authors considered in earlier chapters, for example, point to the difficulty 
offering a nonarbitrary (or non-”gerrymandered”) interactionist description of race 
(Gannett, 2010; Hardimon, 2013; Kitcher, 1999).  The problem remains largely 
unanswered, which is why I take Gannett’s worry to be not merely local to 
biomedicine but representative of a broader set of problems in a host of contexts 
concerning philosophy of race. 
In Chapter 3, I showed that, at least among philosophers, a natural way to 
begin is by critically analyzing the concept ‘race’ to reveal the necessary and 
sufficient conditions supporting its fundamental definition.  Of course, unless 
philosophers could agree on a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, battling 
over definitions can serve only to reinforce the dichotomy, but Mallon shows that 
this is only the beginning of the problem for definitional approaches, arguing that 
the “semantic strategy” doesn’t—can’t, in fact—do the job we ask of it.  Even if 
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successful, he says, a “project of semantic ascent” exaggerates metaphysical 
disputes, obscures metaphysical agreement, and does little to tilt the balance in 
favor of either conserving or eliminating ‘race’ talk.  In other words, the semantic 
strategy does not adequately address the guiding normative question, since, 
even if races are fictitious, we are not compelled by necessity to eliminate ‘race’ 
talk—we might, for example, think that, even if “race” doesn’t refer, its 
conservation is necessary to correct social ills.  So, this classical approach is 
not—either in its rationalist or empirical manifestation—sufficient to advance our 
goals.  As a result, our original problem, the dichotomy, is sustained by the 
apparent absence of techniques to efficaciously attack it.  Fortunately, as I 
showed in Chapters 4 and 5, Mallon, along with Kelly and Machery, offers an 
alternative approach. 
The evolutionary-cognitive program advocated by those scholars shifts the 
investigative focus from race’s “logical core” to its (opaque) psychological 
foundations.  In this vein, Chapter 4 centered on the role of innate psychology in 
categorization, Chapter 5 on implicit, though not necessarily innate, attitudes.  
The former appealed to a growing body of evidence that suggests certain 
important aspects of racial categorization are (both temporally and 
geographically) universal in human populations.  The most important of them is 
that, in spite of a scholarly consensus against biological essentialism, humans 
tend to racialize one another, that is, to presume that races are distinguished by 
racial essences that all or most members of a race share.  In Chapter 5, I shifted 
focus from innate racial classification to implicit racial evaluation, showing that, in 
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addition to explicit attitudes, humans harbor implicit attitudes about others based 
on race affiliation and, most importantly, that both sorts of racial attitudes impact 
our behavior.17  Crucially, each chapter—and, in fact, ECP and implicit bias 
research themselves—raises challenges for social constructivist accounts of race 
that they do not appear capable of meeting.  As a result, it appears that I have 
started with one dichotomy only to finish with another.   
Since I can hardly attack one dichotomy with another, the first task of this 
final chapter is to establish the feasibility of telling a coherent and practically 
useful interactionist story about race using complementary constructionist and 
ECP pieces.  To this end, Mallon and Kelly once again lay the groundwork, so in 
the first section, I detail their general discussion of social construction and segue 
to two early attempts—one from Mallon and Stephen Stich, the other from David 
Sloan Wilson—to map out ways to combine the insights of social construction 
and innate psychology to render a more complete picture of race.  After that, I will 
be in position to describe my approach, psychological constructivism of race, and 
detail its relevance to understanding race and its capacity to address the many 
unresolved social issues that surround it.  Breaking down this second apparent 
dichotomy, in other words, will help me to chip away the first, along with some of 
the other issues raised along the way.  All of this is to say that I am finally in 
                                                          
17 To be clear, none of this is to say that these tendencies—classification and 
evaluation—derive from the same (or a related) source.  Even conclusive proof of an innate 
mental mechanism that determines significant aspects of racial classification provides no proof 
that implicit racial bias is subserved by the same (or a similar) mechanism.  In fact, implicit 
attitudes needn’t be innate at all.  Fortunately, my aims are in no way dependent on such a claim.  
My thesis proceeds on a much weaker commitment, namely, to the apparent fact (based on 
mounds of evidence) that the human inclinations to both classify and judge by race derive from 




position to describe and defend my primary theses, namely, that race is 
psychologically constructed and that conceiving of race that way helps us to fill 
the normative gaps left by previous accounts.   
So, to be entirely clear, I proceed as follows. In the first section, I offer a 
brief preliminary explanation of what it means for race to be psychologically 
constructed. Then, I distinguish PCR from semantic and purely18 social 
constructivist accounts.  This move necessitates augmenting my previous 
discussions of social constructivism with some additional, complementary details. 
In Section 3, I finish the account of the psychological construction of race, first by 
offering a detailed description, and, finally, by distinguish it from a pair of closely 
related accounts: Wilson’s “evolutionary social construction” and Mallon and 
Kelly’s “hybrid constructionism,” a constructivist account that also proceeds 
according to the insights of ECP and implicit racial bias research.  The latter 
distinction is crucial, of course, both because of its proximity to my own view and 
because of the dissertation’s heavy reliance on work from Kelly and, especially, 
Mallon.  In the final section, I argue that PCR conduces to our normative goals 
involving race and then discuss its practical application to three salient racialized 
contexts of social concern.  First, though, an introductory word about what 




                                                          
18 I say “purely” here because it will become clear later in the chapter that, like Mallon, 
Kelly, and Machery, and, as I show below, Wilson, I think there is plenty of room for social 
constructivism to contribute to race scholarship even after I establish my position.  In fact, it will 
turn out to be a crucial factor in describing the most comprehensive conceptions of race. 
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6.2 What Psychological Constructivism  
About Race Is and What It Is Not 
Although I dedicate most of the first part of this section to delimiting PCR 
by indicating what it is not, establishing a point of reference for the position will 
make that task easier, so I begin with a succinct definition of “psychological 
constructivism of race,” as I think of it.  After the brief introduction of PCR, I veer 
back toward what it is not; in particular, I spend some time distinguishing it from 
those strategies—semanticism and social constructivism—that it is meant to 
either replace or complement.  Having earlier criticized some of the alternatives, I 
will want to distance my position from them, to be sure, but the short detour also 
serves the larger purpose of setting up the a fuller description of PCR. 
Psychological constructivism, which follows the evolutionary-cognitive 
approach in taking innate mental mechanisms to be foundational to race, 
represents an attempt to provide the conceptual nexus through which race’s 
disparate constituents can be more coherently and consistently linked.  It is 
especially designed to handle contexts in which, as Gannett says, the 
dichotomizing biological and social factors interact and, hence, to address our 
pragmatic needs in those racialized contexts. Alternatively, it represents an 
attempt to provide a new method for structuring the ‘race’ talk that has informed 
the conceptual and practical problems I have described in the first four chapters.  
The choice of descriptive terms such as “nexus” and “structure”—as opposed to 
“definition,” for example—is important.  As Chapter 2’s discussion of Gannett’s 
paper showed, obsessive focus on the “object-ness” or “kind-hood” of race is 
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counterproductive, and in contrast to the more philosophically venerable notion of 
a “natural kind,” “nexus” suggests a “bond, link, or junction” and, importantly, “the 
state of being connected or linked,” while “structure” entails an “arrangement and 
mutual relation of...constituent parts,” especially in “determining its distinctive 
nature or character...frame, or make-up” (www.oed.com).  A nexus is a point of 
union; a structure provides a framework or skeleton.  Each set of concepts is 
important to the explanation of my ends. 
These terminological choices confer several conceptual advantages.  
Describing those is, of course, one of the primary purposes of the chapter, but it 
is worth pointing out that they also enjoy what could be called a “tonal” 
advantage in that the tone they set for discussion of race is one that, unlike its 
predecessors and rivals, lowers the metaphysical stakes of race debates.  This is 
not to say that they are irrelevant to metaphysical debates, but rather that, for 
present purposes at least, it helps table worries about whether races are really 
real, or natural kinds.  As I argue in more detail below, PCR describes the 
conditions under which conceptions of race are constructed and acted upon.  As 
such, it is best to think of any products of PCR—that is, of any “psychological 
race constructs”—as context-sensitive: Psychologically constructed race is not a 
once-and-for-all sort of thing, and it is not to be considered (in the strong sense) 
universal, though many aspects of the structure PCR provides likely are (in the 
sense preferred by evolutionary psychologists, that is).19 Again, its purpose is to 
supply a nexus around which complex aspects of race can be structured, 
                                                          
19 That is, in the sense of populational or cultural, not individual, universality. 
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analyzed, discussed, and most importantly, put to use.  Now, on to the long 
version.  
Following Gannett and Mallon, I have suggested that two venerable 
scholarly approaches, the semantic approach and social constructivism, are 
ineffective and incomplete, respectively, with regard to the challenges that 
surround ‘race’ talk.  So, the defense of PCR as an efficacious method of 
understanding race requires showing first that it is not, or at least not merely, a 
version of those.  So, I begin by distinguishing it from those more common 
approaches to race. 
 
6.2.1 PCR Is Not Semantic  
As the name itself suggests, PCR proceeds from a foundation of research 
supporting the evolutionary-cognitive approach, not the semantic one.  Recall 
that the semantic approach involves the attempt to arrive at the proper normative 
conclusions (primarily) about ‘race’ talk  by consideration of one’s metaphysical 
commitments regarding race as determined by one’s definitional analysis and 
favored theory of reference.  In its direct appeal to ECP, psychological 
constructivism eschews traditional philosophical analyses.  Instead of proposing 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept ‘race’, it proceeds from the 
empirically-backed psychological conditions that give rise to common or regular 
elements among various conceptions. PCR’s shift from concept to conception is 
crucial because, as I have argued, conceptions are more intimately involved with 
behavior.  Following that lead, PCR shifts discourse from the semantics of race 
to the foundational psychological conditions of racializing behavior, including, of 
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course, the behavior of categorization itself.  In the first instance, then, PCR does 
not signal an attempt to define ‘race’ once and for all, or even too rigidly for a 
particular time and place, but to provide some flexible but limiting conditions for 
understanding both how race is being used in a particular context and the effect 
of that particular use.   
Moreover, psychological constructivism is largely agnostic on the deep 
metaphysical reality of race.  Instead of investing intellectual resources to 
determine whether race exists in the world apart from the human mind, PCR 
holds only that the actions of opaque psychology causally impact conceptual and 
normative dynamics.   
So, one benefit of my approach is that, heeding Gannett’s admonition, it 
lowers the metaphysical stakes and, ipso facto, attenuates the dichotomy she 
describes.  Notice that lowering these stakes neatly complements Mallon’s 
criticism of the semantic strategy.  That approach, remember, involves more than 
just determining the conditions necessary and sufficient for being a race.  
According to the semantic strategy, the definitional status of race is used in 
conjunction with a theory of reference to determine its metaphysical status, which 
in turn is supposed to inform our normative decisions.  Mallon (2005), of course, 
shows that this strategy does not function as supposed, arguing that ‘race’ is 
“normative, not metaphysical or semantic” (p. 525).  To say that ‘race’ is 
normative in Mallon’s sense is not to say that what “is normative is in the world, 
but how, when, and where we decide what to about what is in the world” (Mallon, 
2006, p. 550).  As Mallon’s arguments from Chapter 2 show, however, the 
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attempt to link these two questions via the semantic strategy “has...resulted in...a 
misplaced emphasis on metaphysical and semantic concerns” (Mallon, 2006, pp. 
550-1).  Since PCR derives from opaque psychology, whatever the shortcomings 
of psychological constructivism, the shortcomings of the semantic approach are 
not among them.  That derivation also demands distinction, of course, but I table 
the explanation of the distinction between ECP and other ECP-based 
approaches, on the one hand, and PCR, on the other, in favor of the more 
immediate concern: Clearly, PCR is constructivist, so is it social constructivist? 
 
6.2.2 PCR Is Not (Merely) Social Constructivism 
Well, no and yes.  Psychological constructivism proceeds from different 
fundamental assumptions than those generally associated with social 
constructivism.  While social constructivists understand race as the result of its 
historical and social predecessors in combination with contingent human 
decisions, PCR absorbs the insights of ECP and implicit attitude research and 
proceeds from the claim that opaque psychology provides a foundational 
framework for race that is later furnished with contextual details, such as those 
provided by the existence of more than one phenotypically discernible population 
in an area.  These points demand elaboration, but in order to extend this line of 
argument, I need to make an additional pass at social constructivism, highlighting 
some of the features that distinguish it from PCR and others that are 
complementary to it. 
I have already discussed social constructivism several times throughout 
the dissertation.  In the presentation of Gannett’s concerns in Chapter 2, for 
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example, social constructivism was cast as the antirealist rival to the realist 
biological description of race. In the second chapter, I again discussed antirealist 
constructivism, but this time via Mallon’s distinction between it and 
representational constructivism, with the former accounting for the popular sense 
in which a proposed theory or kind is cast as “merely” a construction, the latter 
for the sense in which race (for example) is described a product of historical 
social and cultural practices, conventions, and decisions.  Finally, in Chapter 3, I 
detailed the obstacles raised by the evolutionary-cognitive program for social 
constructivist accounts of race.  To move the ball forward, however, I need to say 
just a bit more about some relevant distinctions within social constructivism.  The 
section is not redundant, however—many taxonomies of social construction with 
differing levels of generality are possible relative to one’s explanatory needs and 
several can be relevant to a single problem domain.  That is the case with race.  
So far I have invoked some fairly specific constructionist issues for particular 
purposes, but in the present context I need a broader focus, so here I present 
some more general claims about social constructivism in order to distinguish it 
from my position.  Mallon, once again, proves useful.    
In his “Field Guide to Social Construction,” Mallon (2007) distinguishes 
two “foci of constructionist work: one centered on our ways of thinking about, 
representing, or modeling the world, and the second centered on parts of the 
world itself” (p. 95).  Broadly construed, the former focus “includes many different 
types of theories—for example folk and scientific theories—as well as theories 
held by an individual, by a cultural group and so forth” (Mallon, 2007, p. 95).  In 
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general, theory construction proceeds via defenses of “particular views of what 
(other than the facts or data) determines the content of accepted theories,” which 
become contentious when “theory constructionists emphasize determinants that 
they take to be the ‘wrong kinds of causes’ or the ‘wrong kinds of reasons’ for 
beliefs” (Mallon, 2007, p. 96). This single argumentative strategy appears in 
many forms, however, including ones that stress “background factors,” “intuitive 
judgments of plausibility and decisions about usefulness”20 and, in the case of 
Charles Mills’ work on race theory construction, “self-interest of the powerful” 
(Mallon, 2007, p. 96).  So, as Mallon (2007) says, “While a great deal of 
constructionist work concerns the construction of theories...more provocative 
constructionist claims seem to concern not only theories but the objects that 
those theories are about” (p. 95).   
The relationship between theory and object construction is contentious.  
For example, Mallon (2007) says that, on a deflationary reading, many 
“constructionist claims that are apparently about objects can be reinterpreted as 
primarily about theories,” but some “constructionists may want to resist this 
deflationary reading, suggesting that recognition of the social construction of our 
theories should lead us to embrace the social construction of the facts those 
theories purport to describe” (p. 97).  In any case, “there is good reason to think 
that social constructionism has special purchase in producing particular sorts of 
                                                          
20 Mallon (2007) offers examples of the first two as well, associating the former with 




object, human kinds,” including race (Mallon, 2007, 95).21  Moreover, the 
construction of both theories and objects revolves around a shared “cluster of 
explanatory views about what determines the constructed phenomena” (Mallon, 
2007, p. 102).  Some of the shared explanatory views supplied by Mallon (2007) 
are already familiar—“that a particular human feature is culturally and historically 
local rather than universal” (p. 98) —others less so—“that as the content of our 
cultural representations of the kind vary, so does the kind” (p. 99)—but in one 
way or another all oppose the primary commitments of ECP, especially the 
contribution of innate mental mechanisms.   
PCR, on the other hand, embraces those commitments.  Innate 
psychology is, in other words, the foundation of the psychological construction of 
race.  It will soon become clear that many social constructivist commitments can 
(and must) contribute to robust, mature psychological constructs, but that need 
not detain me here—recall that my aim was only to show that psychological 
constructivism is not merely social constructivism.  The role given to opaque 
psychology is enough to secure that conclusion.  So, having distinguished PCR 
from metaphysical, semantic, and social constructivist positions, I move to its 
fuller positive development, a part of which centers on distinguishing it from two 
more closely allied positions.   
 
 
                                                          
21 More specifically, Mallon (2007) goes on to say that whatever one thinks about the 
relationship between theory and object construction in general, “there is good reason to think that 
connecting theory construction and objects may have special purpose in the study of human 
kinds” (p. 97). 
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6.3 What PCR Is 
In the introduction to this chapter, I alluded to the appearance of a second 
potential conceptual dichotomy—one between social constructivist and 
evolutionary-cognitive theorists—which represents the chief obstacle to 
establishing and defending PCR.  The threat is serious: Mallon (2007) refers to 
the debate that underpins the new dichotomy as “human nature wars” and says 
that the “global positions [on each side] are powerful in that they guide research 
programs in more specific domains, domains like morality, the emotions, sexual 
difference, racial classifications, and so forth” (p. 97).  Since, at root, 
psychological constructivism is an attempt to stake out a middle ground between 
the rival camps, and since I have distinguished PCR from social constructivism, 
the first task is to explain away this apparent dichotomy.  Ultimately, I will carve 
out an interactionist solution that involves complementary aspects of the two 
sides, but the explanatory differences between them (some of which have been 
previously discussed) are quite real, so let me begin with a bit about how the 
debate plays out before turning to the solution.   
 
6.3.1 The Makings of the Second Dichotomy 
According to Mallon (2007), this high-profile battle in the human nature 
wars pits those “who insist on a central role for innate human biology and 
psychology in explaining human traits, including dispositions and behaviors” 
against those “who argue that culture and human decisions fundamentally shape 
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the human kinds to which we belong” (p. 97).22  In an earlier paper, Mallon and 
Stich outline three more specific differences—one empirical, one strategic, and 
one semantic—between the two sides.  There is, first, an “empirical 
disagreement about the extent to which all normal humans share innate...mental 
mechanisms that constrain our psychology and our social interactions and 
intuitions” (Mallon & Stich, 2000, p. 135).  Strategically, the sides differ on “the 
best way to make progress”; specifically, ECP theorists “urge that we focus on 
what people have in common, while social constructionists think that it is more 
important to attend to the many ways in which people differ” (Mallon & Stich, 
2000, p. 135).  The third important issue is by now quite familiar: “it is a semantic 
disagreement....What is at issue is the meaning and reference of many ordinary 
terms” (Mallon & Stich, 2000, p. 136).  In one way or another, I have alluded to 
each of these issues, and the last is, of course, the issue concerning the 
semantic strategy covered in Chapter 3.  
There are additional general disagreements.  For example, social 
constructionism investigates primarily “phenomena that are contingent upon 
human culture and human decisions—contingent upon theories, texts, 
conventions, practices, and conceptual schemes of particular individuals and 
groups of people in particular place and times” (Mallon, 2007, p. 94).  In contrast, 
“defenders of the importance of human nature often claim that there is a broad 
range of human universals” (Mallon, 2007, p. 98), so on that account, “human 
minds have a rich, species-typical cognitive architecture composed of functionally 
                                                          
22 The parameters of the rivalry are familiar from earlier discussions.  See my discussion 
of the “received view” that race is a social construction in Section 3.2. 
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distinct systems—‘mental organs’...that have been shaped by natural selection” 
(Mallon & Stich, 2000, p. 134).  That is not, of course, to say that the products of 
evolution, or these particular products, are not in some sense contingent as 
well—human evolution could have turned out differently for myriad reasons.  
Here, the point is about what the trait in question is contingent upon.  For social 
constructivists, it is primarily the activities of humans, while for ECP theorists it is 
primarily evolved mental mechanisms. 
So, a significant chunk of the human nature wars turn on the role of 
evolution in constructing human kinds.  To be clear, however, as Wilson (2005) 
argues, “the controversy does not center on the basic fact of evolution but on 
certain consequences, such as the importance of natural selection and especially 
the relevance of evolution to human affairs” (p. 20).  Nevertheless, social 
constructivist approaches are “united in their commitment to the idea that 
individuals and societies have enormous flexibility in what they can become, in 
contrast to the inflexibility and determinism attributed to evolutionary approaches 
to human behavior” (Wilson, 2005, p. 20).  Indeed, “while no serious social 
constructionist would deny that our innate mental endowment imposes some 
constraints on what we can learn and what we can do, they believe that most of 
these constraints are weak and uninteresting” (Mallon, 2000, p. 134).  This, of 
course, is why social constructivists attribute differences to “surrounding culture” 
that is “in turn explained by differences in history and local conditions” (Mallon, 
2000, p. 134).23   
                                                          
23 As a useful point of reference, one can consider a distinction made by David Buller in 
Adapting Minds.  Buller uses the lower case “evolutionary psychology” to designate “a field of 
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Yet another point of contention is that social constructivism about race 
tends to be “radically” antirealist and antinaturalist, and while ECP can remain 
antirealist about race, its connection to evolutionary and cognitive psychology 
suggests a naturalistic framework.  This is not to say, of course, that it is 
naturalistic in the same sense as biological explanations of race.  Indeed, like 
social constructivist work, “work on racial categorization in cognitive and 
evolutionary psychology has...begun with the falsity of biological theories of race” 
(Mallon, 2007, 103).  Given these general disagreements, it is no wonder that 
ECP and “social constructionism are widely regarded as fundamentally 
irreconcilable approaches to the social sciences” (Mallon & Stich, 2000, p. 133).  
Even so, the approaches can be described in complementary terms.  Ironically, 
the easiest way to show this is by enlisting a couple of more specific examples of 
their competing views.  For that, I return to Mallon’s 2012 paper that informed 
significant parts of Chapter 4.  
Recall that Mallon (2012) argues that social constructivist stories about 
race most often depend on the “Conceptual Break Hypothesis” (or CBH), which 
suggests a relatively recent fundamental change in the way humans represent 
“human groups we now call ‘races’” (p. 77).  In particular, it says that the change 
in concept, meaning, or theory turns on the essentialization of race at that time.  
                                                          
inquiry” which covers a broad set issues that are “united only by a commitment to articulating 
questions about human behavior and mentality” (Buller, 2005, 8).  In contrast, the capitalized 
“Evolutionary Psychology” is reserved for a specific “paradigm” in the Kuhnian sense.  So, a way 
to understand Wilson and Mallon, here, is to say that they, like Buller, think that evolutionary 
psychology enjoys broad acceptance, but Evolutionary Psychology is rejected by social 
constructivists.  In saying that social constructivists think that evolutionary constraints are weak 
and uninteresting, however, Mallon may be arguing that they are unimpressed even with the field 
of study.  The point of the comparison is merely to provide a context that clears up the points of 
contention between ECP and SC. 
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The lynchpin of CBH is what Mallon calls the “HERE” hypothesis—the view that 
“racial essentialism is a culturally specific and historically recent way of thinking 
about some human groups” (Mallon, 2012, p. 79).  Of course, ECP promotes an 
origin story for essentialist thinking based on evolved, innate mental 
mechanisms, and given that “a range of emerging evidence supports the 
evolutionary-cognitive thesis that racial essentialism is the product of an innate, 
domain-specific, and species-typical mechanism that supports lineage 
essentialist reasoning about human groups,” Mallon argues that the “HERE 
hypothesis is mistaken,” thereby undermining the CBH (Mallon, 2012, p. 86).  
Even so, Mallon (2012) claims to “join with a great deal of constructionist 
academic work suggesting that the modern treatment of human groups involves 
some sort of break” (p. 86, emphasis added).   
In fact, even “allowing close examination of the senses in which social 
constructionist and evolutionary-cognitive approaches compete,” Mallon (2012) 
aims to “provides a case study of a potential site of integration,” arguing that “the 
central idea of constructionism—that human decision and human culture exert 
profound and often unnoticed influence...remains interesting and provocative 
within a broadly naturalist and realist framework” (p. 79).  In other words, “even in 
this context of evolutionary-cognitive vindication, both constructionists and 
evolutionary-cognitive explanations have a role as part of the complete causal 
story” (Mallon, 2012, p. 86).  As a result, he and Kelly defend a position they call 
“hybrid constructionism,” in which they “pair social constructionism about racial 
difference with a partially nonconstructionist account of racial representations” 
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(Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 512).  Mallon and Kelly are not alone in this view.  
Wilson (2005) also aims at “a more productive explanation of the middle ground” 
and tries “to show that the heart of social constructivism can be given an 
evolutionary formulation” (p. 20).  In fact, he goes farther, arguing that “Social 
constructivists have more to gain from adopting an evolutionary perspective than 
by avoiding it, and [ECP theorists] need to incorporate large elements of social 
constructivism into their framework” (Wilson, 2005, p. 20). So, these scholars 
supply the motivation for an interactionist/complementarian story about race.  
Social constructionists are particularly resistant to such a move, primarily 
because they tend to associate nativism with determinism.  The trick is to show 
how they might fit together.  Mallon and Kelly’s hybrid constructivism, along with 
Wilson’s position, which he calls “evolutionary social construction” offer useful 
paradigms for comparison. 
 
6.3.2 Is an Interactionist Thesis Possible? 
The first move is to show that variability and malleability of racial 
categories and attitudes are possible, even if subserved by an innate mental 
mechanism.  To this end, I take an intuitive (rather than conceptual or formally 
argumentative) approach in this section, beginning with two examples that 
support the sort of interactionist thesis that Mallon, Kelly, Wilson, and I have in 
mind. 
First, citing related work from both Paul Ekman and Paul Griffiths, Mallon 
discusses differences in emotive facial expression response between Japanese 
and Americans.  Eckman’s studies show that “Japanese suppressed their facial 
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expressions in the presence of authority figures” (Griffiths, 1997, as cited in 
Mallon, 2007, p. 100).  In this respect, the most likely explanation for the 
difference between Japanese and Americans is a cultural one.  Although some 
aspects of facial expressions associated with emotional response are innate—
members of all human populations smile and frown, for example—“they can 
nonetheless be modified by cultural and human decisions” (Mallon, 2007, p. 
100).  “Such is the power and versatility of the human capacity to shape our 
environment and ourselves that many traits that develop extremely robustly 
across a wide range of environmental perturbation are nonetheless under the 
control of our decisions and our culture” (Mallon, 2007, p. 100).  This example 
suggests that the social constructivists’ resistance to nativism that grows out of 
concern for inevitability of certain traits is ill-founded.  While some aspects of 
innate characteristics and capacities are likely inevitable, humans exert 
significant control over the full-fledged characteristic. 
My own example of the interaction of innate and sociocultural elements 
appeals to Chomsky’s view of natural language, which I have touched on before.  
Again, to say that a phenomenon is (partially or fundamentally) psychologically 
constructed to say that it is underpinned by psychological mechanisms that are 
augmented by some social practices and deliberate decisions.  As such, the 
helpful analogue to race according to PCR is not biological theories of natural 
kinds or even species, but the Chomskyan view of language.24   
                                                          
24 In this context, whether Chomsky is right about the origins of language is 
inconsequential.  I chose the example to add clarity to my discussion of race and because it is 
one that is likely familiar to many philosophically and linguistically oriented readers. For details on 
his linguistic theory, see Chomsky (1955).  
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In broad outline, Chomsky’s view is that language is something for which 
humans are hard-wired; in some sense, humans simply innately have language.  
Whatever the details, the human brain contains a language module, an innate 
mechanism for generating natural languages.25  So, according to the Chomskyan 
paradigm, particular natural languages—Dutch, English, Arabic, Mandarin, etc.—
arise from the interaction of innate language mechanism, on the one hand, and 
social and cultural stimuli, on the other.  For one to communicate in a particular 
language, then, one must acquire and display competence in the ways of those 
around one.  In this analogy, a particular language may look like a 
representational construct, but language is itself, whatever it is, arises out of 
psychological construction.26  So, despite some fairly obvious differences, the 
Chomskyan line on language helps clarify the psychological construction of race.  
In fact, Chomsky’s view of language is reminiscent of Hirschfeld’s arguing that 
race is what it is “by virtue of the way it is acquired...young children acquire racial 
knowledge via a predilection to attend to input relevant to community standards 
and convention,” and they acquire racial knowledge “largely on their own” 
(Hirschfeld, 2012, 22).  So Hirschfeld’s evidence, like the examples above, 
supports the move toward the evolutionary-cognitive approach to race.27  Race, 
according to this view, does not exist merely because of particular history of 
                                                          
25 There is an obvious disanalogy here, namely, that Chomsky thinks the module that 
gives rise to language was designed for language, whereas (again) the module implicated in race 
likely is not a race module.  The two objects of inquiry needn’t be analogous in this way, however, 
in order for the comparison to shed light on psychological constructivism about race. 
26 For a more recent scholarly treatment of Chomsky’s linguistic theory, see I-Language: 
An Introduction to Linguistics as Cognitive Science (Isaac & Reiss, 2008).  
27 Machery and Faucher (2004) are critical of Hirschfeld’s conclusions, but the focus of 
their objections is the particular cognitive mechanisms that Hirschfeld defends, not the claim that 
cognitive mechanisms are fundamental to racialization. 
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social practices of certain sort.  Instead, it appears to be grounded in a 
predilection to sort people into groups based on racialized qualities.  In sum, 
despite resistance from social constructionists to evolutionary psychology, these 
real-world examples illustrate that at least some phenomena are best understood 
as combinations of complementary psychological and social forces.  To this end, 
in fact, Wilson and Mallon make stronger claims.   
Wilson (2005) argues that social constructivism can be preserved, even 
strengthened by incorporating an evolutionary-cognitive foundation.  Elaborate 
“innateness...does not exclude and indeed makes possible the potential for open-
ended change...In short, the way forward for social constructivism is to become 
more sophisticated about evolution, not to deny its relevance to human affairs” 
(p. 28).  Mallon (2007) expresses similar sentiments, arguing that “a weak social 
dependence constructionism need not be opposed to innateness” (p. 99).  Citing 
the aforementioned work on emotions and facial expressions, Mallon (2007) 
argues that “even these ‘biologically determined’ motor responses can be shaped 
by cultural reinforcement” (p. 100).  In sum, these examples “show that it is 
possible for a trait to be both socially dependent and innate,” which is to say that 
“social dependence is not incompatible with the biological or psychological claim 
that some important traits are innate.  We may well be able to alter innate 
characteristics if we have the (individual or collective) will” (Mallon, 2007, p. 101).  
So, to find middle ground, social constructionists are likely going to have to 
broaden their views of what informs (at least some) constructions. 
Social constructionists are not the only ones who will need to adapt, 
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however.  While innate psychology provides a framework for racial cognition, it 
does not tell the whole story.  This much should be intuitive, given that 
evolutionary psychologists regard the mental mechanism responsible for 
racialization as an exaptation: if the module is an adaptation for something other 
than race—for example, biological reasoning—then one should not expect that it 
would account for race in toto.  Wilson (2005), in fact, makes a point of drawing 
attention to limited nature of evolutionary psychology as well as social 
constructivism.  “Evolutionary psychology in its current form...must take back 
some of what has been rejected as part of the ‘standard social science model’, in 
particular open-ended, non-genetic evolutionary processes that adapt individuals 
and groups to their current environments” (Wilson, 2005, p. 15).  Kelly et al. 
(2010) are less forceful on this point but similarly allow for dual contributions to 
the study of race, noting that evolutionary psychologists do not deny that 
“socialization plays some role, they simply insist that it is not the whole story” (p. 
440).  Finally, Mallon (2012) delivers another version of the message: “in effect, 
the content of our racial representations is determined by a range of forces that 
include both domain specific predispositions to believe...but also cultural and 
social forces” (p. 86).  So, neither research program gives the complete picture. It 
appears, then, that innate psychology without social construction is empty, and 
social construction without innate psychology blind.  
A middle ground appears necessary, but so far little has been staked out, 
particularly with regard to race.  Because the “debates have become so 
polarized,” the “middle ground becomes a no man’s land into which no one dares 
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to venture” (Wilson, 2005, p. 1).  As a result, despite mounting empirical 
evidence and useful complementarian analogues, the “relationship of such 
accounts (growing out of cognitive and evolutionary psychology) to more 
traditional constructionist work in the social sciences and humanities has barely 
been considered” with regard to race (Mallon, 2012, p. 86).  But, as Wilson has it, 
much of the debate that prevents complementarian theses is ado about nothing.  
The “middle ground that we have been discussing has remained unoccupied 
because of perceived implications, not just intellectual difficulty. Intellectually it is 
fully possible to achieve a theory of evolution...that serves as a resource for 
individual and societal change” (Wilson, 2005, p. 15, emphasis added).  ECP and 
social constructivism are not mutually exclusive; in fact, “those of us who use the 
term evolutionary psychology broadly think of it not as a counterweight but as a 
framework for explaining all aspects of psychology from an evolutionary 
perspective” (Wilson, 2005, p. 15).28  The “framework” metaphor is, of course, 
familiar.  I have already discussed psychological constructivism’s providing a 
framework for race, and now the time has arrived that I can more fully develop 
the point.  
 
6.3.3 PCR as Framework and Nexus 
Recall that Gannett’s dichotomy problem arises from the tendency among 
philosophers of science to adopt “an essentialist approach to natural kinds” 
(Gannett, 2010, p. 371).  The problem is that races, just like genuine biological 
categories, are nonessentialist—racial groups do not share biological racial 
                                                          
28 Again, see Buller’s distinction described in footnote 7 above.  
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essences.  Still, racialism won’t go away, and given its recalcitrance, Gannett 
advises that “a better argumentative strategy recognizes that ‘race’, as it is 
socially constructed, is essentialist” (Gannett, 2010, p. 371).  The move to 
relocate the essentialist element of race is one that I adopt, but not quite in the 
same way as Gannett, who in the passage just cited goes on to say that “With 
society, not science, as the starting point, the question becomes whether or not 
social construction conforms to biology” (Gannett, 2010, p. 371, emphasis 
added).  Unfortunately, this is just an instance of the semantic strategy, which I 
have already shown (via Mallon) to be inefficacious.  So, I offer the following 
emendation: The first important point is to recognize that race, as it is 
psychologically constructed, is essentialist, and with psychology, and neither 
(classificatory biological) science nor society as the starting point, the question 
becomes how the skeleton provided by an innate mental module is fleshed with 
social phenomena to form robust, albeit context-dependent, conceptions of race. 
So, PCR begins with an innate human tendency toward racial 
classification, but to say only that humans tend to sort one another according to 
some typically racial standard would be insufficient.  It is equally crucial to say 
that the classed groups are essentialized.  An easy way to understand the 
importance of this point is to recall that in crafting his conceptual analysis of 
‘race’, Hardimon denies essentialism a place in its “logical core,” the necessary 
and sufficient conditions common to all conceptions of race.  The “logical core 
does not require that races have essences,” he says, and for emphasis adds that 
the “ordinary concept of race is not essentialistic” (Hardimo, 2003, p. 449).  But, 
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in the passage below, it’s easy to spot the flaw in his justification:  
[The] logical core does not hold that human beings are divided ‘by 
nature’ into a hierarchy of races…that each race is characterized by 
a fixed set of fundamental, ‘heritable’, moral, intellectual, and 
cultural characteristics common to it…that each race has an 
essence that explains why it has the visible physical features it 
does, why it has the moral, intellectual, and cultural characteristics 
it does, or why the two are correlated. It does not hold that each 
individual member of a race necessarily shares the ‘essential’ 
characteristics of his or her race. It does not—and this point should 
be underscored—require any intrinsic connection between skin 
color and humanly important traits such as intelligence or moral 
character. (Hardimon, 2003, p. 450) 
 
The problem is that what Hardimon (2003) says is not merely true, it is a 
truism.  The view that essentialism is “in the object,” that racialism is biological, is 
rejected as a part of the ontological consensus.  Nevertheless, it is patent that 
people commonly and naturally essentialize race and that the essentialized 
conceptions of race are the ones most associated with social and political issues.  
So, while PCR agrees that race is not biologically essentialist, it takes the 
psychologically provided essentialist element as paramount.  Even if racialism is 
not essential to the logical core of ‘race’, it is essential to our pragmatic aims that 
we recognize the ubiquity and consequences of racialism.   
This is a point to which social constructivist Sally Haslanger appears to 
object.  Haslanger’s aims are similar to mine: “the task is to develop accounts 
of...race that will be effective tools in the fight against injustice” (Haslanger, 2000, 
p. 36).  In fact, we agree even on the more specific concerns that guide her 
project, save one detail.  Haslanger, like Hardimon, deflates her account by 
shedding essentialism.  Consider the following footnote in which Haslanger is 
explicit about this point: 
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We need here a term for those physical features of individuals that 
mark them as members of a race.  One might refer to them as 
‘racial’ features, but to avoid any suggestion of racial essences, I 
will use the term ‘color’ to refer to the (contextually variable) 
physical ‘markers’ of race, just as I use the term ‘sex’ to refer to the 
(contextually variable) physical ‘markers’ of gender.  I mean to 
include in ‘color’ more than just skin tone: common markers also 
include eye, nose, and lip shape, hair texture, physique, etc.  
Although the term ‘people of color’ is used to refer to non-Whites, I 
want to allow that the markers of ‘Whiteness’ count as ‘color’. 
(Haslanger, 2000, p. 53, fn. 7, emphasis added)  
 
Even Haslanger’s way of expressing her conception of race suggests to me that 
“color” alone cannot constitute race, the formation of which demands an 
additional ingredient.  To see this, consider a physical, but generally non-racial, 
characteristic: eye color (or Hardimon’s choice, the Adam’s apple).  While it may 
not be true that no stereotypes exist with regard to, say, brown-eyed people, it 
certainly does not appear that we apply deep essential properties to all brown-
eyed people, likely in part because brown eyes are shared by a large numbers of 
members from all recognized races.  Both Hardimon’s and Haslanger’s 
minimalist conceptual accounts of race appear to treat all phenotypic 
characteristics as though they were like eye color, that is, as properties that 
demarcate different colors of people, rather than pointing to deeper psychological 
and moral characteristics typically associated with race.  Their motivation, which 
is common to social constructivists, is easy to imagine.  Racially essentializing 
persons and groups is clearly at the heart of many problems associated with 
race.  But races, even if they exist, aren’t essentialist, so by (re-)defining race 
without essentialism, social constructivists such as Hardimon and Haslanger 
remove the most harm-inducing element of common conceptions of race. 
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PCR shares that aim, but takes a different course: It accounts for racialism 
by providing a medium for racial discourse that correctly locates it in the human 
mind—that is, in the cognizing subject—rather than in the racialized being or 
group—that is, in the object so cognized.  This line of argument becomes clearer 
if we consider an example.   
Psychological constructivism is committed to the view that group-typical 
physical characteristics are only that, until they are used to (fallaciously) predict 
deeper and, in the most extreme cases, essential racial characteristics.  
Hardimon is right that we could group people according to skin tone in rather 
innocuous ways—these people are brownish, these whitish, these yellowish, 
these reddish, etc.—but it does not appear that those groups constitute races 
until they are in some measure essentialized.  That is why eye color is seldom 
counted as a racial characteristic—it is rarely used to suggest deeper meaning of 
the relevant kind.  Similarly, if I say my friend’s skin is darker than mine—or that 
another group generally has darker skin than the group with which I am 
associated—I doubt that that alone qualifies my claim as racial.  The set of 
sunbathers, for example, has darker skin than I, regardless of their racial 
affiliation.  Forming a race in the popular and pernicious sense requires 
something more than grouping according superficial characteristics.  It takes a 
particular kind of story about those characteristics to make them racial, and PCR 
is founded on the view that racialist thinking best informs that story.   
Even allowing essentialism is not enough, however.  Evidence of innate 
psychology’s role in racial matters demands a thicker foundation that reflects the 
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fact that humans not only natively classify by and essentialize race, but also 
implicitly evaluate by race.  In his discussion of points of potential integration of 
social and innate psychological factors, Mallon (2007) opines that “there is no 
reason that human kind constructionism about race cannot be paired with 
alternate accounts...of racial theories.  Such account might hold that 
psychological predispositions contribute to the formation of racial social roles that 
have played an important role in racial oppression” (p. 103).  In an earlier work, 
Mallon delivers a lengthier, but lucid description of the favored approach: 
Instead of focusing on defending an account of what race is or what 
racial concepts mean, we should ask: what kinds of conceptual 
apparatus do we need to discuss racial classification and racially 
associated phenomena in historical and contemporary life? We 
thus exchange the question of whether and how race exists for the 
project of developing an adequate metaphysical theory 
distinguishing as many accounts of race or racial phenomena as 
are needed to serve all our functional needs—including the various 
dimensions of racial identification, experience, appearance, and 
folk classification—so that their practical, social, and ethical 
significance can be discussed. Only in such a project of theoretical 
refinement are we likely to shed the persistent mistakes of ordinary 
racial thinking while continuing to refer to the world in ways that 
satisfy a multiplicity of theoretical needs. (Mallon, 2004, p. 668) 
 
That sort of supposition motivates the inclusion of racial evaluation, that is, of 
implicit racial bias in the psychological foundations of conceptions of race.  The 
evidence leaves little doubt that the human predisposition to essentialize race 
contributes to racial oppression, but the more crucial concern involves what 
characteristics or tendencies are attributed to the supposed racial essence. 
Perhaps if racial stereotypes tended to be fairly benign, they could be left 
aside.  And, in fact, Erin Beeghly uses her “descriptive view of stereotypes and 
stereotyping” to cogently argue that stereotyping is not intrinsically wrong” 
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(Beeghly, 2015, n.p.)  Beeghly (2015) points out, for example, that even if the 
proposition “doctors wear White coats” counts as a stereotype, there “is no moral 
failing...no moral vice” when a “panicked father in an emergency room” grabs 
“the first person he sees in a White coat.”  So, instead of simply assuming that all 
cases of stereotyping are morally objectionable, Beeghly argues that “we might 
have to be pluralists about what’s wrong with stereotyping.   
There may be no single wrong present in all the bad cases.  
Despite the gravity of such wrongs, an important fact would remain.  
When these wrongs do not accompany a case of stereotyping, 
stereotyping could be permissible and even good. (Beeghly, 2015, 
n.p.) 
  
One thing that could be wrong with racial stereotyping, in particular, 
involves the tendency to essentialize it, a point that Beeghly recognizes and 
allows (Beeghly, 2015).  In light of what was said about race in Chapters 4 and 5, 
this consideration is particularly relevant to racial stereotyping, of course.  Racial 
stereotyping, after all, tends to be deemed particularly and universally wrong.  
Indeed, as the Kirwan studies from Chapter 5 show, implicit racial bias (and, 
hence, racial stereotyping) is very likely causally relevant to oppressive, real-
world disadvantages in a host of contexts.   
In fact, when it comes to race, even “positive” or “good” stereotypes can 
be harmful.  An obvious problem is that positive stereotypes set standards that 
most members of the group will not reach.  If we accept, even casually, the 
stereotype that Asians are good at math, then an Asian student who is poor at 
math is set up for criticism, even if he or she is has other robust talents.  
Anecdotally, I have been present for several pick-up basketball games in which 
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African American males who were chosen first by team captains are chastised 
when it turns out that they are not very good.  The bigger problem with “positive” 
racial stereotypes, however, is that they make negative ones seem more 
plausible.  Believing that “Blacks are naturally good athletes,” for example, opens 
the door to believing “Blacks are naturally less intelligent.” The point is that, very 
often, even “good” racial stereotypes aren’t good.  These claims, however, 
should not be taken as critical of Beeghly’s position; rather, I think they promote 
Beeghly’s analysis.  If the previous chapters have shown anything, it is that we 
should assume very little about race, since our intuitions are often misguided and 
counterproductive.  While it might very well turn out to be the case that racial 
stereotyping is usually (either directly or indirectly) harmful, Beeghly’s thesis 
serves as further testament to the need to critically approach all aspects of race, 
even (perhaps especially) those that are most culturally entrenched.     
Returning to the original point, since PCR is designed to meet practical 
concerns, it is important to build implicit racial bias into its foundation.29  In sum, 
then, the foundational aspects of PCR—what I have been calling its “framework,” 
“structure,” and “skeleton”—are the innate psychological human tendencies to 
racially categorize ourselves and others, to imbue those categorizations with a 
presumed essence, and, for reasons that do not necessarily invoke nativism, to 
evaluate races and raced individuals via implicit biases.  These ingredients, one 
could say, are cooked into the broth of racial cognition. 
                                                          
29 One could object that not everyone who recognizes race or competently uses “race” 
will essentialize and/or exhibit bias toward those groups, but this anecdotal claim misses the 
point.  The important point is that those sorts of conceptions are widespread and powerful enough 
that they explain a great deal that foments racial problems. 
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But this is only half the story.  PCR does not stop at the attempt to place 
all the innate aspects of racial cognition under one heading.  The point of PCR is 
to tell a fuller story about race by accommodating interaction between social 
constructionist and psychological approaches to race (in order, of course, that we 
might make headway in social and political issues).  While many questions 
remain for PCR at its innate psychological foundation—which, if any, of the 
evolutionary stories give the best account of racial cognition, for example—
accounting for the social contribution is, if anything, more difficult.  Much of what I 
have to say about social contributions, then, is more speculative.  What seems 
like a bug, however, is really a feature.  Mallon’s quote above helps explain why.  
Again, he says that we should shift our focus from defending accounts of what 
racial concepts mean to accounts of the “kinds of conceptual apparatus...we 
need to discuss racial classification and racially associated phenomena in 
historical and contemporary life” so that we can distinguish “as many accounts of 
race or racial phenomena as are needed to serve all our functional needs” 
(Mallon, 2004, p. 668).  The ways in which we need to discuss racial 
phenomena, such as “racial identification, experience, appearance...so that their 
practical, social, and ethical significance can be discussed” will be highly context-
dependent (Mallon, 2004, p. 668).  Again, this thought is one I have promoted 
since the opening chapter’s discussion of Gannett (2010), who complained that 
when focus centers on natural kinds, “the practical context in which the question 
initially arose...falls away,” and who, therefore, argues that we should instead 
focus on “the very context-dependent ways in which biological and social factors 
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interact” (p. 375).  So, the social considerations will depend largely on context, 
though we may find some relatively universal social results, such as the fact that 
White power structures tend to weigh disproportionately in outcomes for both 
Whites and non-Whites. 
A descriptive example of this process comes from Pieter Adriaens and 
Andreas De Block, who account for “male homosexuality as an evolutionary 
social construction” in order to aid progress “beyond the traditionally polarized 
debate between evolutionary psychologists and social constructionist” (Adriaens 
& De Block, 2006, p. 570).  The relevant part of Adriaens and De Block’s 
argument, which owes a debt to Wilson, is that “some sociohistorical conditions 
around 1700 may have quickened the transition from a mainly occasional kind of 
same-sex contact to…[an] exclusive kind we now call ‘homosexuality” (Adriaens 
& De Block, 2006, p. 583).  For example, they provide evidence of a “sudden 
occurrence of homophobia around 1700,” which may have been “an instrument 
used by marginalized individuals to (re)gain (more) power” (Adriaens & De Block, 
2006, p. 582).  As a result, one discovers a social “feedback loop” in which 
homosexuality and homophobia ironically feed one another.30  Just as with 
Chomsky’s explanation of language, neither the details nor even the accuracy of 
Adriaens and De Block’s view is at issue.  The point of the example is to show 
only that beginning with an evolutionary-cognitive framework, Adriaens and De 
Block offer a reasonable and fresh view of how social and native factors interact 
                                                          
30 Here, Adriaens and De Block acknowledge a debt to Ian Hacking, who discusses 




in a way that help us make sense of one important phenomenon surrounding the 
category ‘male homosexual’.  Machery and Luc Faucher (2005) make a run at 
race that is similar to Adriaens and De Block’s on male homosexuality (as well as 
the one I am currently describing).  In an effort to “overcome the prevalent 
theoretical tribalism and inspire integrative theories of racialism,” Machery and 
Faucher propose several “requisites for future theories of racialism,” many of 
which could be relevant to the future development of PCR.  For example, while 
underscoring the universal aspects of racialization, they acknowledge that racial 
categorization varies across cultures and argue that a “theory of racialism has to 
accommodate this diversity” (Machery & Faucher, 2005, p. 1030).   
So, PCR is designed to compensate for the explanatory gaps in social 
constructivist accounts, but not to replace it; rather, it complements the received 
view by filling those gaps and merging the explanations that social constructivism 
is well-equipped to supply.  That alone does not distinguish PCR from similar 
projects, however.  Wilson’s evolutionary social construction and Mallon and 
Kelly’s hybrid constructions are designed to do same, so I use the next two 
sections to distinguish my project from theirs. 
 
6.3.4 PCR Versus Evolutionary Social Construction 
Since I have referenced both Adriaens and De Block’s and Wilson’s own  
use of the phrase, I should say a bit about “evolutionary social construction,” a 
title Wilson coined in the 2005 paper cited above.  Wilson (2005), of course, 
argues that social construction can be given an evolutionary framework, using 
the aforementioned phrase to describe the strategy.  Needless to say my 
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position, PCR, does something very similar, so similar, in fact, that I would not be 
distressed by someone who wanted to collapse PCR into evolutionary social 
construction.  Even so, I want to argue that there is at least one reason, one with 
philosophical and practical consequences, to stick with my phrase.  Although I 
am quite sympathetic to the evolutionary aspect of the project, I think that the 
cognitive aspect is, at least for now, more significant.  To show this, I appeal to 
the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes, the difference being, of 
course, that proximate causes involve behaviors that are triggered by immediate 
stimuli, while ultimate causes involve explanations of a given behavior in terms of 
its evolutionary functional history.  The distinction can be made clear with an 
example.   
I recently adopted a dog31 from the Humane Society, which received and 
cared for him after he was hit by a car when he was approximately 1 year old.  
Hunter is likely equal parts American Bulldog and American Staffordshire Terrier 
(or “pitbull”), and though he is in no way “aggressive,” he is quite playful, often 
too playful.  He has, in fact, sometimes instigated very minor and bloodless 
quarrels with other dogs, even though it is clearly a desire for play that motivates 
him.  Those episodes have amounted to very little, but suppose he really were ill-
tempered and violent.  Out of concern for his and other’s welfare, I might wonder 
why.  Suppose the Humane Society workers told me that Hunter had been 
rescued from dog-fight breeders.  They might say, he is ill-tempered and 
belligerent around other dogs because his trainers induced him to fight other 
                                                          




dogs, and now when he sees them, he acts on the impulse generated by that 
training.  This would be the proximate cause of my dog’s behavior.  But suppose 
I respond that I’ve seen dogs engage in similar behaviors—say, using their front 
limbs and paws to control the head movements of another dog—and they 
couldn’t all be former fighters.  The workers might then respond that most or all 
dogs have a defense or fighting technique that comes out in play or battle, but 
that the universal behavior is best explained by evolution.  The ancestors of 
modern dogs who developed effective fighting techniques survived and 
reproduced at a high rate, so now modern dogs sometimes exhibit those survival 
behaviors.  In fact, those are the very behaviors that trainers manipulate to make 
fighting dogs.  This is the ultimate cause of the behavior. 
By analogy, I might conceptually divorce proximate cognitive 
psychological causes of racialism from its ultimate evolutionary causes, and 
there might be advantages to doing so.  The primary motivation for doing so 
would be that we might discover racializing behaviors in humans via tests such 
as the IAT, but remain completely in the dark about its evolutionary explanation.  
Given the urgency of racial issues, we might want to proceed with relatively 
independent investigations of the proximate and ultimate causes of the racializing 
behavior.  This could confer both scholarly and practical benefits. In terms of 
scholarship, the partial division of labor between cognitive and evolutionary 
approaches allows the former to advance without being held up by the latter.  In 
short, we don’t want to hold up our investigation of the proximate aspects of 
racial cognition while we wait on the ultimate explanation.  The following 
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anecdote shows that practical implications, however, the ones that apply outside 
of the academy, are likely more important.   
I was born in Alabama, and, although I am no longer a Southern Baptist, I 
was brought up in a rather large all-White32 Southern Baptist church in a rather 
small Alabama town.  While many of the members of the church were “good 
folks,” they did not generally hold what are considered progressive racial views.  I 
would like nothing more than to affect change in the American South with regard 
to its racial attitudes, but notice that as an adherent of the evolutionary-cognitive 
program, I face not one but two major challenges—resistance to racial 
sensitivities, of course, but also resistance to evolutionary theory.  If I want to 
make a difference in the south, I have to be able to talk to Baptists, so I cannot 
afford to make racial progress dependent on evolution.  Wilson, in contrast, can, 
because he uses the term to support a thesis concerning literature and narrative, 
subjects whose finer points are largely confined to the academy.  So, PCR 
maintains that we have certain universal racial beliefs and only secondarily 
inquires into their evolutionary roots.  The phrase “evolutionary social 
construction” leads with a word that shuts some of those folks down.  Again, I am 
entirely dedicated to understanding the evolutionary roots of racial cognition, and 
I fully understand that evolution theory is the only way to explain some aspects of 
racial cognition, so I am happy to eventually have PCR subsumed under Wilson’s 
                                                          
32 People are often shocked to learn of the extent of segregation in my childhood, which 
spanned the late 1970s and early 1980s.  My first grade school was segregated, for example, 
save for one Black student, whose surname was “White.”  The irony is somewhat amusing, but 
the fact that it alludes to—continued de facto segregation—is not.  This anecdote serves as a 
reminder that while we need to move beyond the strategies of the 1960s civil rights movement, 
the movement’s causes are still quite real. 
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favored research program.  The evolutionary aspects, however, are likely not the 
most important ones for immediate social progress.  Evolution should continue to 
inform our racial investigations, but it should not in the process hinder our racial 
progress.   
Since I have relied on Mallon so extensively throughout the dissertation, a 
likely more important distinction is between PCR and Mallon and Kelly’s hybrid 
constructivism, a topic to which I now turn. 
 
6.3.5 Distinguishing PCR From Hybrid Constructionism 
Mallon and Kelly set out to solve what they call social science’s “race 
puzzle,” which centers on the question, “If there is no biological basis for race...in 
virtue of what are racial categories a successful basis of informative, important 
social scientific generalizations?” (Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 507).  The “standard 
answer”—that races “are social roles of some sort”—is not dismissed; in fact, 
Mallon and Kelly begin with the standard answer, which they take to be “basically 
correct,” and then “suggest some ways in which such a solution might be 
extended and improved” (Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 508).  The key to that move, 
and, ipso facto, hybrid constructionism (or HC), is “understanding the way racial 
social roles are psychologically constrained” (Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 508).33  
The constraints of psychology on race are not trivial; in fact, to “say that a social 
role is psychologically constrained...is to claim that social roles are strongly 
                                                          
33 This move is analogous to one Wilson (2005) makes, in which he contrasts social 
constructivism that is ”largely [but not entirely] unconstrained by human biology” and what he 
calls “anything goes” constructivism, and argues that the former is adaptable to the evolutionary 
approach (p. 21).   
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influenced, in some way or another, by the specific character of the psychological 
mechanism in play” (Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 523).  The constraining 
mechanisms are, of course, the two familiar opaque psychological aspects of 
racial representations: the innate, domain-specific, species-typical mental module 
implicated in racialist classification and the aspects of racism that involve implicit 
and automatic evaluation (Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 508).  So, just as it reflects 
important aspects of Wilson’s evolutionary social constructionism, PCR reflects 
important aspects of hybrid constructionism, and, again, might ultimately be 
subsumed by it.  As it stands, however, by conferring upon innate psychology 
and implicit bias roles foundational to the construction of race, PCR rests on a 
more specific commitment than HC.  This claim can be secured by underscoring 
some ambiguity left in Mallon and Kelly’s psychological “constraint 
requirement.”34   
I should first say that to call the constraint requirement ambiguous is not to 
criticize it.  In fact, Mallon and Kelly appear to be intentionally ambiguous, 
committing only to the claim that social roles are constrained (or “strongly 
influenced”) “in some way or another” by psychological mechanisms (Mallon & 
Kelly, 2012, p. 523).  In short, they intentionally leave the door open to more 
specific proposals; they do not, however, take the door completely off the hinges.  
In other words, Mallon and Kelly do supply constraints on the constraint 
requirement.  First, they suggest that psychological mechanisms “support and 
shape racial social roles” (Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 508, emphasis added).  
                                                          
34 The choice of phrase is mine, not Mallon and Kelly’s, but it should be uncontroversial 
and is used only for brevity. 
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Second, unlike traditional social constructivist accounts, HC pairs “social 
constructionism about racial difference with a partially nonconstructionist account 
of racial representation” (Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 523, emphasis added).  By 
doing so, Mallon and Kelly can explain “the stability and distinctiveness of racial 
social roles” and “the evaluations associated with and the causal effects of those 
social roles,” and, thereby, make the case that the “standard answer is best 
understood as psychologically constrained in a number of ways” (Mallon & Kelly, 
2012, p. 523).   
Even with these specifications, however, I think that Mallon and Kelly’s 
constraint requirement can be interpreted in at least two ways and that it is not 
entirely clear which, if either, they intend or prefer.  In my view, the ambiguity 
rests on which (if either) aspect of the hybrid construction is primary or “given,” 
that is, we can reasonably ask whether the social or psychological aspect is 
foundational.  A brief explanation invoking a pair of simple examples should clear 
up what I mean.   
First, one could take the social facts—the “cultural understandings, social 
conventions, institutions, and common practices”—as primary and argue that the 
psychological mechanisms mold the social given.  Here, one might initially 
imagine a block of marble (the given) chipped into shape by a sculptor.  But, a 
better image is an above-ground swimming pool, which has walls that shape the 
water, constraining it in the sense that it can move all about but not over the wall.  
Either way, the point is that the psychological sets limits that the social 
phenomena bump into.  Call this interpretation “constraint-ism.”  
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Alternatively, one could take the psychological mechanisms as primary 
and argue that the social aspects arise from the accumulation of their effects.35  
Here, one might imagine, instead of a pool, a large water slide—not just the slide 
itself, but the entire mechanism.  Metaphorically, the pumps “create” the water 
and the slide determines its trajectory.  Accordingly, the second interpretation 
suggests that the psychological mechanisms are foundational in that they both 
construct the foundational aspects of “social roles” and guide their course.  Call 
this option, “accretive constructivism.”  I favor this latter interpretation and have 
designed PCR to reflect that preference.   
In fact, I think that parts of Mallon and Kelly’s discussion of the role of 
implicit bias in HC supports this interpretation.  In a key section of their 2012 
collaboration, they discuss one “prominent approach to understanding [persistent 
racial] disparities—one that emphasizes institutional racism” (Mallon & Kelly, 
2012, p. 517).  “Institutional approaches “focus primarily on unequal social level 
outcomes” and “typically favor a distinctive, anti-individualist kind of explanation” 
(Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 517).  Accordingly, racial inequalities “are best 
explained not by appeal to the characteristics of individual people...but mainly by 
appeal to the institutions, social structures and policies of the society...and the 
policies that govern [it]” (Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 517).  Since “racism...can exist 
and thrive even in the absence of racists,” the contribution of the psychology of 
                                                          
35 Of course, a third option is that neither is primary and that they operate in tandem, 
perhaps according to a sort of looping effect.  I resist that option here because it depends on 
greater understanding of each causal aspect of racial representations.  Even if this third option 
eventually wins the day, then, it will probably have benefitted from the relatively independent 
investigations of each of the options described above. 
184 
 
individuals is, according to institutional accounts, “of minor explanatory value, if 
of any at all” (Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 517).  Of course, Mallon and Kelly resist 
those claims, arguing that “approaches focusing on institutions need not be 
hostile to psychological research” (Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 518).  What is 
interesting in this context is how they defend that claim. 
Mallon and Kelly begin with Ian Hanley-Lopez’s “New Institutional” 
approach, which “expands the institutional approach so that it can take into 
account characteristics of individual actors” and “sets out to build a theory of 
racism that explains organizational activity that systematically harms minority 
groups even though the decision-making individuals lack any conscious 
discriminatory intent” (Haney-Lopez, 2000, as cited in Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 
520).  Of course, research on implicit racial bias provides an explanation for 
variance between explicit and implicit racial attitudes and so supplies a 
foundation for a view like Hanley-Lopez’s.  So, Mallon and Kelly accept some 
basic claims of the standard answer, but argue that it “leaves out an important 
piece of the puzzle: namely, the influence of specific features of individual 
psychologies on those classificatory dynamics, and the types of patterns those 
features can generate and sustain” (Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p .522).  Although one 
could object that the effects of the constraining psychological mechanisms are 
“too small to actually shape population level regularities,” they argue that even 
slight factors “will aggregate upward to affect the character of a population, 
especially when those factors are widespread” and that “collectively, the 
influence of implicit biases can scale up to shape the types of population 
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regularities that social sciences attempt to capture” (Mallon & Kelly, 2012, pp. 
523, 519, emphases added).  The highlighted phrases “aggregate upward” and 
“scale up to shape” suggest the accretive constructivist, rather than constraint-ist, 
interpretation, and, therefore, support PCR’s psychological “ground up” rendering 
of racial phenomena.  That interpretation is also supported by Hirschfeld’s 
influential conclusions about the formation of racial cognition. 
Recall that Hirschfeld claims that the racial beliefs and attitudes of children 
develop independently of their parents, teachers, and peers.  According to 
Hirschfeld (2008), “there is considerable evidence that even infants are capable 
of drawing distinctions between individuals that become basis of social category 
identity” (p. 38).  In fact, he says, “the young child may play a special role in 
sustaining racial thinking.  Rather than simply rehearsing adult racial beliefs, 
young children may be crucial to the way racial beliefs become a fixed part of 
adult cultural repertoire” (p. 42).  Again, among the most important factors that 
children appear to supply is an intuitive essentialism, which I have argued is 
among the most important elements of race according to PCR.  So, children don’t 
blindly or passively acquire racial traditions, they “come to racial thinking 
because thinking racially is subserved by a cognitive susceptibility that makes 
race the sort of idea that is readily learned and stabilized in the culture of their 
elders” (Hirschfeld, 2008, p. 47). Quintana and McKown offer perhaps the best 
summary of the role of children in sustaining these phenomena, arguing that 
“between birth and adulthood, children become racialized beings…all of whom 
are to some degree beholden to the psychology of intergroup cognitions and 
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relations.  We rapidly and automatically categorize and judge others on the basis 
of their group membership” (Quintana & McKown, 2008, p. 6).  So, aspects of 
both the Mallon/Kelly and, especially, the Hirschfeld/Quintana/McKown lines 
appear to support a ground-up, accretive interpretation of the proposed 
psychological constraints of HC, according to which the psychological 
mechanism implicated in racial cognition provide a foundation out which social 
constructions of race are formed.  PCR proceeds on that interpretation. 
Furthermore, in my view, the psychological ground-up orientation of PCR 
likely means commitment to a softer antisemanticism than Mallon promotes.  
Mallon was originally motivated to attack the semantic strategy to ensure that 
metaphysical and semantic disputes would not forestall normative progress. In 
Chapter 2, I offered an example of a way in which such disputes can result in 
neglect of important normative problems.  My use of the arrow analogy suggests 
that definitions and ontological status are irrelevant to racial health disparities or 
unequal treatment in the criminal justice system—there is no use in suspending 
investigation of the Ferguson, Missouri Police Department’s racist actions until 
we resolve what we mean by “race” and whether that word names something 
real.   Even so, at some level of discourse, we will have to get straight on our 
terms. 
In fact, initially, Mallon’s own arguments against the semantic approach 
are a bit more tempered.  “The semantic strategy is problematic,” he says. “Race 
theory ought not to rely on finding the correct theory of reference to determine 
the appropriate use of ‘race’ talk” (Mallon, 2006, p. 528).  It is only later, when he 
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engages Glasgow, that his stance hardens, and he suggests excluding 
semanticism from the discussion altogether.  To see why I break from Mallon’s 
strong stance, consider also that his initial aim was to show that the semantic 
strategy does not do any work for THE normative question of whether to 
conserve or eliminate ‘race’ talk.  The capitalization, “THE,” is meant to suggest 
that the question whether or not to conserve is the primary, fundamental, guiding 
normative question in race theory.  Mallon thinks that THE normative question 
should be addressed with arguments that do not depend on quibbles over 
definitions and are not suspended while we argue about what counts as real so 
that we can determine if race is real.  To this point, I am on board with Mallon’s 
antisemanticism.   
But, to say that the conservationism-eliminativism question is THE 
normative question is not to say that it is the only normative question.  Once we 
decide whether to conserve (or eliminate) ‘race’ talk, we will be faced with more 
specific, context-dependent normative questions.  So, I suggest thinking of the 
normative racial realm as consisting of levels.  At the highest, most general level, 
the question is simply whether to conserve ‘race’ talk, and semantic approaches 
do not appear to do much work at that level.  At subordinate levels, however, I 
suggest that we will have to get clear on our terms (albeit, I think Mallon is 
correct that even those decisions should not be held up by descriptivist-versus-
causal-historical arguments over reference, for example).  Moreover, Mallon 
sometimes appears to think likewise. 
In their description of hybrid constructionism, for example, Mallon and 
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Kelly discuss a series of studies about causes of academic underachievement 
among African American students.  They report disagreement among the studies’ 
conclusions, but pointing out inconsistency is not their purpose.  Instead, they are 
making a point about the relative stability of racial conceptions, which flies in the 
face of social constructivist commitments to instability in classification and 
attitudes.  In so doing, they argue that “Unless we take the predicate ‘Black’ to 
have a common meaning purporting to pick out a single sort of person, it is 
unclear how a social role structured by such meaning could perform explanatory 
work stably across time and space” (Mallon & Kelly, 2012, p. 515, emphasis 
added).  So, clearly at some (subordinate) levels, meanings do matter even to 
Mallon and Kelly.  We will sometimes have to agree upon quite broad definitions, 
when, for example, we want to speak generally about decreasing oppression of 
non-Whites.  Other times, we will have to be more specific, such as when we 
note that African Americans appear to respond better to BiDil than other racial 
groups.  Finally, we will sometimes be forced to speak about race in surprisingly 
specific ways.  In a recent paper, for example, Sean A. Valles argues that our 
racial classification is often too coarse-grained to be effective in medical 
contexts.  He notes two examples: that the “Black immigrant population does not 
have the same hypertension risk as US-born African Americans.  Similarly, 
Finnish descendants have a far lower rate of cystic fibrosis than other 
Caucasians” (Valles, 2012, p. 3).  Often, these racial (sub)populations are simply 
ignored or, at best, clumsily placed in our broadest racial categories.  But 
recognizing subsets of these groups leads to practical payoffs.  It gives us a 
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better, more fine-grained understanding of the meaning of “race” relevant to the 
context, so Valles’ grain of analysis strategy allows for more efficient use of 
limited resources.  PCR, as I have described it, addresses our needs for context-
dependent semantic agreement, again by offering a psychological (rather than, 
say, a “Hardimonian semantic-conditional”) foundation that is adequately stable 
for broad aims, yet malleable enough to accommodate social vicissitudes that 
affect ‘race’ talk. 
So, the model described and defended here depends neither on a 
traditional analysis of the concept ‘race’ (at the general level) nor a settled-for-all 
time definition of the word “race”; rather, it offers a framework on which to build a 
range of definitions that are sensitive to the demands of a given context.  PCR 
maintains only that humans act on their conceptions of race—what they conceive 
race to be generally or in a given context.  What we want to know, in part, is what 
conceptions and attitudes about race lead individuals and groups to racialize the 
way that they do. It likely does not matter what, if anything, is common to all of 
those conceptions, and, in the main, PCR does not concern itself such questions.  
It does not ask, “How do we define ‘race’ generally?” It asks, “How and why are 
we using it in this context?  What are its material and social consequences?” and 
so on.  Ultimately, it is aimed at social progress, the topic of the next and final 
section.   
 
6.4 What Psychological Constructivism Does 
The primary aim of the dissertation has been to describe certain 
functional, flexible conception of race, and that project is, for present purposes, 
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complete.  The point of building and defending PCR, however, is to supply a 
framework for a large range of racial conceptions that can be used to do 
normative work.  That is, I have not aimed at something like a correct conceptual 
analysis of ‘race’, but rather at offering an analysis that can be used to approach 
the normative problems neglected by other accounts.  As Chapter 2’s discussion 
of medical contexts suggests, my investigation should be meaningful and 
pragmatically useful—like Wilson, I am specifically trying to avoid “an exercise in 
idle diplomacy” between social constructivists and ECP theorists by offering a 
“serious attempt to find the common ground” (Wilson, 2005, p. 15).  The ultimate 
goal of any study of race ought to involve real-world progress on social matters.  
To that end, the reintroduction of Gannett in this chapter has brought me full 
circle.   
I began with a desire to offer a medium for racial discourse “in the 
conservationist spirit” that allows us to address ignored and precluded questions, 
such as the ones Gannett describes, and also bring fresh hope to more 
traditionally recognized ones. So, I conclude the chapter by considering three 
brief (and unavoidably incomplete) suggestions for ways that PCR could promote 
our normative aims.  The first is the one familiar from the earlier discussion of 
Gannett, namely, biomedical contexts in which racial disparities are best 
explained by the interaction of social and biological factors.  The second involves 
what is, at the time of writing, the most salient and incendiary social issue 
regarding race, treatment of non-White minorities, especially African Americans, 
in the criminal justice system.  For the last, I suggest that PCR offers a way to 
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respond to scientific racism.   
Of course, many of the details of PCR must still be sorted out.  Among 
other things, we will need to investigate the processes by which social and innate 
psychological factors interact—by what process, for example, does a looping 
effect such as the one described by Adriaens and De Block proceed?  
Furthermore, as Machery and Faucher (among others) point out, PCR will benefit 
from greater cross-cultural study to determine to what extent its foundational 
facets can be described as genuinely universal.  Since the conceptual apparatus 
remains incomplete, so does the normative investigation.  Even so, I think I can 
use PCR to initiate some normative progress and offer the promise of more, so I 
now turn—admittedly cautiously—to the three normative areas of concern.   
 
6.4.1 PCR and Biomedical Contexts 
Although Gannett introduces it as a philosophical-conceptual problem, the 
dichotomization of race into exclusively biological or exclusively social 
explanations is a problem of significant practical import.  Thus, Gannett’s ultimate 
focus is a normative one—the preclusion of a range of questions about race that 
involve biological and social interaction.   
The chief philosophical obstacle to addressing interactionist contexts 
appears to be the absence of a reasonable interactionist model.  Recall, for 
example, that Gannett is dubious even of Kitcher’s exclusively biological 
interactionist position, calling it “curiously gerrymandered.”  More to the point, 
Hardimon’s tone borders on mockery when refers to the “erroneous belief that 
there is an amorphous thing race that is (somehow!) both social and biological” 
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(Hardimon, 2013, p. 6).  I have allowed that Hardimon is right that no “thing” (by 
which he appears to mean something like a natural kind) is both social and 
biological, but Hardimon mislocates the interactionist foundation, just as he did 
the essentialist element of racialism, by reading it into the racialized object.   
According to PCR, the seat of interaction is in the cognizing subject, not 
the object so cognized, so here is where it is useful to switch PCR’s metaphorical 
description from “framework” to “nexus.”  My claim is that the opaque 
psychological mechanisms that give rise to racial phenomena provide a nexus in 
which social and biological beliefs are combined in a common conception of 
race.  This is not to say, however, that we simply have a false belief that should 
be eradicated, despite the resistance to interactionist models in this context.  
Instead, PCR accommodates such interaction.    
Recall that Gannett says that, generally, sociocultural factors impact the 
distribution of genetic variants (and, hence biology) and that that race is “socially 
constructed by enlisting biologic differences and investing these with socio-
cultural meaning,” but this falls short as an account of the recalcitrance and 
power of the socializing of the biological.  One might expect that if social 
constructivism accounted for the recruitment of biological truths to conceptions of 
race, we would be rid of the false biological pretenses of folk conceptions of race.  
Social constructivists, after all, generally hold that biology is irrelevant to race.   If, 
in contrast, race is regarded as psychologically constructed, one can make better 
sense of the extent to which race is biologized by the folk.  
According to PCR, race is imbued with biological essentialism, likely as a 
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result of racial cognition’s dependence on innate biological cognition.   Since, as 
Gil-White (1999) argues, humans process “ethnic groups (and a few related other 
social categories) as if they were ‘species’” (p. 515), we should expect races to 
be conceived as real, complex biosocial classes.  So conceived, we should then 
expect races to, in some manner, become real (or “real-like”)—through selective 
intraracial breeding, for example, that could help account for some biological and 
medical commonalities among people of a shared race.  This could be important 
for several reasons, one of which is the prospect of a better account the 
reification of racial categories.  Furthermore, as indicated above, particular PCRs 
are informed by social, historical, and political factors in the ways championed by 
social constructivists.  As a result, conceiving of race as psychologically 
constructed means allowing for interaction of biological and social factors.  The 
case of BiDil, the heart medication targeted for African Americans, illustrates the 
point. 
Shortly after the FDA approved BiDil, controversy ensued.  Some saw the 
new drug as a positive sign both for African Americans and for racial equality 
more generally.  Others took it as yet another way to advance positions of 
scientific racism.  For example, Gannett (2010) notes that New York Times 
science reporter Nicholas Wade asked, “Is there a biological basis for race? If 
there is not, as many social scientists and other argue, how can a drug like BiDil 
work so well in one race?” (p. 364).  Gannett (2010) weighs in, pointing out once 
again that “this focus on the question of the biological reality vs. social 
construction of race leaves many other more interesting and socially and 
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politically important questions unasked” (p. 364). So, how does PCR apply to the 
case? 
The quote above suggests that Wade does not recognize the difficulty and 
nuance of the issue—he seeks a simple conclusion in a biological world that, as 
philosophers of biology such as Sandra Mitchell and Helen Longino suggest, is 
maddening complex and often demands proportionally complex explanations 
(Longino, 2013; Mitchell, 2003, 2009).   
Congestive heart failure can occur as the result of many factors, some 
biological (such as a genetic propensity for hypertension) and some social (such 
as diets that increase risk of hypertension).  Apparently assuming a sort of 
biological realism, Wade’s thinking mires him on one side of the issue.  Wade 
digs in on the biological side, which gives him the illusion of a simple answer: 
BiDil works because race is biological.  But even allowing that biology has some 
role in race, statistical biological traits encompass only a fraction of racial traits 
shared by African Americans, who also are more likely than other racialized 
groups of Americans to be poor and, hence, have the sorts of diets that promote 
heart disease.  BiDil appears to be a treatment not for a biological condition, but 
a multidimensional medical condition in which biological and social factors 
interact. Wade’s confusion is understandable, if (as his language suggests) he 
adopts a biological realist position on race.  He should consider PCR instead. 
PCR alleviates the tension that Hardimon rightly points out, allowing 
specification of relevant boundaries without gerrymandering, and most 
importantly gives us a way to respond to people like Wade, who support similar 
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notions about race.  Since PCR holds that race is not a thing—at least not in the 
robust, intuitive sense—we are not tasked with discovering a “thing” that is, per 
impossible, both social and biological.  It is true that in many contexts we often 
treat race as a thing to be discovered and defined; however, its apparent reality 
in this respect is more likely the result of its reification based on human cognition 
and actions.  The only way to account for the complexity of race—its odd 
combination of the biological and social—is along psychological constructivist 
lines. PCR, then, allows us to make sense of human race in crucial interactionist 
contexts without sacrificing the biological influence on race and without reducing 
race to biology. 
 In sum, if we choose to conceive of race as psychologically constructed, 
we can offer a more robust way of analyzing the interaction of biological and 
social factors in specific contexts, which is to say PCR in no way precludes the 
asking of the crucial questions Gannett brings to light.  Having said this, however, 
I do not mean to limit the interactionist element to the field of biomedicine.  In my 
view, biological-social interactionist conceptions of race inform many contexts.  
PCR has implications beyond medicine, so I turn now to the topical issue of race 
in criminal justice contexts, including police interaction. 
 
6.4.2 PCR and the U.S. Criminal Justice System 
As I showed in Chapters 4 and 5, opaque psychology better explains than 
explicit attitudes the persistent unequal treatment of non-Whites in a host of 
contexts.  Among the most important factors is that humans naturally sort 
themselves into groups on the basis of not only shared traits, but also a deeper 
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shared essence underlying those traits.  So, although it may not be obvious that 
an interactionist conception is relevant to criminal justice contexts, if one 
recognizes the biological essentialist element of racial cognition, the claim 
becomes clear.  Recall also that we do not apply a merely generic essence to 
human groups; rather, as the implicit attitude literature suggests, we, again, 
naturally and unconsciously, imbue racial essence with particular traits, some of 
which are negative and oppressive.  As a result, persons can be and often 
genuinely are explicitly nonracist and still harbor undetected implicit racial bias.  
So, since opaque psychology is foundational for PCR, I think it sheds light on 
persistent problems for racial minorities in legal contexts.   
One striking factor in these incidents is the tendency for the police officers 
involved to claim no racial bias (Kelly et al., 2010; Staats, 2013).  Of course, 
consciously suppressed explicit bias remains a problem in the U.S.—see my 
citation of the U.S. Justice Department’s conclusions on the Ferguson Police 
Department in the previous chapter, for example.36 There is little doubt, however, 
that at least some, if not most, of the officers involved in racialized incidents 
sincerely identify as nonracist.  That is, of course, a good thing, but it also helps 
explain some of the inflammatory defensiveness of (especially White) officers 
                                                          
36 Also, I might relate—anecdotally—that while serving the U.S. Army I met many fellow 
soldiers who intended to transition from the military to positions as police and corrections officers.  
Many were well-intentioned—if one believes in the positive values of military service, those 
values are easily realized in police work as well.  However, not all or even most but a significant 
number voluntarily reported other motives.  One told me—no kidding—that he wanted to become 
a corrections officer because you get to “beat the shit out of niggers and spics,” and, while not 
referencing his postmilitary career directly, another who aimed at a career in law enforcement had 
the habit of describing racial minorities, especially Blacks, as “just animals anyway.”  This is not 
intended as an indictment of all police and corrections officers, of course, but as a reminder that 
explicit racism is still rampant both institutionally (again, see the Ferguson case) and individually.  
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when accused of racist motivations.  Police officers are required to take an oath 
that binds them to serve “without favor or affection, malice or ill-will” 
(connect.lawofficer.com).  So officers might reason that by virtue of willingness to 
take an oath of impartiality, they take an oath to be nonracist.   
Data show, however, that racial minorities are treated unequally by police 
in a variety of ways.  Even in San Francisco, often considered among the most 
progressive cities in the United States, “Black adults...are much more likely to be 
arrested” (sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com).  In addition, of “79 people in South 
Carolina who were fatally shot by police, 43%...were African American,” even 
though African Americans comprise only 29% of the state’s population,” and 
despite accounting for only 13% of the U.S. population, nationally, African 
Americans were subject to 30% of police killings between April 2013 and March 
2015 (Fischer-Baum & Bialik, 2015).  African Americans also “fare worse in 
court” in a number of ways—they receive (on average) 25% higher bail fees, 12-
year longer sentences, and higher rates of capital punishment (Rachlinski et al., 
2009, p. 1195).  
 I concede that these data do not preclude social constructivist 
explanations.  One could develop a story according to which contingent historical 
and cultural events along with intentional human decisions account of a long 
legacy of racist police and judicial mistreatment.  But is that the best explanation? 
Consider the increasing social pressure against inegalitarian treatment.  
Can a judge or police officer risk social backlash that could affect both their 
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professional and personal lives?37  Intuitively, a better explanation is that, in 
many of these cases, implicit bias against essentialized racial groups plays a 
role.  Moreover, the empirical data on implicit bias back that intuition.  Recall that 
the Kirwan report shows that implicit bias is manifest in many ways in the criminal 
justice system, from the initial interaction with police—in which a suspect may be 
subject to weapons bias effect—to charge and trial to sentencing and appeal 
(Staats, 2013, p. 36).  Moreover, recall that these independent influences can 
accumulate, causing an amplifier effect (Staats, 2013, p. 36). In short, 
essentialist thinking and implicit bias are relevantly associated with the 
phenomena and mesh with the intuition that most police and judges work to 
suppress bias when they discover it in themselves.  As a result, “mere” social 
constructivist explanations appear inadequate to fully explain the phenomena.    
Give that, understanding race as PCR is advantageous in at least two 
ways.  First, it better explains the persistence of unjust treatment of minorities in 
the justice system, given the apparent fact of social pressure against racism.  
Assuming that a majority of police officers and judges feel a duty toward 
egalitarian treatment, PCR explains why explicit attitudes and actions frequently 
diverge.  Second, it helps societies better address the social ills tied to unequal 
police treatment.  If implicit bias is active in these contexts, then instead of 
continuing to prescribe social nostrums, interventions and remedies can be 
designed to address race and racial attitudes that are psychologically 
                                                          
37 One could object that police officers are often exonerated in these cases, but there is 




constructed.  So, at the risk of repetition, it bears mentioning that given the level 
and persistence of unequal treatment of minorities in the U.S. justice system, 
social constructivist explanations no longer appear utile.  We need a new way of 
attacking these problems.  PCR not only supplies one, but, as I have repeatedly 
argued, supplies one on the basis of the best available evidence on racial 
cognition. 
 
6.4.3 PCR and Scientific Racism 
Although I have concentrated on some of her other arguments, Gannett 
(2010) also takes up the issue of scientific racism and its standing in race 
scholarship. Gannett (2010) reports that “the biological reality of race is a hot 
topic these days, for scientists and nonscientists, philosophers and 
nonphilosophers alike” (p. 381).  Recall that Andreasen, Kitcher, and Pigliucci 
and Kaplan all attempt to rehabilitate or reinvent biological race along 
nonracialist, nonracist lines.  I have also related that Collins, the former director 
of the Human Genome Project, concedes that “it is not strictly true that race or 
ethnicity has no biological connection” (Collins, 2004, p. S13).   
This news should not be assumed bad, however.  Inasmuch as biology 
can inform the study of race, it should bring benefits, especially to biomedicine, 
so long as we keep in mind Gannett’s claim that the connections between race 
and biology will remain “statistical not universal, interest-relative not mind 
independent, dynamic not static, [and] indeterminate not determinate” (Gannett, 
2010, p. 383).  Alarmingly, these points do not seem to be ones to which all 
biologically-minded race theorists ascribe. Not everyone forming connections 
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between biology and race, that is, does so in such meliorative terms.   
For example, Gannett (2010) reports that in Race: The Reality of Human 
Difference, Vincent Sarich and Frank Miele opine that “significant cognitive 
differences arising during the past 10,000 years among geographically human 
groups as cultures...makes it inevitable that racial groups will be 
disproportionately represented at the extremes of values for traits like being a 
criminal or having high-paying jobs” (pp. 381-2).  The most well-known version of 
this line of argument comes from Richard Jensen, who pioneered modern 
scientific racism via his race-IQ studies, which in turn influenced the reasoning in 
the publicly recognized book The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles 
Murray. 
In crude terms, Jensen’s main argument goes like this.  Intelligence, as 
measured by IQ tests, has a heritability of approximately 80% in White 
populations.  Furthermore, the average IQ score of Blacks is 15 points lower than 
the average IQ score of Whites.  Since, IQ is highly heritable (at least in Whites), 
it is very probable that the IQ difference is largely due to genetic factors.  From 
this argument, Jensen drew several conclusions with social implications.  Among 
the most salient is that 
Compensatory education has been tried and apparently 
failed….Why has there been such uniform failure in compensatory 
education programs wherever they have been tried?  What has 
gone wrong?  In other fields, when bridges do not stand, when 
aircraft do not fly, when machine do not work, when treatments do 
not cure, despite all conscientious efforts on the part of many 
persons to make them do so, one begins to question the basic 
assumptions, principle, theories, and hypotheses that guide one’s 




More recent works by Wade and Sesardic make similar claims.  As James 
Tabery says, Sesardic’s Making Sense of Heritability offers an “acrid, bitterly 
antagonistic contribution to the nature-nurture debate” (Tabery, 2009, n.p.); most 
of Sesardic’s acerbity is aimed at philosophers of science he opposes, most of 
his worrisome conclusions at Black folks.  
Tabery notes that Sesardic commits himself to several controversial 
conclusions.  He argues, for example, that given evidence of genetically caused 
differential IQ scores between Whites and Blacks, egalitarianism can survive only 
with modification (Tabery, 2009).  But Sesardic does not stop at the conclusion 
that Blacks are inherently less intelligent than Whites; he argues that the average 
IQ of Blacks is likely overestimated.  He argues, for example, that based on 
Bayesian analysis, if an American Black person and an American White person 
each score 100 on an IQ test, “then if we know nothing else about these two 
persons and if we want to get the best estimate of their true IQs on the basis of 
their measured scores, we should ascribe a lower IQ to the Black person than to 
the White person” (Sesardic, 2010, p. 225).  This is simply a matter, he says, of 
regression to the mean, which “tells us if there are two different populations with 
different trait means and if the trait is normally distributed in both populations, 
then in any unbiased study that is not 100 percent reliable, measured individual 
scores should always be” corrected toward the mean. So, since IQ testing is not 
“100 percent reliable,” and since the average White IQ score is 100, while Black 
average is 85, we correct by assuming that the Black subject who scores 100 
actually has an IQ closer to the mean.  In short, since “the Black mean is lower 
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than the White mean, Black true scores will have a ‘downward pull’ compared to 
White true scores” (Sesardic, 2010, p. 225).  According to Sesardic (2010), then, 
it’s not just that Blacks are inherently less intelligent than members of other 
races.  Their intellectual shortcomings exert dumbing gravitational power. 
 While Sesardic never explicitly claims that race is a natural kind, as 
Andreasen and Kitcher, Pigliucci and Kaplan do, many of his conclusions rest on 
a de facto commitment to a natural kind view of race.  PCR, I argue, places a 
new and formidable obstacle in path of scientific racists.  
To show this, let me begin with a roughly Kantian analogy.  Hilary Putnam 
(1992) says that “Kant was the first really to see that describing the world is not 
simply to copy it.  Kant saw that whenever human beings describe anything in 
the world, our description is shaped by our conceptual choices” (p. 28).  Similarly, 
Mitchell (2003) says that since “Kant, most philosophers accept that every 
representation will be shaped, in part, by the concepts that humans bring to the 
task of describing the world” (p. 182).  Even part of Gannett’s quote from the 
previous page gets at this point.  When we divide the world’s population into 
races, we should consider those “cuts in nature to be interest-relative not mind-
independent” (Gannett, 2010, p. 383, emphasis added).  This point is one that 
scientific racists apparently ignore.  That is, they treat race as though it were just 
copied from the world and neglect the innate conceptual, schematic, and 
classificatory contributions of human minds.  
Of course, in light of evidence from ECP, this simply won’t do—we can’t 
hope to understand race, unless allowance is given to the mind’s interaction with 
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what is presented to it.  In Kantian terms, it’s as though—and I do not mean this 
literally, of course—scientific racists believe that they have access to the realm of 
racial noumena, forgetting that they experience only phenomena and, in so 
doing, they forget that minds interact with experience to form the classifications 
that guide inference.  This way of framing the problem may seem pedantic or 
unnecessarily technical, so let me offer an example that helps secure the point. 
The problem for Jensen and like-minded scholars, of course, is that “all 
conscientious efforts” have not been exhausted.  PCR, in fact, suggests that 
Jensen suffered from far too narrow conception of all that counts as 
“environmental.”  Most notably, through no fault of his own,38 he was not able to 
consider the impact of implicit bias on educational achievement, which the 
Kirwan study suggests is every bit as important to education as to law 
enforcement and to medicine.  Again, “Implicit bias can permeate educational 
settings in several forms, all of which can yield disadvantageous consequences 
for students of color.  Teacher expectations of student achievement, teacher 
perceptions of student behavior, and students’ self-perceptions” are three of the 
most important factors (Staats, 2013, p. 30).  This is not a problem for Jensen 
alone; it is shared by all of the scientific racists mentioned above.  Each gives too 
much weight to genetic factors, and each appears to completely ignore the 
effects of implicit racial bias in reaching their very strong conclusions.39  By 
beginning with innate psychology, PCR not only avoids that problem, but 
                                                          
38 Jensen’s 1969 paper was published well in advance of implicit bias research on race. 
39 This is especially embarrassing for Wade and Sesardic, each of whom writes well after 
the advent of implicit bias research. 
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provides an additional problem for scientific racists.  If they want to explain away 
environmental factors in race-relevant issues such as educational achievement 
and criminality,40 they have to explain away the psychological construction of 
race, and this would be a formidable task.  And the deeper their commitments to 
biological race, the more their theories predict, the further are they removed from 
the critical insight that opaque psychology determines a lot of what constitutes 
our racial representations and attitudes.  
Moreover, introducing race as a psychological construct facilitates 
correction of the effects of implicit bias in the education context.  Interventions 
with educators could, for example, focus not only on socially constructed aspects 
of race, but also on the opaque psychological mechanisms that underpin them.  
As such, establishing PCR facilitates fresh approaches to long-standing 
problems that strictly social interventions have yet to solve. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
I have used this final substantive chapter to describe the psychological 
construction of race and its meliorative potential for a number of practical 
contexts.  Though it does support contextual definitions of race, PCR does not 
recapitulate the errors of the semantic strategy, and though it supports social 
construction, psychologically constructed race is not merely socially constructed 
                                                          
40 I should say I find the criminality point particularly objectionable, even before we 
consider implicit bias, because that argument depends on what we conceive of as criminal.  To 
non-Whites, I imagine that given the socio-political status of the world’s peoples, White actions 
must seem quite criminal.  It seems patent that Whites are historically responsible for the most 
intense and frequent acts of criminality, violence, and aggression.  Perhaps an interesting 
psychological study could focus on why White people appear to project these attributes onto 
other racialized groups.  Perhaps that is also a matter of innate psychology. 
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race.  In particular, PCR avoids the pitfalls of those traditional philosophical 
approaches by building insights of the evolutionary-cognitive program and implicit 
attitude research into its foundation.  PCR is not alone in this move, however. 
At least two other approaches—Wilson’s evolutionary social construction 
and Mallon and Kelly’s hybrid constructionism—proceed according to those 
projects as well.  Even so, I have shown that PCR, even if it resolves into one of 
those positions over the long-term, is distinguished from them in several crucial 
ways.  Finally, given the full description of PCR, I argued that it answers several 
unmet needs of three salient contexts that have important consequences for 













Holmes (2015) calls postracial America a “fantasy,” and nothing I’ve 
written here contradicts that claim.  In fact, if race is psychologically constructed, 
then it is the case not only that we are not yet postracial, but that postracialism is 
close to impossible.  That is not to say that human racial classifications and 
attitudes are static; they will change with social progress and scientific discovery.  
But, if races are PCRs, then some sort of racial classification is bound to persist 
until the human mind evolves away from the mechanisms that inform racial 
cognition.  A review of what I have written here shows why. 
Again, I used Gannett (2010) because the problem she highlights is not 
merely interesting, but also representative.  In other words, the dichotomization 
of race in biomedical contexts is not unlike its status in other contexts.  Virtually 
everywhere race is relevant, it is constructed from disparate, sometimes 
intuitively contradictory parts.  So, the point was not just to address her 
immediate concern, but also to describe a position versatile enough to inform 
racial discourse over a variety of contexts.  If opaque psychology is an ever-
present factor in racial cognition, then PCR is well-equipped to handle a host of 
racialized issues.  It functions better, I have argued, than its rivals in that 
capacity.  It is, unlike the semantic strategy, highly relevant to pressing normative 
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racial concerns.  Since PCR’s foundation is built of material supplied by the 
evolutionary-cognitive program and implicit bias research, it accommodates and 
explains facets of race that social constructivism cannot—it is not, for example, 
undermined by the ”five lines of argument” presented by Kelly et al. (2010) 
against the favored explanations of the received view, and it can naturally 
account for dissociation between explicit and implicit racial bias. 
Although it clearly belongs to the family of complementarian approaches 
champions by Wilson, Mallon, and Kelly, it can be distinguished from them in 
useful ways. I have described it as a specifically accretive, rather than a broadly 
constraint-ist type of constructivism.  That is to say, while it may be a species of 
hybrid (constraint-ist) constructivism, it is distinguished by the specific way in 
which in which the constraints it offers are understood.  PCR’s guiding 
commitment is that opaque psychological mechanisms are foundational to some 
social constructions, that is, that the individual psychology constructs, or plays a 
leading role, in the subsequent constructions.  So conceived, PCR offers a 
versatile approach to recalcitrant social problems surrounding race.  It facilitates 
effective racial discourse in a host of normatively problematic contexts, including 
health care, criminal justice, and education.  That’s good news, and given the 
prospect of goods news, I want to finish with a few positive reflections. 
It’s so easy to become cynical when considering race and the social 
issues that surround it.  In fact, it’s far too easy to become far too cynical.  But 
things likely have gotten and certainly can get better.  When I was a kid in 
Alabama, people would sometimes ask, “Are ya’ll racist,” meaning, “do you and 
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your family subscribe to racism?”  Among some of my peers, such a question 
would have been offensive, of course, but it was not considered so by the folks 
asking the question.  They would ask in the manner that they might ask whether 
we were Democrat or Republican, or whether we supported University of 
Alabama or Auburn University football.  Even given my strictly antiracist 
upbringing, the question did not seem unnatural.   
Today, I would respond to such a query with incredulity.  My mind would 
race—“What could someone intend with that sort of question?  I am bald; are 
they really asking if I am a White supremacist?”  The point is that it’s no longer 
okay, I assume even in Alabama, to ask whether someone or someone’s family 
is racist, especially in a manner as casual as one used to ask whether we eat at 
the table or in front of the television.  My students rarely recognize the word 
“miscegenation,” and when I explain antimiscegenation laws, they’re not 
offended, they’re incredulous.  It may not seem so at times in the United States, 
but in many ways, things are getting better. 
And that view doesn’t follow merely from my anecdotal experiences.  It 
wasn’t just President Obama’s election in 2008; several events coalesced to give 
the impression of a postracial United States.  As Holmes (2015) notes, “data from 
2008-9 showed that one in seven new marriages was between spouses of 
different racial or ethnic backgrounds” and an earlier New York Times report 
noted that “some people felt that ‘the blending of the races is a step toward 
transcending race, to a place where America is free of bigotry, prejudice and 
programs like affirmative action.”  And while many of the incendiary racial events 
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described earlier led to disillusionment, despair, and even some violent backlash, 
reaction to the Charleston shooting supplied hope and renewed concern.  Shortly 
after the tragic event, White Christian groups gathered outside of the Emanuel 
African Methodist Episcopal Church to pray for it and its victims.  Addressing the 
crowd, Reverend Brandon Bowers, a White man, said, “As a pastor in this city, a 
husband and a father to two boys and two girls, my heart broke in grief and 
disbelief….What the enemy intended for evil, God is using for good.  We are here 
to pray for the healing that needs to come” (Eligon & Fausset, 2015, n.p.).  
Meanwhile, inside, Reverend Norvel Goff Sr., a Black man, claimed that the 
united gathering of Black and White Charlestonians “sends a message to every 
demon in hell and on earth.  Some wanted to divide the race—Black and White 
and brown—but no weapon formed against us shall prosper” (Eligon & Fausset, 
2015, n.p.).  A sign outside read, “Holy City...Let Us Be the Example of Love That 
Conquers Evil” (Eligon & Fausset, 2015, n.p.).  The unified reactions to the 
tragedy placed renewed pressure on Southern states to take down vestigial 
symbols of the Confederacy. 
The seeds of racism are in us, cooked into our broth.  But so are the 
seeds of amelioration and union.  We must renew our efforts to fight racism, and 
those efforts require new tools.  But progress has been and can be made.  A 
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